Berry v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
| Decision Date | 03 December 1902 |
| Citation | 53 A. 720,96 Md. 45 |
| Parties | BERRY et al. v. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. OF BALTIMORE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore court of common pleas; Henry D. Harlan, Judge.
Proceedings contesting the will of George R. Berry, deceased, by Louisa C.E. Berry and others against the Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, executor of such will. From a judgment in favor of defendant, caveators appeal. Affirmed.
Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, BOYD, PEARCE SCHMUCKER, and JONES, JJ.
Wm. L Marbury and William S. Bryan, Jr., for appellants.
Wm Pinkney Whyte,
Edgar H. Gans, and Charles E. Hill, for appellee.
This protracted litigation, involving the validity of the last will and testament of the late George R. Berry, is before us for the third time. The first appeal is reported in 93 Md. 240, 48 A. 502, and the second in 93 Md. 560, 49 A. 501. The pending appeal was taken by the plaintiffs, who are the caveators. The others were brought here by the defendant, the executor. The present record contains 34 bills of exception. Some of them relate to rulings on the admissibility of evidence, and the last one concerns rulings on the prayers presented by the defendant and granted by the court at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence. Those prayers instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that there had been adduced no legally sufficient evidence to support the issues before the jury. It will be necessary, in considering the various questions which arise, to understand the precise situation of the case, and therefore that will be briefly stated. Upon the filing of the caveat there were six issues framed and sent to a court of law for trial. The proceedings were instituted by collateral kindred, the testator having left no direct descendants. The issues were, in substance, as follows: The first relates to mental capacity; the second, to knowledge of the contents of the will; the third, to its execution; the fourth, to undue influence; the fifth, to fraud in its procurement; and the sixth is as to whether the will is the testator's last will. After the rulings complained of on the former appeal had been reversed, and the record had been remanded for a new trial, the case was removed from the superior court to the court of common pleas. When the jury had been impaneled in the latter court, they were instructed by the trial judge to find, and they did find, in favor of the defendant on the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth issues. The first and second issues were thus left open, and upon them the parties went to trial. It will be observed that, as the case is now presented, it is a case where a verdict has been rendered finally determining that the assailed will was executed in accordance with the formal requirements of the statute; that there was no undue influence practiced upon the testator; that the will had not been procured by fraud; and, fourthly, that the contested paper was the last will and testament of George R. Berry. With those findings of record at the beginning of the case, and with the inquiry before the jury narrowed to the two questions as to whether the testator was possessed of sufficient mental capacity to enable him to make a valid deed or contract, and, secondly, as to whether he was aware of the contents of the paper which he signed, the plaintiffs not only offered the same evidence which they had adduced on the former trial, but much of that which had been presented by the defendant; and they then called several medical experts to the stand, and offered to propound hypothetical questions to them, but those questions were excluded upon grounds that will be stated and considered later on. The defendant put in no evidence.
The predominant question as the case is presented, though it is the last one raised on the record, is this: Was there any legally sufficient evidence, apart from the proffered and excluded expert testimony, from which a jury could rationally find that the testator was not mentally capable of making a valid will? Now, what is the degree of mental capacity which the law requires in such a case? We are not dealing with a question of sanity or insanity. Whatever that mysterious malady called insanity may be according to the theories of speculative specialists, the law, in the administration of justice, both in civil and criminal proceedings, has its own standards of mental capacity and responsibility; and to those standards judicial tribunals must look, and by them they must be governed, when dealing with questions of the character now before us. By the legal standard, he who is possessed of sufficient capacity at the time of executing his will, to make a disposition of his estate with judgment and understanding in reference to the amount and situation of his property and the relative claims of the different persons who should have been the objects of his bounty, is mentally competent to make a valid will. Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J. 269, 25 Am.Dec. 282; Jones v. Collins, 94 Md. 408, 51 A. 398. In a word, if he has capacity enough to make a valid deed of conveyance or an ordinary contract, then he has capacity enough to make a valid will. This standard is plain, simple, and intelligible, precisely as is the law's standard of criminal responsibility, viz., the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and not the vague, indefinite, and speculative theories of alienists, who undertake to measure accountability for crime in a totally different way. Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809. The mental condition of an individual, whatever the cause of that condition may be, is manifested by external acts and appearances, and in no other way. Is there in the record any evidence of external acts and appearances from which a jury could rationally draw the conclusion that on the day George R. Berry made his will he did not possess sufficient mental capacity to make a disposition of his estate with judgment and understanding in reference to the amount and situation of his property and the relative claims of the different persons who should have been the objects of his bounty? Let us see what manner of man he was, and what he did. George R. Berry made and executed his will on the 10th day of February, 1899, and died on March 19th following. His estate, according to the inventories filed by the executor, amounted to something over $73,000. The will contains 36 bequests, besides a residuary clause, and goes into the most minute details with respect to much of his property. To his own relations he gave sundry sums aggregating $9,200; to the relations of his deceased wife he gave altogether $20,500; to friends of his wife and to his own friends he gave $9,000; to his servants he gave $4,300; to the Boys' Home he gave $1,500; to the Home of the Aged, $2,000, and to the Woman's College the residue of his estate. At the time of his death Mr. Berry was 78 years and 4 months of age. He had been an active, energetic, and successful business man. He had held positions of trust and responsibility, both public and private. He had been a member of the general assembly of Maryland and of the city council of Baltimore, and a director of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, of the Maryland Penitentiary, and of the Fireman's Insurance Company, besides having served on the grand jury probably more frequently than any other individual in Baltimore. There is no pretense that he was not perfectly competent to transact business, or to make a valid deed or contract, up to the date of the death of his second wife. Physically he had been a hale and vigorous man. But it is alleged a change came over him upon the death of his wife in November, 1897; and it is from that event it is asserted his mental faculties began to fail. There is no doubt this calamity greatly depressed him. We said in the former appeal: "But if the question were before us to be determined on the evidence in the record, we feel bound to say that we see nothing in all that has been testified to to indicate that this great sorrow, or any other cause, seriously impaired his intellect, or deprived him of the capacity to make a valid will." The will in contest was not the first he had made. During the life of his wife he had signed a will wherein many of the legatees named in the caveated paper were provided for, and wherein the Woman's College was also made residuary legatee. After the death of his wife he executed other wills; "and the record shows in all these instances that he acted with particularity, circumspection, and intelligence." On the former appeal we said, and we now repeat: "If there ever was a will made with deliberation and after careful preparation, the evidence, if worthy of credence at all, shows that the will of February the 10th was so made." As the case is now before us on the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence, we will transcribe at length the only testimony contained in the record on the subject of the preparation and the execution of the will.
The will was prepared by Mr. John W. Marshall, second vice president of the Safe Deposit & Trust Company, and the following is what Mr. Marshall, when called as a witness by the plaintiffs, deposed to: "I prepared a will for Mr Berry in 1896; then one in the spring of 1898; then a codicil in the fall of 1898; then the final will of 1899. Witness stated that the classification from which he got the Walker children, who were legatees, was handed him on February 6, 1899, by Mr. Berry. It was a list of legacies by which I was to be guided in the preparation of the will, and the order in which they should be inserted in the will. It was not in the handwriting of Mr. Berry, but was in the handwriting of ...
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