Berry v. Pfister

• Decision Date: 23 February 2022
• Docket Number: 4:21-CV-00903 AGF
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: IRVING BERRY, Plaintiff, v. STEVE PFISTER, et al., Defendants.

IRVING BERRY, Plaintiff, v. STEVE PFISTER, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:21-CV-00903 AGF

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

February 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action.

Background

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Farmington Correctional Center in Farmington Missouri. On July 22, 2021, he filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff paid the $402 filing fee in this matter on August 13, 2021.^[1]

Plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He named the Missouri Sex Offender Program (MOSOP), Steve Pfister, and Mike White as defendants. Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to release on parole without completing MOSOP.

Plaintiff claimed that on August 6, 2020, the Board of Probation and parole granted him a parole date. He asserted that this was “not a conditional release date but a parole date because [he has] a life sentence and pursuant to Missouri State laws in effect at the time of [his] conviction and sentence in the year 1979…conditional release did not apply to offenders with life sentences.” As a result plaintiff contended that he did not have to attend MOSOP. In support of his contention, plaintiff attached a letter from his institutional parole officer telling him as much. Despite his contention, he was transferred to the Farmington Correction Center, where MOSOP is located after the culmination of his institutional sentence.

In support of his argument that he should not have had to attend MOSOP, plaintiff attached two additional documents to his complaint. The first was a letter from the Chairman of the Missouri Parole Board that informed plaintiff that placement into MOSOP was not an issue related to the Parole Board. The second was a letter, from Scott O'Kelley, Assistant Division Director of Mental Health and Substance Use and Recovery Services, that stated only that neither Kelley's “office nor MOSOP stipulate program enrollment or completion requirements.” The letter directed plaintiff to speak with his institutional parole officer about any perceived errors.

In his complaint, plaintiff referenced a MOSOP Phase I form, which stated that “successful completion of MOSOP Phase I and Phase II is mandatory as it relates to release on parole for inmates imprisoned for sexual assault offenses who committed their offenses after August 13, 1980.” Thus, in support of his argument, plaintiff insisted that based on the Phase I form, “offenders like him” do not “have to attend/complete the MOSOP program if their conviction or sentence happened before August 13, 1980.”

Despite the aforementioned, when plaintiff arrived at the Farmington Correctional Center, he was advised that he would have to “take MOSOP regardless.” Plaintiff attempted to file an informal resolution request (IRR), but was dissatisfied with the results and decided to file a civil rights complaint. After submitting the IRR, plaintiff received a “memorandum” from defendant Pfister in which Pfister “unconstitutionally told [him]” that “MOSOP doesn't treat anyone that either P&P or the Parole Board don't direct to us.” Plaintiff attached defendant Pfister's “memorandum” to his complaint, which additionally advised plaintiff that his questions were better directed to either Probation and Parole or the Board of Parole. Defendant Pfister significantly informed plaintiff that contrary to plaintiff's contentions, RSMo 589.040 has been amended so that it includes “all sex offenders regardless of when they were convicted.” In any event, defendant Pfister noted that he was “not the one who makes these determinations.”

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant Pfister's “statement…[was] unlawfully founded and unconstitutionally executed.” He further accused defendant Pfister of directing defendant White to give plaintiff a schedule as to “how and when” he would “start MOSOP.” Plaintiff claimed that defendants Pfister and White had a “meeting of their minds” to “disregard the very law they misinterpret[ed] [in order] to enforce their unconstitutional will upon” him.

According to plaintiff, his exhibits clearly showed “that the Board of Probation and Parole came to the lawful conclusion” that he did not have to complete MOSOP. He asserted that defendants “disregarded the lawful process” and “were not functioning under the code of state regulations and state laws that govern offenders such as” himself. Plaintiff states that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine “who is responsible for MOSOP functions.”

With regard to relief, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment “to bring forth how MOSOP is being [run], ” as well as an injunction “blocking” him “from attending MOSOP.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 8). He also sought damages in the amount of $100, 000.

The Court reviewed plaintiff's complaint on January 28, 2022, for frivolousness, maliciousness and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court found that the complaint was subject to dismissal for four reasons. First, plaintiff's claim against MOSOP was barred, as MOSOP is a program run by the Missouri Department of Corrections, which itself is a department of the State of Missouri. “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons' under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court.” Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8^thCir. 2018). Sovereign immunity bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages. See Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8^th Cir. 2007) (stating that district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed against state university for injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal).

Second, with regard to the official capacity claims against defendants Pfister and White, such claims are treated as being made against the State of Missouri itself, their employer. See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8^th Cir. 2017) (stating that in an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the governmental entity itself”). Defendants Pfister and White are alleged to be employed by the State of Missouri. To the extent that plaintiff was seeking monetary damages, however, the state is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “person.” See Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8^th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Furthermore, “[a] claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the Eleventh Amendment.” Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8^th Cir. 1999).

To the extent that plaintiff was seeking prospective injunctive relief, he had not adequately alleged that he had been injured due to a State of Missouri policy, custom, or failure to train. See Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8^th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Plaintiff referred to a “policy, ” but had provided no facts explaining why any so-called policy was unconstitutional. His legal conclusions on the matter were not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8^th Cir. 2002) (“While the court must accept allegations of fact as true…the court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations”).

Third, as to the individual capacity claims against defendants Pfister and White, plaintiff failed to show a “causal connection between” an “action on the part of defendants and” a deprivation of plaintiff's rights. See Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8^th Cir. 1993). That causal connection was missing here.

Finally, it was not apparent that a liberty interest was at stake. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff had to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights. See Wong v. Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.3d 922, 934 (8^th Cir. 2016) (To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”). However, the Supreme Court has determined that there “is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).

A state's own “parole statutes and regulations may create a liberty interest that is entitled to due process protection.” Marshall v. Mitchell, 57 F.3d 671, 672 (8^th Cir. 1995). With regard to Missouri, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that Missouri's statutes do not create a liberty interest. Id. (explaining that “[t]his court has consistently held that the current Missouri statutes, standing alone, do not create a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). See also Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 645 (8^th Cir. 2005) (stating that “our court has held that the Missouri parole statutes create no liberty interest under state law in the parole board's discretionary decisions”).

Despite the foregoing, plaintiff was...