Best v. Richie, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-00257-KD-N

• Decision Date: 03 March 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-00257-KD-N
• Parties: WILLIAM R. BEST, JR., Petitioner, v. WARDEN PATRICE RICHIE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

WILLIAM R. BEST, JR., Petitioner, v. WARDEN PATRICE RICHIE, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-00257-KD-N

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

March 3, 2021

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, William R. Best, Jr., a state prisoner currently in the custody of the Respondent Warden Patrice Ritchie, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Best challenges the validity of his 2015 convictions for Rape in the First Degree and Incest in the Circuit Court of Dallas County, Alabama. (Doc. 5). This action was referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Following a thorough review of the petition and record, the undersigned finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.¹

Having carefully considered Best's petition, Respondent's answer, and Best's reply, the undersigned finds that Best's petition is due to be denied. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Best's habeas petition be DENIED in its entirety, that judgment be entered in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner, William R. Best, Jr., and that if Best seeks the issuance of a certificate of appealability, his request be denied, along with any request to appeal in forma pauperis.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS.

On July 2, 2014, Best was charged in a four-count indictment for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and incest. (Doc. 9-2 at 54-55). Best entered a plea of not guilty and waiver of arraignment form on September 29, 2014. (Doc. 9-2 at 57). On June 8, 2015, Best entered a "best interest" guilty plea to the charges of first-degree rape, in exchange for a 20-year sentence, and pleaded guilty to incest, in exchange for a 10-year sentence. (Doc. 9-2 at 59, 61-62). In exchange for the guilty pleas, the charges of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse were dismissed. (Id. at 64). Best was sentenced on June 8, 2015, to the Alabama Department of Corrections, with his sentences to run concurrently. (Doc. 9-2 at 64-65). Best did not appeal his convictions. (Doc. 5 at 3).

On May 10, 2016, Best filed a petition for postconviction relief, pro se, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure collaterallyattacking his guilty-plea convictions. (Doc. 9-2 at 15-43). In his Rule 32 petition, Best raised the following issues:

(1) that his guilty plea was unknowing and unlawful (id. at 23-27);

(2) that the indictment was legally insufficient (id. at 27-29);

(3) that his confession was coerced (id. at 29-32);

(4) that the prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence in violation of Brady (id. at 32-33) ;

(5) his convictions violated double jeopardy principles (id. at 33-34);

(6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel (id. at 34-41);

(7) that he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal (id. at 41-42); and

(8) that he was denied disability accommodations, which prevented him from participating in preparation of his defense (id. at 42).

On May 16, 2017, Best was granted in forma pauperis status, and a hearing was set in the matter for September 20, 2016. (Doc. 9-2 at 7). Thereafter, the State responded to Best's petition and moved for dismissal due to failure to raise the claims at trial or on appeal in violation of Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), respectively, and for failure to sufficiently plead his claims pursuant to Rule 32.3 and 32.6(b). (Doc. 9-2 at 50-51). The State further reasoned that Best's claims were meritless. (Id.).

On August 26, 2016, Best filed an "Amendment to Rule 32 Petition for Relief from Conviction or Sentence" ("Amendment to Rule 32 Petition" or "Amended Petition"), where he explicitly requested that the circuit courtreplace his argument found in his original petition with the arguments listed in his amended petition.² (Doc. 9-4 at 2-9). On Spetember 15, 2016, Best filed an Addendum to Rule 32 Petition ("Addendum"), requesting that certain facts be added to his Amended Rule 32 Petition, but making no substantial alterations or additions to the Amended Petition. (Doc. 9-2 at 116-120).

A hearing was held on September 20, 2016, where Best requested an attorney and an extension for the hearing and was informed by the court that a lawyer would be appointed for him and the hearing rescheduled for 60 or 90 days.³ (Doc. 9-4 at 14). However, Best was not appointed counsel, was not afforded another hearing, and on May 2, 2017, the trial court summarily denied Best's petition. (Doc. 9-2 at 139-40, 142; Doc. 19 at 2). The trial court, adopting verbatim the State's proposed order, found that Best's claims were precluded, insufficiently pleaded, and/or meritless. (Doc. 9-2 at 139-40).

Best appealed the trial court's ruling to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. (Doc. 9-5). On February 9, 2018, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, by memorandum opinion, the judgment of the trial court denying Best's Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 9-7). Best's applicationfor rehearing was overruled on March 2, 2018, and his application for certiorari review was denied by the Alabama Supreme Court. (Doc. 9-1 at 1). A certificate of judgment was issued on Best's Rule 32 appeal on May 11, 2018. (Id.).

On June 29, 2018, Best filed the instant and timely petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking federal habeas relief of his state court convictions, setting forth the following grounds for relief:

(1) Unlawful guilty plea due to the court's failure to conduct the plea colloquy in open court (Doc. 5 at 6, 13);

(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

a. where counsel mislead Best as to the charges against him (Doc. 5 at 7, 14-15);

b. where counsel misinformed Best as to the consequences of his plea (Doc. 5 at 7, 15-16);

c. where counsel failed to provide Best with reasonable disability accommodations (Doc. 5 at 7, 16-17);

(3) Unlawful guilty plea where Best was not informed of the charges against him with adequate notice to prepare defense (Doc. 5 at 8, 18); and

(4) Unlawfully induced guilty plea where Best was denied reasonable accommodations for his disability (Doc. 5 at 8, 19-20).

Respondent contends that these claims are procedurally barred or provide no basis for habeas relief. (Doc. 9 at 3-15).

II. FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW STANDARDS.

This Court's review of Best's petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, "the role of thefederal court . . . is strictly limited." Jones v. Walker, 496 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2007).

A. Merits Review.

AEDPA significantly limits the scope of federal review where the state court adjudicated a claim on the merist. Specifically, § 2254(d) provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

According to subsection (1), "[a] federal habeas court may issue the writ under the 'contrary to' clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 152L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002). "A state court's decision is not 'contrary to ... clearly established Federal law' simply because the court did not cite our opinions." Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16, 124 S. Ct. 7, 157 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2003). Indeed, "a state court need not even be aware of our precedents, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Id. (internal quotes omitted).

The "clearly established Federal law" contemplated by subsection (1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [U.S. Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003) (internal quotes omitted); accord Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37-38, 132 S. Ct. 38, 181 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2011). Moreover, review under Section 2254(d)(1) is "limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011).

Importantly, "[f]or purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (internal quotes omitted, emphasis in original). Thus, "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. (internal quotes omitted). That is, "an unreasonable applicationof those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L. Ed. 2d 698 (2014) (internal quotes omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (...