Best v. California Apprenticeship Council

• Decision Date: 31 March 1987
• Citation: 193 Cal.App.3d 1448,240 Cal.Rptr. 1
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Stephen BEST, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL, Respondent and Appellant, SAN DIEGO COUNTY ELECTRICAL JOINT APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING COMMITTEE, Real Party in Interest and Appellant. D003633.

Page 1

240 Cal.Rptr. 1

193 Cal.App.3d 1448

Stephen BEST, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA APPRENTICESHIP COUNCIL, Respondent and Appellant SAN DIEGO COUNTY ELECTRICAL JOINT APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING COMMITTEE, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

D003633.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

March 31, 1987.

Atwood, Hurst & Knox & Andersen, Stanford H. Atwood, Jr., Peter Uzzi, San Jose, for petitioner and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Timothy G. Laddish and Calvin J. Abe, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and appellant.

Ludecke, McGrath & Denton, L. William McGrath, San Diego, for real party in interest and appellant.

WORK, Acting Presiding Justice.

Stephen Best appeals a judgment awarding him attorney's fees under CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1021.5¹, contending the trial court erred in disallowing an award for fees incurred during administrative proceedings. We agree with his contention, reverse that portion of the judgment, and remand the case for a further calculation of attorney's fees. San Diego County Electrical Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee (JATC) and California Apprenticeship Council (CAC) ² cross-appeal, meritlessly contending Best should not have been awarded any attorney's fees at all.

I

The facts underlying this case appear in a decision of this court, Best v. California Apprenticeship Council (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 626, 207 Cal.Rptr. 863. Best, a participant in the JATC program, applied to JATC for an exemption based on religious belief from assignment to a nuclear power plant. JATC denied his request and disciplined him with a 60-day suspension and termination from the program. Best appealed the decision, and after an administrative hearing, an administrator held JATC unreasonably applied its policy by ignoring Best's religious beliefs and concern for his safety. JATC appealed the administrator's decision to CAC, which reinstated JATC's decision. Best petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to set aside CAC's decision, which was denied. Best appealed to this court, and we reversed the trial court's decision, holding JATC had a duty to accommodate Best's religious beliefs. We directed the superior court to issue a writ vacating CAC's decision and to order CAC to adopt the decision of the administrator. (Id. at pp. 628-629, 636-637, 207 Cal.Rptr. 863.)

The superior court entered judgment in accord with our decision, including an award of $17,331.50 attorney's fees against JATC and CAC under section 1021.5. The superior court disallowed fees for expenses incurred during the administrative proceedings before the administrator and CAC, citing our decision in Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 212 Cal.Rptr. 485. The court also denied an award of attorney's fees under 42 United States Code section 1988.

II

Section 1021.5 states:

"Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be required to be filed therefor." (Emphasis added.)

In Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 115-116, 212 Cal.Rptr. 485, we held the prevailing party-plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for expenses incurred during administrative proceedings, but did not decide the issue now posed. The facts in Beach Colony II were similar to those here: administrative proceedings were first held before the California Coastal Commission, followed by a writ of mandate petition to the superior court. (Id. at p. 109, 212 Cal.Rptr. 485.) First, we reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees for the writ of mandate litigation, on the basis that the plaintiff, a partnership formed to develop real property, had made no showing its financial burden transcended its personal financial interest in the outcome, and section 1021.5's policy of encouraging public interest lawsuits would not be promoted by awarding fees to persons having strong personal economic interests in litigating matters. (Id. at p. 115, 212 Cal.Rptr. 485.)

Second, we affirmed the trial court's disallowance of attorney's fees incurred during administrative hearings before the Coastal Commission. We noted the language of section 1021.5 referring only to "in any action ...", and the definition of "action" in Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 636, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985, (Serrano IV ), as a form of judicial remedy administered by the courts of justice or by judicial officers empowered for that purpose. ³ We concluded under Serrano IV "an administrative agency may not award a successful petitioner attorney's fees under a private attorney general theory for prevailing in nonjudicial (i.e., legislative) proceedings." (Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 116, 212 Cal.Rptr. 485.) We also noted the contrasting language in section 1028.5, ⁴ which unlike section 1021.5, included a provision for attorney's fees for "expenses incurred in administrative proceedings." We concluded the "absence of any reference to administrative proceedings in section 1021.5 suggests, at least, the section was not meant to apply to nonjudicial aspects of an administrative proceeding." (Ibid., emphasis added.) Finally, we stated "[a]ssuming, without conceding, that section 1021.5 permits a court to award attorneys fees for expenses incurred during the quasi-judicial portion of administrative proceedings from which judicial review is taken through writ procedures, Colony II is nevertheless precluded from an award of attorneys fees under the private attorney general theory because it does not show its burden was out of proportion to its individual stake." (Ibid., emphasis added.)

Thus, our holding in Beach Colony II left open the possibility that section 1021.5 allows attorney's fees arising from quasi-judicial, as opposed to quasi-legislative, administrative proceedings. This holding is consistent with the California Supreme Court's reasoning in Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Comm. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 906-908, 160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41, which held the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), had the equitable power to award attorney's fees under the common fund doctrine ⁵ in quasi-judicial reparation ⁶ actions.

In contrast, Consumers Lobby also held that attorney's fees were not available for expenses incurred during PUC rate-making proceedings, since these were quasi-legislative (i.e., adopting rules and fixing rates which are prospective in application) rather than quasi-judicial (i.e., looking to the past to remedy primarily private injury and adjudicate vested interests). (Id. at p. 909, 160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41.) The court explained that in rate-making proceedings much public participation is allowed, the commission's task is to assimilate the varying views into a composite "public interest," the result is often not a clear-cut victory for any party, and isolating the contribution of numerous intervenors is likely to be impossible. (Ibid.)

We see no reason why the holding of Consumers Lobby, finding attorney's fees appropriately awarded for quasi-judicial administrative proceedings in cases involving the common fund doctrine, should not apply with equal force to cases involving the private attorney general doctrine. However, we must determine whether the Legislature has evinced a contrary intent merely by enacting section 1021.5 without including the term "proceeding." Section 1021.5 codifies the private attorney general doctrine, whereas the common fund doctrine has not been so codified. ⁷ In the discussion in Consumers Lobby disallowing the award of attorney's fees for quasi-legislative proceedings, there is dicta which arguably suggests that the omission of the term "proceeding" in section 1021.5 indicates a legislative intent not to allow attorney's fees based on that section for any administrative proceedings. Consumers Lobby states:

"TURN advances two additional theories under which the commission assertedly has jurisdiction to award attorney fees in quasi-legislative ratemaking proceedings. First, TURN invokes Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. That section, however, only authorizes 'a court' to award attorney fees 'in any action.' By no stretch of definition is the commission a 'court' when acting in this context, nor is a ratemaking proceeding an 'action' within the meaning of the statute. We must assume, rather, that if the Legislature had intended section 1021.5 to apply to administrative agencies in any of their functions, it would have plainly said so. Because there is no such language in the statute, we conclude that section 1021.5 does not authorize the commission to award attorney fees in ratemaking proceedings. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id. at p. 910, 160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41, emphasis added.)

Wallace v. Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 836, 847-848, 216 Cal.Rptr. 694, held the language in Consumers Lobby regarding section 1021.5 did not prohibit an award for fees incurred in all administrative proceedings. The court held a trial court could award fees for services in administrative proceedings which were inextricably intertwined with the court action. Clearly, Consumers Lobby interprets section 1021.5 in the context of an administrative agency's power to award...