Berry v. Deloney
Decision Date | 28 June 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-1080,93-1080 |
Citation | 28 F.3d 604 |
Parties | 92 Ed. Law Rep. 1117, 40 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1319 Angela BERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William DELONEY, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Kenneth N. Flaxman, Chicago, IL (argued), for plaintiff-appellant.
Brian W. Ellis, Adler, Kaplan & Begy, (argued), David R. Butzen, Office of State's Atty., of Cook County, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee.
Before BAUER, COFFEY, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
High school student Angela Berry sued William Deloney, her truant officer, alleging that Deloney violated her civil rights protected by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, in the course of their nonconsensual sexual relationship. Berry sought damages for being impregnated by Deloney, for physical pain and suffering, and for severe emotional distress in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder. A jury returned a verdict in Deloney's favor. Berry appeals three of the district court's evidentiary rulings and the trial court's denial of her motion to bifurcate the trial. We affirm.
In November 1987 Berry sought to transfer from Corliss High School in Chicago to Thornridge High School in School District 205. As truant officer at Thornridge High School, Deloney had the responsibility to verify the information concerning residency provided by transfer students. Deloney testified that he initiated his investigation into Berry's requested transfer by asking Berry and her grandmother to fill out forms requiring background information. After the forms were returned, Deloney would verify the information, initial the forms, and submit the applicant's file to the assistant principal for approval. Deloney's role in the transfer process was limited to verification of information provided by the applicant, and did not include any recommendations as to the propriety of the transfer.
Deloney testified that his sexual relationship with Berry began after he had verified information concerning Berry's residence and Thornridge's assistant principal determined that Berry lived in a different school district. Deloney stated that Berry paged him some time in December of 1987 to invite him to lunch at her grandmother's home. During this visit, the two allegedly expressed their mutual attraction and launched into a sexual relationship. Berry disputed Deloney's account and maintained that Deloney compelled her to have sex with him as a condition of the transfer. At trial Deloney testified that their relationship included fifteen to twenty consensual sexual encounters, but Berry asserted that it was limited to six instances of coerced sex. After Berry informed Deloney in June of 1988 that she was pregnant, Deloney allegedly coerced her into further sexual encounters before he would disgorge money for an abortion. Although Deloney paid Berry $150.00 for the abortion, she abandoned her plans because she stated the pregnancy had progressed to a point at which the procedure would cost more.
When Berry's grandmother learned of the pregnancy, she threatened to throw Berry and her child out of the house if Berry did not get an abortion. Unable to acquire enough money for an abortion, Berry opted to take an overdose of sleeping pills out of desperation to induce the abortion. While recovering from the overdose in the hospital, Berry told her grandmother that the difficulties caused by her pregnancy drove her to attempt suicide. Berry's story was contradicted at her trial in district court, however, by a social worker who attended to Berry. The social worker testified that Berry told her that the overdose was simply an attempt to induce an abortion. Berry's mother corroborated the social worker's recollection of Berry's explanation. During her testimony at trial, Berry conceded that she never attempted suicide. In August of 1988, when she was over five months pregnant, Berry had an abortion. Approximately four months after Berry's overdose, her grandmother filed a criminal charge against Deloney. In 1989, Deloney pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse, commonly referred to as "statutory rape." See 720 ILCS 5/12-16(d). In August of 1991, Berry filed her complaint in district court seeking relief under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
Prior to trial, the district judge denied Berry's motion in limine seeking to preclude Deloney from referring to Berry's sexual activity other than that with Deloney. The district court ruled that such evidence was admissible solely on the damages issue of whether Deloney or another man impregnated her. At trial, Deloney attempted to prove that any damages Berry sustained from being impregnated and obtaining an abortion should be reduced by plaintiff's emotional and physical injuries from pregnancies and abortions prior and subsequent to her relationship with Deloney. The trial judge ruled that evidence of Berry's prior and subsequent abortions was admissible only as to the damages issue in the case. Counsel then moved to bifurcate the trial to preclude any mention of the plaintiff's sexual relationships with men other than Deloney or other abortions until after liability had been determined. The district court denied the motion to bifurcate, and stated that a limiting instruction would dissipate any threat of undue prejudice. Prior to testimony on the subject of the plaintiff's two abortions, the trial court instructed the jury that it should consider testimony about the abortions and the circumstances leading to the abortions only in regard to the damages issue. 1 As a result of the trial court's ruling, the jury heard testimony from Berry and her mother that Berry had two abortions, the abortion allegedly caused by her relationship with Deloney, and an abortion she had in 1986 following impregnation by a man named Andreas Prince. The jury also learned through Berry's testimony that she subsequently had a child fathered by Prince on June 2, 1987. To establish that his professional relationship with Berry regarding her requested school transfer had ended prior to their sexual involvement, Deloney testified that when he met Berry on November 14, 1987, he initialed the school form thus concluding his professional contact. Berry's counsel attempted to impeach Deloney on cross-examination by inquiring into the whereabouts of the records Deloney had initialed in November of 1987. Deloney's counsel had subpoenaed the document from School District No. 205, but it could not be located. The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to any inquiry about the whereabouts of subpoenaed documents. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in Deloney's favor on the liability issue.
Berry raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence concerning Berry's sexual relationships during the time period when she was impregnated; (2) whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of Berry's abortions before and following her relationship with Deloney; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Berry's motion to bifurcate the trial; and (4) whether the trial court erred in precluding Berry's counsel from cross-examining Deloney on the whereabouts of subpoenaed school records.
An appellant challenging a trial court's evidentiary rulings has an onerous burden "because a reviewing court gives special deference to the evidentiary rulings of the trial court." Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1274, 122 L.Ed.2d 669 (1993); see also Klonowski v. International Armament Corp., 17 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir.1994).
Id. (quoting Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d at 1183).
Berry asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning her sexual relationships and any other abortions because such evidence was not relevant and any probative value it had was outweighed by its prejudice to her. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401. "Evidence is relevant simply if it tends to make a witness' testimony more or less credible." 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 401; see Davis v. Lane, 814 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir.1987) ( ). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that the district court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or time considerations. Fed.R.Evid. 403.
Evidence concerning Berry's sexual relationship with men other than Deloney was unquestionably relevant because Deloney was not responsible for any emotional or physical injuries (damages) caused by her sexual activity with other men. The evidence of sexual activity was limited to a time period beginning approximately two years prior to the relationship with Deloney and ending with the abortion of the child allegedly fathered by Deloney in August 1988. Berry's claim for damages rested in part on her allegation that she suffered psychological trauma from an unwanted...
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