Best v. State

Decision Date27 January 2005
Docket NumberNo. 38A04-0406-CR-303.,38A04-0406-CR-303.
Citation821 N.E.2d 419
PartiesLarry D. BEST, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Kimberly A. Jackson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Larry Best, Jr. appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

Issues

Best raises three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress all evidence seized against him. The State raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court properly found that the search warrant was facially defective.

Facts and Procedural History

Joseph Fleming rented a mobile home located at 2687 East Treaty Line Road in Portland, Indiana, in March 2002 from his father-in-law. Fleming's father-in-law stored a camper trailer on the property, which Fleming was permitted to use. Best had been to Fleming's property a dozen or more times but had never stayed overnight. On or around December 3, 2002, Fleming gave Best and Tom Coby, Best's cousin, permission to use the camper trailer to manufacture methamphetamine.1 In exchange for use of the camper trailer, Best agreed to give Fleming an "eight ball" of methamphetamine.

On December 6, 2002, a confidential informant ("C.I.") contacted Portland Police Department Officer Judson Wickey and told Officer Wickey that Best and Coby would be manufacturing methamphetamine in the camper trailer at the Treaty Line Road property later that day. Officer Wickey conducted surveillance at both the Treaty Line Road property and Coby's residence at 631 East Water Street. Although Officer Wickey observed the camper trailer and certain vehicles that the C.I. stated would be at the residences, Officer Wickey did not see any illegal activity at either residence. Officer Wickey did, however, observe the C.I. leave the Treaty Line Road property at one point during the day.

Later that evening, the C.I. again contacted Officer Wickey and stated that a batch of methamphetamine had been manufactured that day in the camper trailer. The C.I. did not see the manufacturing take place but did see the methamphetamine that was produced. The C.I. further stated that Best had a bag of methamphetamine stored in a Marlboro Light cigarette pack. Based upon this information, Officer Wickey sought a search warrant to search the Treaty Line Road property and the camper trailer, which the trial court granted. During the execution of the search warrant at the Treaty Line Road property, police officers found various items used to manufacture methamphetamine in and around the camper trailer, including blister packs of pseudoephedrine, starter fluid, and a propane tank.

On that same day, Portland Police Department Officer Robert Myers proceeded to 631 East Water Street to arrest Best on an unrelated, outstanding warrant. En route, Officer Myers stopped a vehicle driven by Annette Lennartz, Coby's girlfriend and the owner of the East Water Street residence. Officer Myers explained that he was looking for Best and requested Lennartz's consent to search her residence for Best. She consented, and police officers entered her residence to search for Best. An officer found Best inside the residence and placed him under arrest. Subsequently, officers found methamphetamine in a cigarette pack that officers knew belonged to Best on the coffee table in Lennartz's residence.

The State ultimately charged Best with two counts of dealing in methamphetamine as Class A felonies: one count for knowingly manufacturing methamphetamine having a weight of three grams or more, and one count for possessing with the intent to deliver at least three grams of methamphetamine. Best filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from the Treaty Line Road and the Water Street residences. After a hearing, the trial court denied Best's motion. Best sought and was granted certification of the trial court's denial for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Best contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence seized against him because the search pursuant to a warrant of the Treaty Line Road property and the warrantless search of the East Water Street residence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Bocko v. State, 769 N.E.2d 658, 664 (Ind.Ct.App.2002),trans. denied. We also consider the uncontested evidence that is most favorable to the defendant. Id. We will affirm the trial court's judgment if it is sustainable on any legal grounds apparent in the record. Meyers v. State, 790 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).

II. Search of Treaty Line Road Property

Best first contends that because the search warrant for the Treaty Line Road property was facially defective, all evidence seized pursuant to the search should be suppressed. We must first determine, however, (1) whether Best can assert the protection of the Fourth Amendment;2 and (2) whether Best had standing to challenge the search warrant under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

A. Fourth Amendment Protection

A person's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure are personal. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). In order to challenge a search as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place that is searched. Id.

In Carter, the defendants were sitting in a tenant's apartment bagging cocaine when a police officer observed their activity after receiving a tip from a confidential informant. Based on this observation, the police officer obtained a search warrant for the apartment, executed the warrant, and seized cocaine. The defendants had never been to the apartment before and had come for the sole purpose of packaging cocaine. They were only in the apartment for approximately two-and-a-half hours. The State ultimately charged the defendants, and the defendants moved to suppress the evidence found at the apartment. Id. at 85-87, 119 S.Ct. 469.

The United States Supreme Court held that any search did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights because the defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. The Court stated,

[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.
[The defendants] were obviously not overnight guests, but were essentially present for a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of hours. There is no suggestion that they had a previous relationship with [the tenant], or that there was any other purpose to their visit.... While the apartment was a dwelling place for [the tenant], it was for [the defendants] simply a place to do business.
Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential property. "An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home." And while it was a "home" in which [the defendants] were present, it was not their home.

Id. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469 (footnote and internal citation omitted). Because the court found the defendants had no significant connection to the apartment, the nature of the transaction was purely commercial, and the defendants were in the apartment a relatively short period of time, the defendants' status was closer to one simply permitted on the premises and, therefore, any search did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.

Best argues that because he had an agreement to pay Fleming for the use of the camper trailer to manufacture methamphetamine, he can assert protection under the Fourth Amendment. Yet the facts in Carter are analogous to the facts in the instant case. Best was never an overnight guest at the Treaty Line Road property but was simply there to do business; that is, to manufacture methamphetamine. Since the property was being used by Best for purely commercial purposes, it is treated differently than property used for residential purposes. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence shows that Best never used the camper trailer as a dwelling place, but only for commercial purposes, and he was there only intermittently. Thus, like Carter, the search did not violate Best's Fourth Amendment rights because Best did not possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in the camper trailer.

B. Standing Under Article I, Section 11

In order to challenge evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, "a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized." Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078, 118 S.Ct. 858, 139 L.Ed.2d 757 (1998). In the instant case, the trial court found that Best did not have standing under Article I, Section 11 for two reasons: (1) Best did not have an interest in either the premises searched or the property seized because on the date of Best's arrest, Best told police officers that he had never been to the Treaty Line Road property; and (2) because Best had no standing to object to the officers' entry onto the Treaty Line Road property, any...

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