Berton Wetmore Jahn Kay v. James Karrick

Decision Date11 March 1907
Docket NumberNo. 144,144
Citation205 U.S. 141,27 S.Ct. 434,51 L.Ed. 745
PartiesBERTON O. WETMORE, Administrator of the Estate of Charles H. Wetmore, Deceased, to the use of JAHN F. McKAY, Plff. in Err., v. JAMES L. KARRICK
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. William L. Ford for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 142-143 intentionally omitted] Messrs. W. W. Millan, J. J. Darlington, and Millan & Smith for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 144-146 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia to reverse a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in favor of the defendant in error, overruling a demurrer to the defendant's second plea.

The action was brought on the law side in the supreme court of the District of Columbia on December 1, 1903, to recover judgment against Karrick, defendant in error, upon a judgment rendered in the superior court for the county of Suffolk, commonwealth of Massachusetts, on November 20, 1900. Copy of the record in the Massachusetts court is made part of the record in the supreme court of the District of Columbia.

This record shows that suit was brought upon certain contracts between the defendant in error and one Charles H. Wetmore, since deceased, plaintiff's intestate. The defendant was personally served with process, appeared, and pleaded to the declaration. Trial was had to a jury, and resulted in a verdict against the defendant. Upon his motion the verdict was set aside. Thereupon the plaintiff filed an amendment to his declaration and another trial to a jury was had. Upon February 21, 1894, by another verdict, special and general, a sum of $9,169.30 was found in favor of the plaintiff. Motion for a new trial was made by the defendant and overruled March 3, 1894, and exceptions filed. On June 8, 1897, more than three years after the proceedings just recited, the action was dismissed under the general order of the court upon the calling of the docket. Two days thereafter, June 10, 1897, the order of dismissal was stricken out and the case restored to the docket.

On June 23, 1897, attorney for the defendant entered an order withdrawing his appearance. On June 13, 1898, an attorney, whose name does not appear elsewhere in the record, withdrew his appearance. The record then shows:

'Thence the case was continued to the July sitting, 1898, when said exceptions, having been presented to the court, were disallowed as not conformable to the truth, the bill not properly and correctly stating the evidence so as to fairly present the questions of law raised by the defendant's exceptions.'

Then follows:

'Thence the case was continued from sitting to sitting into the April sitting, 1899, when, on the 12th day of June, 1899, at a calling of the docket under the general order of court, said action was dismissed.'

And then the entry:

'And now, at this present October sitting, 1900, to wit, on the 18th day of said October, 1900, said dismissal is stricken off and the case brought forward, the same having been dismissed improvidently, action having been taken within one year, but not discovered.'

On November 17, 1900, there was a motion by plaintiff for judgment on the verdict of the jury, and on November 20, 1900, judgment was entered accordingly against the defendant for the sum of $12,881.46 and costs.

Two pleas were filed to the declaration in the supreme court of the District of Columbia; first, the general issue nul tiel record; second, a special plea, wherein the defendant set out that on June 12, 1899, the cause against him in the Massachusetts court was dismissed; that under the rules of court that dismissal became final on the first Monday of July, 1899; that the cause remained so dismissed for more than five terms or sittings of the court, and until October 18, 1900; that, in the meantime, on April 29, 1899, defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy in the district court of the United States for the district of Colorado, enumerating in his schedule the debt due to said Wetmore, and was, by the said district court, on June 23, 1899, discharged from all debts provable against him in bankruptcy, including the debt sued on; that subsequently to the discharge, as aforesaid, he made inquiry of the clerk of the court in Massachusetts as to the suit, and was informed that said suit was no longer pending; that relying upon this statement he took no steps to suggest in that court his discharge in bankruptcy; that the action of the court in Massachusetts, restoring the case to the docket, was without summons, citation, or notice of any kind to him, or to anyone for him, and without his knowledge; that the court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment sued upon.

Issue was joined upon the first plea, and to the second plea a demurrer was filed, which was sustained by the supreme court of the District of Columbia. From the order sustaining the demurrer special appeal was taken on January 6, 1905, to the court of appeals for the District of Columbia, and on April 17, 1905, the judgment below was reversed and the cause remanded. 25 App. D. C. 415.

On May 16, 1905, the supreme court of the District of Columbia entered an order overruling plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's second plea and, the plaintiff electing to stand on his demurrer, judgment was entered for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia.

On October 10, 1905, the case was submitted; and, on the 12th day of the same month, judgment below was affirmed without further opinion.

Before taking up the case in detail it must be regarded as settled by previous decisions of this court that, where an action is brought to recover upon a judgment, the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment is open to inquiry. And the constitutional requirement as to full faith and credit in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state does not require them to be enforced if they are rendered without jurisdiction, or otherwise wanting in due process of law. This principle was so lately asserted by a decision in this court as to render unnecessary more than a reference to the consideration of the subject in Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, decided on January 7, 1907, of the present term. 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236.

It is also an elementary doctrine of this court that a judgment rendered in personam against a defendant without jurisdiction of his person is not only erroneous but void. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565. And the same case holds that such judgment is not required to be enforced in another state, either by the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution, or the act of Congress (Rev. Stat. § 905, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 677) passed in aid thereof.

It is apparent from the statement of facts preceding this discussion that the precise question to be determined is whether a court which has once rendered a judgment in favor of a defendant, dismissing the cause and discharging him from further attendance, may, at any time after the term, and at a subsequent term, no matter how remote from the time of rendering judgment, without motion or proceeding to vacate the judgment, and without notice, set aside the judgment so rendered and render a new judgment against the defendant for the recovery of a sum of money against him.

The general principle is that judgments cannot be disturbed after the term at which they are rendered, and can only be corrected, if at all, by writ of error, or appeal, or relieved against in equity in certain cases. There are, it is true, certain exceptions to the rule, within which, it is the contention of the plaintiff in error, the present action is brought.

No contention is made in the brief or argument of counsel for plaintiff in error that the question for decision in this case is changed or modified because of the fact that terms of court are abolished by statute in Massachusetts. The statutes of that commonwealth (Rev. Laws, vol. 2, 1382, § 24) provide for 'sittings' of the superior court at Boston, in the county of Suffolk, for civil business, on the first Tuesdays of January, April, July, and October. The exemplified copy of the record in this case shows that the case was dismissed under the general order of the court at the April sitting, 1899, on the 12th day of June, 1899. At the October sitting, 1900, to wit, on October 18, 1900, the dismissal was stricken off for the reason stated, and on November 20, 1900, the new judgment was rendered.

In Dalton-Ingersoll Co. v. Fiske, 175 Mass. 15, 55 N. E. 468, the supreme judicial court recited the previous cases, holding that terms no longer exist in the superior court, and said (p. 22, N. E. p. 471): 'When we had terms the practice was to enter judgment, either on some day in the term, upon motion, or, of course, on the last day. Howe, Pr. 267. Since terms have been abolished the practice is regulated by statutes and the rules of the courts.' In the second plea it is averred, and admitted by the demurrer, that under the rules of court the dismissal became final on the first Monday of July, 1899; that is, the first Monday of the following month.

We think this rule day equivalent to the end of a term. It is the time at which, by the rules of court adopted under statutory power, the judgment became final, unless set aside for mistake within the principles to be hereinafter discussed.

Pierce v. Lamper, 141 Mass. 20, 6 N. E. 223, was a case where a suit had been dismissed upon the call of the docket under the same rule under which the case against Karrick, defendant in error, was dismissed. for want of action within the year, which order should have been followed by an entry of judgment of dismissal, in place of which the clerk simply...

To continue reading

Request your trial
77 cases
  • United State v. Morgan
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 4, 1954
    ...would ever lie in federal courts.15 This Court has approved correction of clerical errors after the term. Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 154, 27 S.Ct. 434, 438, 51 L.Ed. 745. However, we have not held that the writ of coram nobis or a motion of that nature was available in the federal In......
  • Gilmore v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 5, 1943
    ...S.Ct. 582, 37 L.Ed. 438, 440; Tubman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 190 U.S. 38, 23 S.Ct. 777, 47 L.Ed. 946; Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 149-152, 27 S.Ct. 434, 51 L.Ed. 745, 748-750; In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U.S. 312, 320, 321, 31 S.Ct. 18, 54 L.Ed. 1051, 1054, 1055. There are cer......
  • Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • August 6, 1982
    ...other state and federal courts are not required to accord full-faith-and-credit to such a judgment."); Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 149, 27 S.Ct. 434, 436, 51 L.Ed. 745 (1907) (full faith and credit does not apply to a judgment rendered without jurisdiction "or otherwise wanting in due......
  • Glass Co v. Co
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1944
    ...415, 12 S.Ct. 9, 35 L.Ed. 775; Tubman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 190 U.S. 38, 23 S.Ct. 777, 47 L.Ed. 946; Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 151, 27 S.Ct. 434, 436, 437, 51 L.Ed. 745; In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U.S. 312, 320, 31 S.Ct. 18, 20, 54 L.Ed. 1051; Delaware L. & W.R. Co. v. Rel......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • How Many Times Was Lochner-era Substantive Due Process Effective? - Michael J. Phillips
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 48-3, March 1997
    • Invalid date
    ...138-42 (1907) (state's system of valuing property for tax purposes does not provide adequate opportunity to be heard); Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 148-60 (1907) (judgment rendered one year after dismissal of suit against defendant is void, when no subsequent service on defendant); Old......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT