Berry1 v. Seeley

Decision Date15 December 2010
Docket NumberCase No. 2:10-CV-162
PartiesCHARLES RODGER BERRY1 , Plaintiff, v. JUDGE THOMAS J. SEELEY, JR.; KAREN GUINN, CIRCUIT COURT CLERK; RONALD W. JENKINS, ATTORNEY; JAMES R. MILLER, II, ATTORNEY; and MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH ALLIANCE, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a pro se civil rights case which seeks both injunctive relief and monetary damages, [Docs. 1, 15, 20]. Each of the defendants has filed a motion to dismiss, [Docs. 6, 7, 13, 26], and/or for summary judgment, [Doc. 40]. The plaintiff has responded to each of the pending motions, [Docs. 15, 24, 30, 43, 47], and the motions are now ripe for disposition. Also pending is an appeal by the plaintiff from the Magistrate Judge's order dated October 20, 2010, [Doc. 49]. For the reasons which follow, each of the motions to dismiss will be GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint and amended complaint will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. As a result of the dismissal of plaintiff's claims, plaintiff's appeal of the Magistrate Judge's order will be DENIED AS MOOT.

I. Plaintiff's Allegations

The plaintiff has filed a rambling, somewhat incoherent, 14 page complaint, [Doc. 1], a pleadingentitled "Motion Defendants Violated Plaintiff's Civil Rights, " [Doc. 2], and a 6 page amended complaint, [Doc. 20]. These pro se pleadings allege various violations of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, including his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments 2 and "the Privacy Act."3 The plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Tennessee Circuit Court Judge Thomas J. Seeley, Jr. ("Judge Seeley"); (2) Washington County, Tennessee Circuit Court Clerk Karen Guinn ("Guinn"); (3) Ronald W. Jenkins ("Jenkins"), a private attorney; (4) James R. Miller, II ("Miller"), a private attorney; and (5) Mountain States Health Alliance ("Mountain States"), which apparently operates Johnson City Medical Center.4

So far as the Court can tell, the following are the factual allegations made by the plaintiff: The plaintiff is a plaintiff in a personal injury case filed in the Circuit Court in Washington County, Tennessee. The defendant(s) in the state court action is represented by defendant attorneys Jenkins and Miller. Judge Seeley is the presiding judge. During discovery, certain of plaintiffs medical records havebeen sought by the defendant attorneys. A hearing on the discovery request was conducted by Judge Seeley on June 6, 2010, and Judge Seeley granted the request and signed an order requiring the plaintiff to provide his Social Security number, presumably to allow the medical providers to correctly identify his records. The plaintiff has refused to provide his Social Security number and claims that both the release of unlimited medical history and records and his Social Security number are irrelevant in his state court action and a violation of his privacy rights. He claims that Jenkins, while representing the defendant(s), had exparte communications with the court clerk and the judge. In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that Mountain States improperly released his medical records in response to Judge Seeley's order.

Plaintiff seeks thirty million ($30,000, 000) dollars in damages because, he alleges, Judge Seeley "has failed to protect the plaintiff's Constitutional Right." He further claims that Judge Seeley has a conflict of interest in the case because he is personally represented by the law firm which employs Jenkins. Plaintiff seeks fifteen million ($15,000, 000) dollars in damages from Guinn "for ex parte communication" with defendants Jenkins and/or Miller.5 Plaintiff seeks twenty five million ($25,000, 000) dollars in damages from Jenkins "for being one of the acting party [sic] in the ex parte communication and refusing to inform the plaintiff that he had a communication with the other defendants without the plaintiff being present or being informed." He also claims that Jenkins is unconstitutionally demanding plaintiffs Social Security number "so he may go on a wild goose chase" through discovery in the state civil action.6 Plaintiff also seeks twenty five million ($25,000, 000) dollarsfrom Miller because he "had full knowledge of the ex parte communication, " failed to inform plaintiff of the ex parte communication, and wrongfully demanded that the plaintiff "fork over his social security number." Plaintiff seeks one million ($1,000, 000) dollars in damages from Mountain States for "negligence in distributing the plaintiff [sic] personal/Private information/property (to Jenkins and Miller) without the plaintiff's consent." More specifically, he alleges that Mountain States released certain of his medical records which were not within the time period covered by the order and wrongfully released his social security number to "defendant" (presumably as part of his medical records). Plaintiff also appears to assert a civil conspiracy by the defendants to violate his civil rights by acting "collectively and in concert."

Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief and requests that the Court order Judge Seeley to "step down" from presiding over the state court case, direct that "all the medical institutions involved in this case remove the plaintiff's social security number from all files, electronic storage and records" that are released during discovery in the state court case, order that the records obtained not be used either in the state court case or the instant case, quash Judge Seeley's order requiring production of medical records, and order that Jenkins and Miller "cease and desist" from seeking plaintiff's social security number.

II. Applicable Legal Standard

The court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint-not to decide the merits of the case. It is well established that a complaint need not set forth in detail all of the particularities of the plaintiff's claim. Instead, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 does not, however, "unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, � U.S. �, �, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, (2009). While legal conclusions can provide the framework for a complaint, all claims must be supported by factual allegations. Id. The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 1949; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is insufficient).

To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead facts sufficient "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The requisite facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The plausibility requirement is not the same as a "probability requirement" but instead "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Examining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.

A district court considering a motion to dismiss must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. See Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ("[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."). Where the well-pleaded facts "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, " the complaint fails to state a claim. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

Moreover, a pro se pleading must be liberally construed and be "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, pro se status does not exempt the plaintiff from the requirement that he comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981). Pro se plaintiffs must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief..." LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority, 55 F.3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir. 1995). Although the standard is liberal, it does require more than the bare assertions of legal conclusion. Lillard v. Shelby Co. Bd. of Educ, 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).

III. Pending Motions
A. Judge Seeley

Judge Seeley moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the following reasons: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars the claim for monetary damages against Judge Seeley in his official capacity; (2) the Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not create a cause of action against Judge Seeley in his official capacity; (3) the doctrine of judicial immunity bars any claim against Judge Seeley in his individual capacity; and (4) the doctrine of abstention prohibits federal court intervention in plaintiff's on-going state court proceedings, [Doc. 7].

The plaintiff has responded to this motion with a rambling and...

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