Berzins v. Berzins

• Decision Date: 27 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 30946.,30946.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Mary BERZINSv.David BERZINS.

122 Conn.App. 674

998 A.2d 1265

Mary BERZINSv.David BERZINS.

No. 30946.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 5, 2010.

Decided July 27, 2010.

Linda C. Lehmann, for the appellant (substitute defendant).

Susan Boyan, Vernon, for the appellee (plaintiff).

BEACH, FLYNN and SCHALLER, Js.

SCHALLER, J.

In this postjudgment marital dissolution action, the substitute defendant, Daniel King, administrator of the estate of David Berzins (administrator), appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion filed by the plaintiff, Mary Berzins, for sanctions and attorney's fees. On appeal, the administrator claims that the court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction and (2) improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees.¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On January 26, 2006, the court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage of the plaintiff and David Berzins. David Berzins failed to appear and was defaulted. He thereafter filed a motion to open the judgment of dissolution, and the court denied the motion. He then appealed to this court. On January 25, 2008, David Berzins died. On February 5, 2008, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Berzins v. Berzins, 105 Conn.App. 648, 938 A.2d 1281, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156 (2008). By order dated February 7, 2008, this court stayed the appeal until there was compliance with General Statutes § 52-599.² On July 23, 2008, this court granted the administrator's motion to intervene and the plaintiff's motion to substitute the administrator as the defendant. It also treated the administrator's motion to dismiss as a motion to withdraw, which it then granted. The administrator then petitioned the Supreme Court for certification to appeal with regard to several issues, including the issue of whether he was a proper party to the dissolution action.³ The Supreme Court denied certification.

See Berzins v. Berzins, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156 (2008). Thereafter, the administrator filed a motion to enforce a post-judgment agreement. Various motions were filed in the trial court, which culminated in the plaintiff's filing a motion for sanctions and attorney's fees. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The administrator first claims that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the administrator argues that he improperly was substituted as a defendant, and, therefore, the plaintiff lacks standing to continue this action against him.⁴ We determine that the administrator's claim is barred by collateral estoppel because he previously litigated this issue before us unsuccessfully in connection with the plaintiff's motion for substitution, his application for leave to intervene and his motion to dismiss.⁵

“We begin by setting out the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) have been described as related ideas on a continuum.... [W]e have observed that whether to apply either doctrine in any particular case should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ... and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim.... The judicial doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate....

“The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.... If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made.... Res judicata bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made....

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim.... Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.... Issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and that determination is essential to the judgment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Massey v. Branford, 119 Conn.App. 453, 464-65, 988 A.2d 370, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 921, 991 A.2d 565 (2010).

The administrator previously challenged the issue of whether he properly was substituted as a defendant. After the death of David Berzins, the following motions were pending before this court: the plaintiff's motion for substitution, the administrator's application for leave to intervene and the administrator's motion to dismiss. The administrator did not file an opposition to the plaintiff's motion for substitution. The administrator, in his motion to dismiss, argued that the underlying motion to open the dissolution action and the appeal from that judgment abated with the death of David Berzins and sought dismissal of the appeal retroactively to the time of David Berzin's death. In deciding those motions, this court determined that the administrator was the proper party to be substituted in this action and that the plaintiff's action did not abate upon the death of David Berzins. See General Statutes § 52-599. The administrator did not file a motion for reconsideration or reconsideration en banc of this court's orders. The administrator thereafter unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certification to appeal.

The administrator is now attempting to litigate the same issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction again in this appeal. Whether the administrator properly was substituted as a party and whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in a court of this state already have been litigated and decided by this court. The subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court was resolved by this court's prior rulings. The administrator, in challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court in this appeal in effect is challenging the prior ruling of this court as to subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the administrator is barred from raising this claim on appeal based on the principles of collateral estoppel.

II

The administrator next claims that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees. Specifically, the administrator argues that the court abused its discretion in its award of attorney's fees because it was against the weight of the evidence. ⁶ We disagree.

To resolve the administrator's claim, we begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles and the standard of review. The court found that the administrator engaged in egregious litigation misconduct and awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007).⁷ “A decision to award counsel fees in a marital dissolution dispute ordinarily is based on an appraisal of the respective financial ability of each party to pay his or her own fees. See General Statutes § 46b-62 ⁸.... Where, however, ‘a party has engaged in egregious litigation misconduct that has required the other party to expend significant amounts of money for attorney's fees, and where the court determines, in its discretion, that the misconduct has not been addressed adequately by other orders of the court, the court has discretion to award attorney's fees to compensate for the harm caused by that misconduct, irrespective of whether the other party has ample liquid assets and of whether the lack of such an award would undermine the court's other financial orders.’ ” ⁹ (Citation omitted.) LaBossiere v. Jones, 117 Conn.App. 211, 213, 979 A.2d 522 (2009). The decision of whether a party has engaged in egregious litigation misconduct is within the discretion of the court. “Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.... [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's & Cos. Collective, 121 Conn.App. 31, 61, 994 A.2d 262 (2010).

The following additional facts are relevant for our resolution of the administrator's claim. On November 10, 2008, the administrator filed a motion to enforce a postjudgment agreement of the parties.¹⁰ On November 12, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the real property awarded to her in the dissolution judgment. The administrator objected to the transfer, claiming that the plaintiff had not given him a note and mortgage as required by the judgment. The administrator then served various discovery requests on the plaintiff and her bank. The plaintiff filed a motion to quash the discovery and for a protective order and attorney's fees. The administrator filed a motion to transfer pursuant to ...