Beswick v. Maguire
Decision Date | 02 March 2000 |
Citation | 748 A.2d 701 |
Parties | Paul A. BESWICK and Christine O. Beswick, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Frederic B. MAGUIRE, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Stanley E. Luongo, Jr., West Chester, for appellants.
Lawrence M. Farnese, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.
¶ 1 Did the trial court err in refusing to grant a new trial to the appellants Beswicks on the basis that the jury award in their favor was inadequate to a degree that a new trial should be awarded?
¶ 2 This is a lawsuit for personal injuries to Paul Beswick and loss of consortium damages claimed by his wife as the result of injuries suffered by Beswick in a motor vehicle accident of February 3, 1995 wherein Beswick was a passenger in a vehicle operated by the appellee, Frederic B. Maguire.
¶ 3 At the conclusion of the jury trial, the 8-person jury unanimously agreed upon a verdict which found the defendant Maguire to be causally negligent for harm caused to Beswick and awarded him damages in the sum of $31,000. An award to his wife was in the sum of $5,000.
¶ 4 The trial court, per the Honorable Clement J. McGovern, Jr., denied the motions for a new trial on the basis of inadequacy of the verdict and, after affirmance by a divided panel of this court, we granted en banc reconsideration and the panel disposition was withdrawn.
¶ 5 In 1980, when faced with a claim of inadequacy of the verdict in a case of clear liability and refusal by the trial court to grant relief, we stated the applicable standards:
229 Pa.Super. 150, 324 A.2d 358 (1974). Hevener v. Reilly, 266 Pa.Super. 386, 404 A.2d 1343 (1979).
.
Mueller v. Brandon, 282 Pa.Super. 37, 422 A.2d 664 at 665-666 (1980).
¶ 6 More recently, the guiding principles have been set forth by our Supreme Court:
A jury verdict is set aside as inadequate when it appears to have been the product of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or where it clearly appears from uncontradicted evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff. Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 114, 152 A.2d 238, 240 (1959); Slaseman v. Myers, 309 Pa.Super. 537, 541, 455 A.2d 1213, 1215 (1983). Where the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to "shock one's sense of justice" a new trial should be awarded. Burrell, 438 Pa. at 289, 265 A.2d at 518; Bochar v. J.B. Martin Motors, 374 Pa. 240, 242, 97 A.2d 813, 814 (1953). It is the province of the jury to assess the worth of the testimony and to accept or reject the estimates given by the witnesses. If the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to the proven damages, it is not the function of the court to substitute its judgement for the jury's. Elza, 396 Pa. at 115,152 A.2d at 240 (citing Paustenbaugh v. Ward Baking Co., 374 Pa. 418, 97 A.2d 816 (1953)). However, where the injustice of the verdict "stand[s] forth like a beacon", a court should not hesitate to find it inadequate and order a new trial. Elza, 396 Pa. at 118,152 A.2d at 241; Slaseman, 309 Pa.Super. at 540,455 A.2d at 1215.
Kiser v. Schulte, 538 Pa. 219, 225-26, 648 A.2d 1, 4 (1994).
¶ 7 From a review of these principles, it is evident that, when reviewing alleged inadequacy of the verdict: 1) wide discretion is given to the jury in assessing damages and; 2) reviewing courts accord deference to the trial court when considering entitlement to relief. Although not articulated by our courts, it appears that the wide discretion given to jury verdicts serves practises which support the efficient operation of our jurisprudential system. We need cite no statistics to demonstrate that a significant portion of the litigation in our civil courts is occupied by personal injury tort claims. It is equally apparent that the continued vigor of our civil courts are, to a large extent, dependent on the voluntary adjustment of a great percentage of these suits by amicable agreement of the parties. Amicable agreement, in turn, is strongly encouraged by the realization that there is an inevitable risk in predicting a jury outcome. It follows that a rule of law which would discourage setting aside a jury verdict unless it does not bear a "reasonable resemblance" to the proven damages, or is the product of "passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption" so as to "shock one's sense of justice" or where the "injustice" "stands forth like a beacon", has a salutary effect on the health of our courts by imposing an onerous burden on one who would invalidate a jury verdict.
¶ 8 With these efficacious principles (which logically and properly apply to both claimed inadequate and excessive verdicts) in mind, we review the present appeal.
¶ 9 Although the issue was given to the jury for its determination, it is patent that this was a case of inescapable liability. Appellant Beswick was a passenger in appellee Maguire's vehicle driven by Maguire on a two lane highway with a snow cover when he lost control of his vehicle causing a collision with another vehicle. Maguire pled guilty to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and, at trial, admitted that he was unfamiliar with the road handling characteristics of his own vehicle. The jury verdict is clear and unimpeachable. Thus, there is no basis for argument for compromise of damages on the basis of contested liability. See, Boyd v. Hertz Corp., 219 Pa.Super. 488, 281 A.2d 679 (1971); Elza v. Chovan, supra.
Nor, since the immediate injuries were clear cut and objectively demonstrable, is there any basis for finding that the liability issues and damage issues are intertwined so as to detract from being the substantial cause of Beswick's immediate injuries. See, Dougherty v. Sadsbury Township, 299 Pa.Super. 357, 445 A.2d 793 (1982); Mano v. Madden, 738 A.2d 493 (Pa.Super.1999) (en banc).
¶ 10 The extensive expert testimony placed in evidence by plaintiff Beswick, leaves no room for doubt that he suffered severe and disabling injuries as an immediate result of the accident. He was found in the vehicle by emergency medical personnel in an unconscious state, bleeding from the nose, and showing signs of brain injury. Taken to Crozer Chester Hospital, the brain injury was confirmed by tests. He was also found to be suffering from a fractured pelvis, and a fractured ankle which required surgical repair. His unconscious state continued for several days and, thereafter, he evidenced fever and disorientation. With some improvement, Beswick was transferred to Bryn Mawr Rehabilitation Hospital. He was placed on a comprehensive rehabilitation program for his severe brain injury which was described as diffuse, but demonstrated by evidence of hemorrhage of the right parietal region. He exhibited mood and personality changes, memory and attention span deficits, guilt and anxiety. The stays at Crozer Chester and Bryn Mawr were both in excess of three weeks. Upon discharge, Beswick continued to receive treatment for his functional deficits which were deemed to be...
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