Berrocal v. Fernandez

• Decision Date: 13 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 75549-3.,75549-3.
• Citation: 121 P.3d 82,155 Wn.2d 585
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Heriberto BERROCAL and Rafael Castillo, Respondents, v. Max FERNANDEZ and Ann Fernandez, a marital community, and Western Range Association, Petitioners.

Page 82

121 P.3d 82

155 Wn.2d 585

Heriberto BERROCAL and Rafael Castillo, Respondents, v. Max FERNANDEZ and Ann Fernandez, a marital community, and Western Range Association, Petitioners.

No. 75549-3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 12, 2005.

Decided October 13, 2005.

Paul Hamilton Beattie Jr., Ryan Mark Edgley, Edgley & Beattie PS, Yakima, for Petitioners.

Daniel Ford, Columbia Legal Services, Seattle, Lori Jordan Isley, Columbia Legal Services, Yakima, for Respondents.

Linda Ann Sellers, Yakima, for Amicus Curiae (S. Martinez Livestock, Inc.)

Douglas B.M. Ehlke, Ehlke Law Offices, Federal Way, for Amicus Curiae (Washington State Farm Bureau Federation).

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 The Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA), chapter 49.46 RCW, provides that a minimum hourly wage rate must be paid to employees in this state. The MWA excludes from the definition of "[e]mployee," and thereby exempts from the minimum wage requirements, "[a]ny individual whose duties require that he or she reside or sleep at the place of his or her employment or who otherwise spends a substantial portion of his or her work time subject to call, and not engaged in the performance of active duties." RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). Petitioners Western Range Association and Max and Ann Fernandez (collectively, the Employers) hired respondents Heriberto Berrocal and Rafael Castillo to work as sheepherders, a position requiring them to live and sleep on location. Claiming their pay was inadequate, Berrocal and Castillo ended their work as sheepherders in Washington State and instituted the present action. At issue is whether, as workers who were required to live at their place of employment, they were entitled to the protections of the MWA. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary dismissal of Berrocal's and Castillo's claims. Berrocal v. Fernandez, 120 Wash.App. 555, 85 P.3d 969 (2004). We now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the plain language of RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) categorically excludes from the MWA definition of "employee" those workers who are required to "reside or sleep" at their workplace.

FACTS

¶ 2 Berrocal and Castillo are Chilean nationals who traveled to the United States under the Department of Labor's H-2A temporary foreign worker program specifically to work as sheepherders. Both entered into labor contracts with the Employers requiring that they reside on the Fernandez ranch and be available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Under the terms of the contract, Berrocal and Castillo were paid $650 per month in addition to being provided with room, board, health insurance, and two weeks' paid vacation per year, but they were not entitled to regularly scheduled days off. A sheepherder's duties include, among other things, feeding the sheep, attending to sheep that are injured or sick, and guarding the sheep from predatory animals. Trained dogs were used to alert Berrocal and Castillo to the presence of predatory animals at all hours of the day and night, at which time they were required to check immediately on the status of the sheep. Additionally, during lambing season, they were required to check on the sheep every few hours during the day and night.

¶ 3 Berrocal worked for the Employers from February 1999 to June 2000, and Castillo worked for the Employers from March 2000 to June 2000. They allege that their various duties during those periods required work of 12 or more hours per day, but the Employers counter that Berrocal and Castillo actually worked fewer than 8 hours per day. Berrocal and Castillo have requested lost wages pursuant to RCW 49.46.020,¹ exemplary damages, and attorney fees. In response to Berrocal's and Castillo's MWA violation claims, the Employers counterclaimed, asserting that Berrocal and Castillo had breached their employment contract. Upon the Employers' motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Berrocal's and Castillo's claims, concluding that the "reside or sleep" exclusion in RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) prohibits recovery under the MWA. Division Three of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) is ambiguous and should be construed to exempt workers who live or sleep at the workplace from the MWA requirements "only for those hours during which they are not engaged in active duties." Berrocal, 120 Wash.App. at 563-64, 85 P.3d 969. We granted the Employers' petition for review.

ISSUE

¶ 4 Under RCW 49.46.010(5)(j), are sheepherders excluded from the protections of the MWA because they live and sleep at the place where they work?

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 Standard of Review. We review petitioners' motion for summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court and viewing the facts, as well as the reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light most favorable to respondents, the nonmoving parties. See Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary dismissal is granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). As with all questions of law, questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 139 Wash.2d 546, 552, 988 P.2d 961 (1999). Where statutory language is "`plain, free from ambiguity and devoid of uncertainty, there is no room for construction because the legislative intention derives solely from the language of the statute.'" Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 752, 888 P.2d 147 (1995) (quoting Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 844, 400 P.2d 72 (1965)). "In undertaking this plain language analysis, the court must remain careful to avoid `unlikely, absurd or strained' results." Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wash.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005) (quoting State v. Stannard, 109 Wash.2d 29, 36, 742 P.2d 1244 (1987)). "Only where the legislative intent is not clear from the words of a statute may the court `resort to extrinsic aids . . . .'" Burton, 153 Wash.2d at 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (quoting Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wash.2d 129, 134, 830 P.2d 350 (1992)).

¶ 6 Interpretation of RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). At issue is the meaning of the MWA exclusion in RCW 49.46.010(5)(j):

(5) "Employee" includes any individual employed by an employer but shall not include:

. . . .

(j) Any individual whose duties require that he or she reside or sleep at the place of his or her employment or who otherwise spends a substantial portion of his or her work time subject to call, and not engaged in the performance of active duties.

Berrocal and Castillo would have us construe subsection (5)(j) as a single exclusion with two conditions: "Any individual [(1)] whose duties require that he or she reside or sleep at the place of his or her employment or who otherwise spends a substantial portion of his or her work time subject to call, and [(2)] not engaged in the performance of active duties." RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). They would thus make no meaningful distinction between those workers who "reside or sleep" at their place of employment and those "who otherwise spend[ ] a substantial portion of [their] work time subject to call." In either event, they argue, a worker is excluded from the MWA definition of "employee" only during that time when the second condition is also satisfied (that is, when the worker is "not engaged in . . . active duties"). Because they assume that the "not engaged in . . . active duties" condition is always necessary for RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) to apply, Berrocal and Castillo maintain that the exclusion raises factual questions as to when and for how long they were "engaged in . . . active duties" and that these questions necessarily preclude the summary dismissal of their suit.

¶ 7 In contrast, the Employers read RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) to exclude two distinct categories of workers from the MWA definition of "employee." Under their proposed interpretation, the two categories are identified as "[a]ny individual [(1)] whose duties require that he or she reside or sleep at the place of his or her employment or [(2)] who otherwise spends a substantial portion of his or her work time subject to call, and not engaged in the performance of active duties." RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). The distinction, of course, is that the Employers' interpretation applies the final modifying phrase ("not engaged in the performance of active duties") only within the category of workers who are "otherwise . . . subject to call," while Berrocal and Castillo would apply the final phrase equally to both types of workers. We must determine which interpretation represents the intent of the legislature in creating the RCW 49.46.010(5)(j) exclusion. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Employers.

¶ 8 First, the syntax of the exclusion directly supports the Employers' interpretation. Subsection (5)(j) consists of the phrase "[a]ny individual" modified by two relative clauses separated by the coordinating conjunction "or." A close examination reveals that the concluding phrase, "and not engaged in . . . active duties," can operate only as an element of the second clause. Permitting the modifying phrase to relate back to the first relative clause, as Berrocal and Castillo advocate, produces a plainly ungrammatical sentence:

"Employee" . . . shall not include . . . [a]ny individual whose duties require that he or she reside or sleep at the place of his or her employment . . . and not engaged in the performance of active duties.

RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). In contrast, assuming the "not engaged in . . . active duties" phrase functions exclusively within the second relative clause, as the Employers contend, the result is a grammatically correct statement:

"Employee" . . . shall not include . . . [a]ny individual . . . who otherwise spends a substantial portion of his or her work time subject to call, and not engaged in the performance of active duties.

RCW 49.46.010(5)(j). Here, the concluding phrase is simply...