Berry v. Queen

Citation469 Md. 674,233 A.3d 42
Decision Date27 July 2020
Docket Number 2019,Misc. No. 10, No. 63
Parties Desiree BERRY and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Andrae QUEEN, and Others Similarly Situated. Maryland Insurance Administration v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Argued by Laura Basem Jacobs (Budow and Noble, P.C., Rockville, MD; Daniel F. Diffley, Cassandra K. Johnson, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA), on brief, for Appellants in Misc. No. 10.

Argued by Thomas J. Minton (Goldman & Minton, P.C., Baltimore, MD; David E. Tompkins, Lewis & Tompkins, P.C., Silver Spring, MD), on brief, for Appellee in Misc. No. 10.

Argued by Philipp M. Pierson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellant in No. 63.

Argued by Laura Basem Jacobs (Budow and Noble, P.C., Rockville, MD), on brief, for Appellee in No. 63.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ.

Getty, J.

The cost of automobile accidents is high, whether it be measured in lives lost, injuries inflicted, or damage to property. The ... monetary loss of the victims of automobile accidents [is] exacerbated by situations where one or more of the parties involved turned out to be uninsured.
- Report of the Task Force on Maryland Automobile Insurance

In the early 1980s, the Maryland General Assembly sought to combat a growing statewide problem: the increased prevalence of uninsured motorists on state roads and highways. A. Janquitto, Maryland Motor Vehicle Insurance (3d ed. 2011), § 3.12(A) at 66–70. Initially, the House Economic Matters Committee formed an insurance task force in 1982. The task force conducted an interim study to recommend ways to enforce Maryland's compulsory insurance laws and reduce the high number of uninsured motorists through new legislative proposals. See Final Report of the Insurance Task Force of the House Economics Matters Committee (January 1983), http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/house/EM/MdE2352.3.F491_1983.pdf (last visited on July 21, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/UF89-KEVV.

In 1984, the General Assembly's Legislative Policy Committee created a bicameral task force to make additional recommendations, such as "[r]efining existing procedures for identifying uninsured motorists in order to minimize the burden on the general motoring public." See Report of the Task Force on Maryland Automobile Insurance 2 (December 1984), http://mdlaw.ptfs.com/awweb/pdfopener?md=1 & did=8682 (last visited on July 21, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/C5F9-SE32. The General Assembly's strong policy determinations that followed these reports have resulted in legislation, over the ensuing forty years, expanding Maryland's Uninsured Motorist Statute to its present state. Md. Code (1957, 2017 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.), Insurance ("IN") §§ 19-509 to 19-511.1

Desiree Berry & State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company & State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Andrae Queen ("Misc. No. 10") and Maryland Insurance Administration v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("No. 63") arrived in this Court by different procedural vehicles. Misc. No. 10 is a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. No. 63 is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City; we granted certiorari while the matter was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. While these appeals have not been formally consolidated, the Court set both matters for oral argument on the same day. Due to the similarity in the underlying facts, and identical legal issue presented in both Misc. No. 10 and No. 63, we issue one opinion.

In both cases, we must determine whether the phrase "damage to property," incorporated by reference in the uninsured motorist statute, requires an insurer to reimburse loss of use damages, such as rental car costs, to an insured. To answer this question, our analysis begins with the ordinary and popular meaning of the words "damage" and "property." Both legal and non-legal sources confirm that these words, together, connote a loss of one's ability to use an object. Building on this common understanding, our analysis examines this Court's earlier jurisprudence interpreting property damage and related legislation. Two particular cases guide us. This Court's prior articulation of the measure of damages where personal property is injured but not destroyed, beginning in Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Electric Railway Co. v. William A. Fingles, Inc. , 135 Md. 574, 109 A. 431 (1920), confirms that loss of use damages are part and parcel of "damage to property." Indeed, this Court applied that principle to the uninsured motorist statutory scheme in D'Ambrogi v. Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Board , 269 Md. 198, 305 A.2d 136 (1973). There, we held that loss of use damages were recoverable under the predecessor statute to Maryland's Automobile Insurance Fund ("MAIF") because such damages were encompassed in the phrase "damage to property." Finally, as with any exercise of statutory interpretation, we view the phrase in the context and purpose of the larger statutory scheme. Here, such a reading undoubtedly leads this Court to conclude that the phrase "damage to property" includes loss of use damages.

BACKGROUND

We recently explained that "[u]ninsured and underinsured[2 ] motorist coverage is a statutorily required component of every motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued in Maryland." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shilling , 468 Md. 239, 242, 227 A.3d 171 (2020). "This mandatory coverage protects insured drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents from paying out-of-pocket expenses when the liable party, a tortfeasor, is either completely uninsured or inadequately insured to cover the extent of the insured's injuries." Id.

The underlying facts of these cases do not affect our analysis. Still, we briefly summarize them for context.

Misc. No. 10

The following information is derived from the U.S. District Court's Certification Order. Andrae Queen owned a car and obtained a motor vehicle liability insurance policy through State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"). Mr. Queen did not purchase the optional rental car coverage as a part of the policy. On February 15, 2018, an uninsured motorist struck Mr. Queen while he was operating his car in St. Mary's County, Maryland. The accident damaged Mr. Queen's vehicle. As a result, Mr. Queen obtained a rental car—which cost $306.23—while his car was being repaired. Mr. Queen submitted a claim with State Farm under the Uninsured Motor Vehicle Property Damage Coverage3 portion of his policy to recover his rental car expenditure. State Farm denied the claim.

Mr. Queen filed suit against State Farm in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on behalf of himself and sought to proceed as a class action. State Farm removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and filed a motion to dismiss. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the U.S. District Court denied State Farm's motion. See Queen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , No. PWG-18-2625, 2019 WL 2568336 (D. Md. June 20, 2019). The U.S. District Court determined that under Maryland law, "[Mr.] Queen ha[d] stated plausible claims, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the [State Farm Insurance] Policy excluding the coverage [Mr.] Queen demand[ed]." Id. at *5. The U.S. District Court ordered State Farm to answer Mr. Queen's complaint.

At State Farm's request, the U.S. District Court then certified a question of law to this Court pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. Md. Code (1957, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings § 12-601 et seq . This Court accepted the certified question on November 22, 2020. State Farm filed, with Mr. Queen's consent, a motion to accelerate the briefing schedule and set the matter for oral argument with No. 63, which we granted on December 10, 2019.

No. 63

The following information is derived from the Joint Stipulation of Facts agreed upon by the Maryland Insurance Administration (the "Administration") and State Farm.4 Arndrea Hoyle owned a car and obtained a motor vehicle liability insurance policy through State Farm. Ms. Hoyle's policy included the following coverage: (1) Car Rental Expense Coverage, 5 providing eighty percent of car rental expenses up to the $1,000 limit; (2) Collision Coverage,6 with a $250 deductible; and (3) Uninsured Motorist Coverage, with a $250 deductible. 7

The uninsured motorist coverage obligated Ms. Hoyle to pay a separate premium charge of $55.59 per policy period, which she paid.

On January 5, 2018, an unidentified vehicle struck and damaged Ms. Hoyle's car while it was parked and unoccupied. That same day, Ms. Hoyle submitted a claim with State Farm. State Farm responded with a coverage letter, which stated, in pertinent part:

The policy provides uninsured motorist property damage coverage for property damages you are legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. Damages may include the repair costs, actual cash value of the property and diminished value, if any. Based upon our investigation, your uninsured motorist property damage coverage will apply to this loss.

State Farm paid Ms. Hoyle $369.78 pursuant to the policy's Collision Coverage provision for property damage to the vehicle.8

While Ms. Hoyle's car was being repaired, she rented a replacement from Hertz Corporation, a car rental agency. In total, the rental car cost $264.07. State Farm paid Hertz directly in the amount of $208.40: eighty percent of the daily rental rate, plus tax, pursuant to the Car Rental Expense provision of the policy. State Farm did not pay Ms. Hoyle the balance—$55.67—which represented twenty percent of the total rental car expense.

Ms. Hoyle filed an administrative complaint with the Administration, which reviewed the complaint and...

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