Beskin v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon (In re Perrow)

Decision Date05 September 2013
Docket NumberBankruptcy No. 09–61234.,Adversary No. 11–06082.
Citation498 B.R. 560
PartiesIn re Michael Douglas PERROW and Brandy Bowling Perrow, Debtors. Herbert L. Beskin, Chapter 13 Trustee, and Michael Douglas Perrow and Brandy Bowling Perrow, Debtors, Plaintiffs, v. The Bank of New York Mellon c/o BAC Home Loan Servicing LP fka Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and CTC Real Estate Services, Inc., Defendants.
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Virginia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Angela Scolforo, Charlottesville, VA, David E. Wright, H. David Cox, Cox Law Group, PLLC, Lynchburg, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey L. Marks, Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., Virginia Beach, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

REBECCA B. CONNELLY, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. The question the Court must answer is whether a Chapter 13 Trustee's strong arm powers under section 544(a)(3) may defeat an unrecorded deed of trust or whether equitable remedies may block the trustee's powers.

The Parties

Herbert L. Beskin, Chapter 13 Trustee (the Trustee), and Michael and Brandy Perrow (the Debtors) (collectively, the Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against BAC Home Loan Servicing LP (the Defendant) and CTC Real Estate Services, Inc. (the Third–Party Defendant) (collectively, the Defendants). The Plaintiffs seek avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) of Defendant's alleged interest in Debtors' real property and disallowance of Defendant's proof of claim under 11 U.S.C. 502.1 The Defendants' assert a counterclaim and a third party claim seeking six grounds of equitable relief, namely: declaratory judgment, equitable subrogation, specific performance, constructive trust, equitable lien, and relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (the “Counterclaim”).2

Procedural Posture and Background

On April 22, 2009, the Debtors filed for Chapter 13 relief. The Debtors' listed Defendant as an unsecured creditor on Schedule F.3 The Debtors explained on Schedule A 4 why Defendant was listed as unsecured. On July 2, 2009, the Debtors filed an amended Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors' amended plan listed Defendant as unsecured and proposed to pay Defendant a two percent dividend. Defendant never objected to the amended plan. The Debtors'amended plan was confirmed as proposed on September 17, 2009. On September 24, 2009, Defendant filed a proof of claim as a secured creditor. The deadline for filing claims was August 17, 2009.

On August 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs initiated this adversary proceeding to avoid Defendant's unrecorded deed of trust. Defendants later added the Third–Party Defendant as a necessary party. On October 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (the “Complaint”), which is the basis of the matter for decision before the Court. The Complaint seeks to avoid Defendant's unrecorded deed of trust under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) and asks that the Court to disallow Defendant's proof of claim as untimely.5 Defendants answered the Complaint and asserted as affirmative defenses 6 six grounds of equitable relief to Plaintiff's Complaint—declaratory judgment, equitable subrogation, specific performance, constructive trust, equitable lien, and relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105.7

On January 27, 2013, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs followed suit and filed a motion for summary judgment on their Complaint on February 25, 2013. On that same day, Defendant filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment on its Counterclaim. After hearings on March 14, 2013, and April 25, 2013, the matter was taken under advisement.

Facts

The facts of this case are minimal and undisputed. On September 20, 2004, the male debtor entered into a loan (the 2004 Loan”) with Charter Capital (the Third–Party Defendant) for $133,299. The 2004 Loan was secured by a deed of trust (the 2004 DoT”) on the male debtor's real property. The 2004 DoT was properly recorded October 20, 2004.

On July 20, 2005, the male debtor deeded by gift his real property to himself and the female debtor as tenants by the entirety. The deed of gift was properly recorded on August 2, 2005.

Debtors entered into a refinance loan (the 2006 Loan”) with another bank on June 12, 2006, in the amount of $184,500, repayment of which was secured by a deed of trust (the 2006 DoT”) on Debtors' real property. The 2006 DoT was properly recorded on July 24, 2006. The proceeds from the 2006 Loan were used to pay off the 2004 Loan, but the Third–Party Defendant never recorded a release of its 2004 DoT.

On May 15, 2007, the Debtors entered into a refinance loan (the 2007 Loan”) with BAC Home Loan Servicing LP, fka Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (the Defendant) for $197,900, the repayment of which was secured by a deed of trust (the 2007 DoT”) on the Debtors' real property. The 2007 DoT was never recorded and has since been lost, misplaced, or destroyed. The proceeds from the 2007 Loan were used to pay off the 2006 Loan and a release of the 2006 DoT was properly recorded on July 2, 2007.

On April 22, 2009, the Debtors filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 of Title 11. The Debtors' Chapter 13 plan was confirmed on September 17, 2009. The Defendant never filed an objection to the plan. After confirmation of the plan, on September 24, 2009, Defendant filed a proof of claim as a secured creditor in Debtors bankruptcy case. Subsequently, the Trustee with Debtors jointly filed this adversary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) seeking to avoid Defendant's unrecorded deed of trust.

JURISDICTION AND THE COURT'S AUTHORITY

This adversary proceeding is a civil proceeding arising in a case filed under Title 11 of the United States Code. Specifically, the plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding are the Chapter 13 Trustee and the Chapter 13 debtors, and the defendants are creditors of the Debtors. The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. This matter is a core proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code because it is a proceeding to determine the Chapter 13 Trustee's ability to use his “strong-arm” powers under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code and to determine the extent, priority, and validity of an alleged lien under Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B) and (K). This Bankruptcy Court can hear this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and the Western District of Virginia District Court Order of Reference.8

Constitutional Authority and the Stern v. Marshall Opinion

In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court found that a bankruptcy court may have statutory authority to hear a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157, yet not Constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in that proceeding. ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2608, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). In Stern, the Supreme Court determined that a bankruptcy court could not issue a final ruling on a state law counterclaim against a non-creditor third party even if the counterclaim was a core proceeding. Id. at 2615. The test for whether a bankruptcy court has constitutional authority to enter a final judgment is “whether the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process.” Id. at 2618.

The Defendants have requested summary judgment on multiple state law counterclaims. Some of these counterclaims do not stem from the bankruptcy itself, but ultimately impact the claim allowance process. The Counterclaim lists several equitable remedies, all of which allegedly allow the Defendant to claim an interest or lien in the Debtors' real property superior to that of the Trustee's interest under section 544(a)(3). If, however, the Defendant does not have a valid interest or lien, or the Trustee is able to avoid Defendant's interest, then the Defendant may not have an allowed secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). As a consequence, Defendant may have an unsecured claim. Id. As an unsecured creditor, Defendant's proof of claim would be susceptible to disallowance as untimely because Defendant's proof of claim was filed thirty-eight days after the bar date. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501 and 502. Plaintiffs' Complaint specifically requests such relief. The equitable remedies put forth by Defendants in the Counterclaim are, therefore, necessary to the claims allowance process because they will ultimately determine whether Defendants' claim is secured and allowed or unsecured and, potentially, disallowed. Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2618. Furthermore, to the extent the Counterclaim asserts affirmative defenses to the Trustee's ability to exercise his strong-arm power, they stem from the bankruptcy itself. Id. The Court concludes that it has authority to issue a final ruling on all matters currently before it.

Conclusions of Law
Summary Judgment

This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Complaint and Defendants' motion for summary judgment on counts II through VI of their Counterclaim. On motions for summary judgment, the Court must apply a different standard of review than it would on the merits of the case at trial. The Fourth Circuit has summarized the standard:

Summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a genuine issue exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make an adequate showing on an essential element for which it has the burden of proof at trial. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Mulkanoor v. Am. Home Mortg. Corp (In re Mulkanoor)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • October 28, 2018
    ......Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Indenture Trustee for American ... In re Perrow , 498 B.R. 560, 580 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013). Finally, ......
  • Kelley v. McCormack (In re Mitchell)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • March 23, 2016
    ...constructive trust beneficiary prevails over judicial lienholder or execution creditor); Beskin v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon (In re Perrow), 498 B.R. 560, 575 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2013) (constructive trust beneficiary prevails over judicial lienholder or execution creditor under Virginia law); Elec. M &......
  • Karras v. Stirlen (In re Stirlen)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • April 30, 2020
    ...... See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A. , 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) ; ... See Beskin v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon (In re Perrow ), 498 B.R. 560, 567 ...-defendant [may] assert in [a] cross-complaint ‘[a]ny cause of action against any of the parties who filed the ......
  • Alexander v. Barnwell Cnty. Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • September 13, 2013
    ...... Medicare overpayments, $47,500.00 to First Citizens Bank and ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT