Best v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12–CV–7028 KMK. |
| Citation | 14 F.Supp.3d 341 |
| Parties | Sean BEST, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Deputy Perez, John Doe, Captain Merced, Warden George Okada, Captain Kurtaz, Captain A. Taylor, O'Connor, John Doe, and The City of New York, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Sean Best, Elmira, NY, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Ryan Shaffer, Esq., Office of the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants.
Pro se Plaintiff Sean Best (“Best”) brings this Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants New York City Department of Correction (“NYC DOC”), Deputy Perez, Captain Merced, Warden George Okada (“Warden Okada”), Captain Kurtaz, Captain A. Taylor (“Captain Taylor”), “O'Connor,” the City of New York (“the City”), and two John Does violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendants the City, Captain Merced, O'Connor, and Warden Okada move to dismiss all claims that Plaintiff asserts against them. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
The events giving rise to the instant Action began on March 5, 2009, at which time Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York. (See Am. Compl. 2, 4.)1 On that date, Plaintiff “received an infraction,” (id. at 4), which appears to have been based at least in part on allegations that he possessed drugs,
A hearing related to Plaintiff's infraction was held on March 10, 2009. (See Am. Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that, at the hearing, Captain Taylor, who appears to have been the presiding officer, “failed to furnish [Plaintiff] with any physical evidence or any reports of the alleged contraband—no photo copies, no chain of custody, no drug test results....” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that Captain Taylor “failed [to provide Plaintiff with] the opportunity to call [his] witness....” (Id. at 7; see also id. at 9 ().) Upon the hearing's conclusion, Plaintiff was told that he would receive a disposition within 72 hours. (See id. at 4.) On the night of March 10, 2009, Plaintiff was “served with a disposition by Capt[ain] Kurtaz.” (Id. ) When Plaintiff “looked at the disposition[, he] realized that there was no signature by an adjudicating capt [ain].” (Id. ) “In fact[,] half of the whole disposition was not filled out.” (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that the disposition was “not even clear on whether the charges were dismissed or not,” or on “anything” at all. (Id. at 8.) After explaining these deficiencies to Captain Kurtaz, Plaintiff “refused to sign for” the disposition, which he viewed as “invalid.” (Id. at 4.)
Following Plaintiff's receipt of the disposition, “[a]s a result of [the] infraction,” he was “moved from [MDC] ..., which was easily accessible by his attorney and[/]or family, to [the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”) on] Rikers Island ... [,] which is located ... several hours away from [Plaintiff's] family, friends, and his attorney.” (Id. at 12.) After he arrived at GRVC, Plaintiff alleges that he was “placed in punitive segregation....” (Id. at 2.) While in segregated housing, Plaintiff claims that he was “deprived of access to remedial programming,” and “denied the ability to have in on trade and craft as a barber.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff further claims that he was denied “access to something so basically fundamental as hot water, each and every day at least once”; that he was only provided with access to showers three times per week; and that he was only permitted “outside recreation in a one man cage” for “one hour a day at times where minimal sunlight [was] provided....” (Id. )
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege for how long he remained in segregated housing. However, he does allege that he repeatedly challenged the validity of his disposition and resultant placement in segregated housing in communications with various MDC and GRVC officials and in New York state court, but to no avail. (See id. at 4–5) ( ); id. at 5 ( ); id. at 6 (); id. ( ). Plaintiff claims that he was not removed from segregated housing even though the officials with whom he communicated acknowledged that his placement there was illegal. (See id. ) (“[T]hough all aforementioned parties knew I was held illegally[,] no one did anything about it.”); id. at 5 ( ).
Plaintiff alleges that, some time after he was placed in segregated housing, “while being transported to court, handcuffs [were] placed behind [Plaintiff's] back and [he was] placed in a cage with no seatbelt or a way to protect [himself] in case of a sudden stop or accident.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also alleges that, “while riding[, he sat] on a slippery seat that cause[d] [him] to continuously slide.” (Id. ) “On [his] way to court, the bus kept stopping short and [Plaintiff] continued to bump [his] head on the gate in front of [him].” (Id. ) Plaintiff “complained to the driver.” (Id. ) After Plaintiff arrived at the courthouse, he “was tak[en] to [the medical center] at [MDC],” where “[his] injuries were assessed and an injury report was filed.” (Id. ) Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the injuries that he sustained during this trip, “[his] neck and shoulders were injured,” and that “[he has] to take medication for migraine headaches....” (Id. at 4.)
On September 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's case was assigned to this Court on November 7, 2012. (See Dkt. No. 4.) On March 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 15.) On May 24, 2013, Defendants Captain Merced, O'Connor, Warden Okada, and the City filed a Motion to Dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 28.) In their accompanying Memorandum of Law, the moving Defendants note that their Motion to Dismiss is ‘ (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl.
( ) 1 n. 1.)2 Plaintiff submitted his Opposition to Defendants' Motion on June 17, 2013, (see Dkt. No. 32), in response to which Defendants submitted a Reply Memorandum of Law on August 1, 2013, (see Dkt. No. 36), at which point Defendants' Motion was fully submitted.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Instead, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed,” id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ( ; id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial