Berry v. City of Chicago

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HAND
• Citation: Berry v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill. 154, 61 N. E. 498 (Ill. 1901)
• Decision Date: 24 October 1901
• Parties: BERRY et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO.

192 Ill. 154

61 N.E. 498

BERRY et al.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1901.

Appeal from Cook county court; Wm. T. Hodson, Judge.

Proceedings for the confirmation of a special assessment for street improvements by the city of Chicago against F. J. Berry and others. From a judgment confirming the assessment, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Samuel J. Howe, for appellants.

Charles M. Walker, Corp. Counsel, and Robert Redfield, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellee.

HAND, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county confirming a special assessment for defraying the cost of curbing, grading, and paving Michigan avenue from 99th street to 109th street, in the city of Chicago. It is urged by appellants that the ordinance providing for said improvement is void-First, because said ordinance is unreasonable; and, second, because the board of local improvements did not cause an estimate of the cost of the proposed improvement to be made 10 days before the public hearing.

The first contention is not covered by the objections filed in the county court, nor is it included in the assignment of errors. In Skakel v. People, 188 Ill. 291, 58 N. E. 1003, on page 294, 188 Ill., and page 1004, 58 N. E., we say: ‘Every error must be specifically pointed out in the assignment of errors (Swift & Co. v. Fue, 167 Ill. 443, 47 N. E. 761), so clearly that from the showing error is manifest (Gibler v. City of Mattoon, 167 Ill. 18, 47 N. E. 319), and an error not assigned is not open to review (Gilbert v. Maggord, 1 Scam. 471;Jackson v. Warren, 32 Ill. 331;Thayer v. Peck, 93 Ill. 357; Diversey v. Johnson, Id. 547; Page v. People, 99 Ill. 418).’

And in our opinion the second contention is not supported by the record. Section 7 of the act concerning local improvements, passed June 14, 1897 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 362, c. 24), requires that an estimate of the cost of the proposed improvement be made, and that it be incorporated in the resolution passed by the board, which resolution shall be passed 10 days before the public hearing. There is no evidence in the record to show that the estimate required by said section was not made and incorporated in the resolution which was passed 10 days before the public hearing, and therefore 10 days before the passage of the ordinance. Section 9 of said improvement act provides: ‘With any such ordinance, presented by such board to the city council or board of trustees, shall be presented also a recommendation of such improvement by the said board, signed by at least a majority of the members thereof. The recommendation by said board, shall be prima facie evidence that all the preliminary requirements of the law have been complied with, and if a variance be shown on the proceedings in the court, it shall not affect the validity of the proceeding,unless the court shall deem the same willful or substantial.’ On the trial of the cause the appellee introduced the formal proofs, including the recommendation of the board of local improvements. This was prima facie evidence that all the preliminary requirements of the law, including...