Best v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 05 March 1934
• Docket Number: No. 477,477
• Citation: 54 S.Ct. 487,291 U.S. 411,78 L.Ed. 882
• Parties: BEST v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

291 U.S. 411

54 S.Ct. 487

78 L.Ed. 882

BEST

v DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 477.

Argued Feb. 9, 1934.

Decided March 5, 1934.

Messrs. John H. Burnett and James A. O'Shea, both of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Robert E. Lynch, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from page 412-413 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner's intestate, a child 5 years of age, while playing on a wharf belonging to the District of Columbia, fell through a hole in the wharf and was drowned. This action was for damages for the alleged negligence of the District. After a jury had been impaneled, an opening statement was made by plaintiff's counsel, and thereupon the court, on motion of the defendant and without taking testimony, directed a verdict in defendant's favor upon the ground that no cause of action had been stated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment (62 App.D.C. 271, 66 F.(2d) 797), and this Court granted certiorari.

The opening statement by plaintiff's counsel was as follows:

'This is a case against the District of Columbia filed by Mr. Best as administrator for the estate of his son. The facts that we will show you, briefly, are these, that Mr. Best's son was a child of five years of age and that on the day in question he and other children were playing down at a wharf close to where the Norfolk boats leave for Norfolk, and this wharf was operated and controlled by the District of Columbia; that they had there on this wharf some boards which extended over the water and they had in the wharf, as several witnesses will testify, from ten to thirteen holes of various and varying sizes; that one of the holes was quite large, approximately 3 feet in diameter; that this place was not fenced off; that it did have some sort of a barrier close to the street. There was no sidewalk, but the side portion was down and that the children went in and out at their pleasure, and that this son of Mr. Best went in there on this morning and while in there fell through one of the holes in this wharf.

'That there was no one that at the time to keep the children away, and that the watchman who was stationed arrived some time after this occurrence; that the children used this place to play on and play in; and that the District having maintained it in a condition such that it was dangerous to the life and limb of these children it is responsible for the child having been attracted there, going in and falling through this hole. Of course the child died, having been drowned; and the damages that the plaintiff has suffered as representing the estate of the child will be determined by you in your verdict if you are convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that we have established our case.

'That this wharf is not part of the public highway but is on private property of the District of Columbia, and is not a place to which the public is admitted, but is a place where the boats dock and unload sand which is taken out and used by the District.'

There is no question as to the power of the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel where that statement establishes that the plaintiff has no right to recover. The power of the court to act upon facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its power to act upon evidence produced. Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103 U.S. 261, 263, 26 L.Ed. 539. The exercise of this power in a proper case is not only not objectionable, but is convenient in saving time and expense by shortening trials. Liverpool, N.Y. & P. Staeamship Co. v. Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 37, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899. But the power is not properly exercised if the opening statement leaves doubt as to the facts or permits conflicting inferences. Where uncertainty arises either from a conflict of testimony or because the facts being undisputed, fair-minded men may honestly draw different conclusions from them, the question is not one of law, but of fact to be settled by the jury. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 45, 13 S.Ct. 748, 37 L.Ed. 642; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Harvey, 228 U.S. 319, 324, 33 S.Ct. 518, 57 L.Ed. 852; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed. 720. The opening statement of counsel is ordinarily intended to do no more than to inform the jury in a general way of the nature of the action and defense so that they may better be prepared to understand the evidence. 'If a doubt exists,' said the Court in the Oscanyan Case, supra, 'as to the statement of counsel, the court will withhold its directions, as where the evidence is conflicting, and leave the matter to the determination of the jury.' Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all inferences that may be drawn from his counsel's statement. To warrant the court in directing a verdict for defendant upon that statement, it is not enough that the statement be lacking in definiteness, but it must clearly appear, after resolving all doubts in plaintiff's favor, that no cause of action exists. See Illinois Power & Light Corporation v. Hurley (C.C.A.) 49 F.(2d) 681, 684; Stuthman v. United States (D.C.) 67 F.(2d) 521, 523.

The controversy in this case largely turns upon a difference of view as to the inferences to be drawn from the opening statement. Thus respondent argues that there was a failure to show that 'the wharf could be seen from the public space'; that 'the child was attracted by the presence of the wharf itself, or any article or thing which may have been upon the wharf'; that 'there was any latent or hidden danger at the place' where the child met his death; that 'there was ever a prior accident to children at or near this wharf'; that 'respondent invited or permitted petitioner's intestate or other children to enter or play on its wharf.' But with respect to each of these circumstances (with a single unimportant exception) the opening statement of counsel permitted an inference in petitioner's favor. Thus his counsel stated that 'this place was not fenced off; that it did have some sort of a barrier close to the street. There was no sidewalk, but the side portion was down.' From this it was not inadmissible to infer that the wharf, without a fence and close to the street, with the side portion of the barrier...