Best v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 18 September 2015
• Docket Number: 12-CV-6142 (NGG) (MDG)
• Parties: HILARY BEST, Plaintiff, v. MYLES SCHNEIDER, ANKUR SARAIYA, MICHAEL HOGAN, ANN MARIE BARBAROTTA, MARIA LOURDES GONZALES, PHILIP NINAN, and YEVGENIY KHALDAROV, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

HILARY BEST, Plaintiff, v. MYLES SCHNEIDER, ANKUR SARAIYA, MICHAEL HOGAN, ANN MARIE BARBAROTTA,MARIA LOURDES GONZALES, PHILIP NINAN, and YEVGENIY KHALDAROV, Defendants.

12-CV-6142 (NGG) (MDG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

September 18, 2015

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Hilary Best brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking both monetary and injunctive relief for the violation of his constitutional rights in connection with his involuntary commitment at Creedmoor Psychiatric Center ("Creedmoor) in Queens, New York. Defendants Myles Schneider and Ankur Saraiya (collectively, "City Defendants"), are psychiatrists employed by Bellevue Hospital Center ("Bellevue"), and are represented by the New York City Law Department. Defendants Ann Marie Barbarotta, Maria Lourdes Gonzales, Philip Ninan, and Yevgeniy Khaldarov¹ (collectively, "State Defendants"), are employed by Creedmoor, and are represented by the New York State Attorney General.² Both City and State Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. 6) in its entirety.

Before the court is Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), dated September 10, 2014, recommending that City Defendants' motion be granted in full, and that State Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part. (R&R (Dkt. 78) at 31.) Both Plaintiff and State Defendants filed objections to the R&R. For the reasons that follow, State Defendant's objections are SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART; Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. Accordingly, the R&R is ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

The following facts are drawn from Judge Go's R&R, as well as (1) several documents that Plaintiff directly incorporated into his Amended Complaint, see Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (documents attached to a complaint or incorporated into it by reference are deemed part of the pleadings and may be considered in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss)); and (2) public records, of which this court may take judicial notice, see Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (courts may take judicial notice of certain records to establish the fact of such filings but not for the truth of the matters asserted therein).

On August 21, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested and charged in New York Criminal Court, New York County, with harassment in the first degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, and stalking in the fourth degree. (See Certificate of Disposition, People v. Best, No. 2011NY061966 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013) (State Defs.' Sept. 17, 2013, Ltr. ("Velez Ltr.") (Dkt. 70), Ex. B (Dkt. 70-2)) at 1.) According to State court records, Plaintiff had harassed a woman by calling her approximately nine times, despite her previous request that he notcontact her in any manner. (See Misdemeanor Compl., Best, No. 2011NY061966 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011) (Velez Ltr., Ex. B) at 1-2.) The State also alleged that although he had never shared a relationship with this woman, Plaintiff appeared at her mother's residence and confronted her mother, asking why she was hiding his wife and child from him. (Id. at 2.)

On August 1, 2012, New York State Supreme Court Justice Jennifer G. Schecter issued an order directing that Plaintiff be examined pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") section 730 to determine whether he was mentally incapacitated and therefore unfit to proceed with trial. (See Examination Report, Best, No. 2011NY061966 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) (Am. Compl. app. (Dkt. 6-1)) at 1.) See also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.30(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff was examined on August 9 and 22, 2012, by two psychiatrists—Defendant Dr. Myles Schneider and Defendant Dr. Ankur Saraiya—of the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at Bellevue. (See generally Am. Compl. app. at 1-14.) Both Schneider and Saraiya diagnosed Plaintiff with Delusional Disorder and determined that as a result of this condition, Plaintiff lacked both the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. (Id. at 2, 5, 7, 14.) Consequently, they concluded that Plaintiff was an "incapacitated person" within the meaning of section 730, and thus Plaintiff was unfit to proceed to trial. (Id.) See also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.10(1) (defining "incapacitated person").

On September 7, 2012, New York State Supreme Court Justice Melissa Jackson issued an order (1) adjudicating Plaintiff an incapacitated person, (2) directing that Plaintiff remain detained for no more than 90 days at Bellevue, pending the designation of an appropriate facility by the Commissioner of Mental Health (the "Commissioner"), and (3) dismissing the misdemeanor complaint against Plaintiff. (Final Order for Observation and Dismissal of Accusatory Instrument ("Final Order"), Best, No. 2011NY061966 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 7, 2012)(Velez Ltr., Ex. C (Dkt. 70-3)) at 3; see also id. (noting no motion for hearing was made).) See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.40(1) ("If [the court] is satisfied that the defendant is an incapacitated person . . . such court must issue a final or temporary order of observation committing him or her to the custody of the commissioner for care and treatment in an appropriate institution for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date of the order . . . ."). Plaintiff was not immediately transferred to a facility under the "care and custody" of the Commissioner (see id.), because he was at that time being held at Rikers Island Correctional Facility, in the custody of the City of New York, pursuant to unrelated misdemeanor charges pending against him in New York Criminal Court, Bronx County. (See R&R at 3 n.3 (citing Sept. 6, 2013, Hr'g Tr. at 13-14; Case Details, People v. Best, No. 2012BX049460 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) (Velez Ltr., Ex. D (Dkt. 70-4)) at 2-3).) In connection with those charges, for which he was being held on $ 1 bail, Plaintiff made seven appearances in Bronx Criminal Court between September 6, 2012, and November 28, 2012. (See Case Details, Best, No. 2012BX049460 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) at 2-3.)

On December 3, 2012, however, the Office of Mental Health ("OMH") Bureau of Institutional and Transitional Services, Division of Forensic Services, ultimately designated Creedmoor to receive Plaintiff for care and treatment pursuant to section 730. (R&R at 3; see also CPL Designation Notification (Velez Ltr., Ex. B) at 2 (reflecting that Plaintiff was being transferred from Rikers Island).) On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred from the custody of New York City to Creedmoor, an OMH-operated psychiatric hospital that provides inpatient and outpatient treatment for adults with mental illness. (See Am. Compl. at 6; State Defs.' Objections to R&R ("State Defs.' Obj.") (Dkt. 85) at 3; see also Ltr. of Incarceration (City Defs.' Oct. 1, 2013, Ltr. (Dkt. 72), Ex. A (Dkt. 72-1)).) On December 5, 2012, Defendant AnnMarie Barbarotta, Creedmoor's Executive Director, executed an application for Plaintiff's involuntary admission to the hospital pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law section 9.27. (See Appl. for Involuntary Admission on Medical Certification (Am. Compl. app. at 16).) See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.27(a) ("The director of a hospital may receive and retain therein as a patient any person alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and treatment upon the certificates of two examining physicians, accompanied by an application for the admission of such person."). On the application, Barbarotta wrote that Plaintiff, who was sent from Rikers Island pursuant to CPL section 730.40, presented with paranoid delusions—including the belief that his landlord's attorney was bribing the judge to have Plaintiff detained—and that Plaintiff had poor insight and refused medication. (Am. Compl. app. at 16.) Another Creedmoor psychiatrist, Defendant Dr. Yevgeniy Khaldarov, confirmed the need for Plaintiff's involuntary care and treatment in a hospital, indicating that he had examined Plaintiff prior to his involuntary admission, and determined that (a) Plaintiff was in need of involuntary care and treatment, and (b) as a result of his mental illness, Plaintiff posed a "substantial threat of harm" to himself or others. (Id.) Khaldarov signed the application at 9:40 a.m. on December 5, 2012.

In apparent compliance with section 9.27, Barbarotta's application was also supported by examining physician certificates completed on December 5, 2012, by two additional Creedmoor psychiatrists, Defendant Dr. Maria Lourdes Gonzales and Defendant Dr. Philip Ninan. (See id. at 17, 18.) According to the certificates, Gonzales examined Plaintiff at 10:30 a.m., and Ninan examined Plaintiff at 11:30 a.m. the same day. (Id.) Both physicians certified that Plaintiff was in need of involuntary care and treatment for his mental illness and that, as a result of this illness, Plaintiff posed a "substantial threat of harm" to himself or others. (Id.) In particular, Gonzales indicated that Plaintiff was paranoid, had "limited insight," and refused any treatment (id. at 17);Ninan reported that Plaintiff presented with paranoid delusions of the "persecutory typ[e]," along with "poor insight" (id. at 18).

Plaintiff was subsequently provided notice of his conversion to involuntary status on December 5, 2012. (Id. at 15.) The notice form given to Plaintiff indicated that he could be kept at Creedmoor for a period of up to 60 days from the date of conversion. (Id.) He was also informed that if he believed he did not need involuntary care and treatment, he could make a written request for a court hearing. (Id.) See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.31 (a) ("If, at any time prior to the expiration of sixty days from the date of involuntary admission of a patient on an application supported by medical certification, he . . . gives...