Betancourt v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Nos. A13A0289,A13A0290.,s. A13A0289 |
| Citation | 322 Ga.App. 201,744 S.E.2d 419 |
| Parties | BETANCOURT v. The STATE. Hernandez v. The State. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
G. Richard Stepp, for appellant (case no. A13A0289).
Page Anthony Pate, Jess Brandel Johnson, Atlanta, for Appellant (case no. A13A0290).
Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., Karen M. Harris, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
Edgar David Betancourt and Oscar Hernandez (collectively, “ appellants”) were jointly tried and convicted on one count of trafficking in cocaine, in violation of OCGA § 16–13–31(a), and Hernandez alone was convicted on one count of obstruction of a law-enforcement officer, in violation of OCGA § 16–10–24(a). In these companion appeals, appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress physical evidence and in allowing the admission of similar-transaction evidence, and that their respective trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm in both cases.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,1 the evidence presented at trial shows that on the afternoon in question, a police officer with the Gwinnett County Police Department observed a vehicle traveling northbound on Interstate 85 with unlawfully dark window tinting. And as the officer began to follow the vehicle, he noticed that it had a Massachusetts license plate that was partially obscured and that the driver was following too closely to the car in front of it. As a result, the officer initiated a stop of the vehicle.
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer detected a strong odor of air freshener and observed that there was only a single key in the ignition and religious insignia throughout its interior (the relevance of which is noted infra ). He requested the license and registration of the driver, Betancourt, and immediately noticed that his license was issued by Rhode Island. The officer began to ask questions in an attempt to establish the ownership of the vehicle due to the equipment violations and the Massachusetts registration; however, each of the officer's questions was answered by the passenger, Hernandez—who indicated that the vehicle belonged to a friend.
The officer then requested that Betancourt exit the vehicle, attempted to explain the reason for the stop, and sought to obtain additional information about the vehicle's owner. Betancourt, who the officer described as “quite nervous,” indicated that he did not understand English. The officer thereafter called for an interpreter from a nearby police department, returned to Hernandez to explain the reason for the stop, and retrieved Hernandez's license, which was also issued by Rhode Island.
The officer then attempted to verify the appellants' identities and Betancourt's license status several times, but experienced a delay due to the computer system—a fact he confirmed by calling the police department's radio room. The officer testified that he needed to obtain this information to complete the traffic citations and to verify whether Betancourt's license was valid or suspended. And as he returned to Hernandez to explain the reason for the delay, the officer asked Hernandez if the car contained any illegal weapons or drugs, to which Hernandez responded, “no, my friend, you can go ahead and check.”
While the officer was completing his paperwork and waiting for the results of the computer check on appellants' licenses, a Spanish-speaking officer arrived on the scene approximately 20 minutes after the initial stop. The first officer directed the translating officer to request Betancourt's consent to search the vehicle, and Betancourt authorized the search contingent upon Hernandez's consent. The first officer then returned to Hernandez and again asked if the vehicle contained any illegal weapons, drugs, or currency. When Hernandez answered in the negative, the officer requested permission to search and Hernandez responded, “[s]ure, no problem, my friend.”
The first officer then conducted a search of the vehicle and located a hidden compartment constructed underneath the back seat. And while he could not access the compartment at the time, he inserted a small flashlight and was able to see shrink-wrapped green cellophane packages which, based upon his training and experience, he believed to contain contraband. The officer signaled to the translating officer, who had moved to a shaded woodline with Betancourt, and upon seeing this signal, Betancourt fled. After a brief foot chase, Betancourt was apprehended. Hernandez, who did not attempt to flee, was also arrested at the scene.
The hidden compartment was later discovered to contain 5.085 kilograms of cocaine consisting of 66.5 percent purity, which had a street value estimated to be approximately $125,000.
Thereafter, Betancourt and Hernandez were indicted on one count each of trafficking in cocaine. And during the ensuing trial, the State introduced similar-transaction evidence over appellants' objection. The similar-transaction evidence consisted of testimony from a K9 officer who was involved in the search of a different Massachusetts-registered vehicle driven by appellants in North Carolina. During that incident, Betancourt was driving and the pair were headed southbound on an interstate that feeds into Interstate 85 in a vehicle with unlawfully dark-tinted windows, a single key in the ignition, and religious insignia on the dashboard.
After law enforcement stopped the car, conducted a free-air search and received a positive alert from the K9 for the presence of narcotics, the appellants consented to a search of that vehicle. The car did not contain drugs, but the search resulted in the seizure of $195,000 cash in shrink-wrapped bundles recovered from hidden compartments located on either side of the front bumper.2 The appellants claimed to have no knowledge of the presence of this money and disclaimed their ownership to it; consequently, the cash was forfeited. No criminal charges were brought against appellants.
The jury ultimately convicted appellants of the trafficking charges and the trial court denied their respective motions for new trial. These consolidated appeals follow.
1. We begin by affirming that the evidence set forth supra, construed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, was sufficient to sustain appellants' convictions on trafficking in cocaine 3 and Betancourt's conviction on obstructing a law-enforcement officer.4
[322 Ga.App. 204]2. Appellants both argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress the drug evidence because the search was unlawful, albeit for different reasons. We will address each of their arguments in turn.
When reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, “the evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the court's findings and judgment.” 5 And if there is any evidence to support the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility, “they will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.” 6 We consider both the trial testimony and the testimony from the motion-to-suppress hearing when reviewing the trial court's ruling.7 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to appellants' respective enumerations of error.
(a) Betancourt does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop but argues instead that the stop and his detention were impermissibly prolonged when the officer's initial investigation into the traffic violations evolved into a drug investigation. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment's protection of a person's right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the investigatory stop of a vehicle, which “cannot be unreasonably prolonged beyond the time required to fulfill the purpose of the stop.” 8 A reasonable stop, however, generally includes “the time necessary to verify the driver's license, insurance, registration[;] ... to complete any paperwork connected with the citation or a written warning[;][and] ... to run a computer check to determine whether there are any outstanding arrest warrants for the driver or the passengers.” 9 And while performing these tasks, the officer may question the occupants and request consent to conduct a search of the vehicle, so long as the officer's questioning does not impermissibly prolong the otherwise lawful detention.10 Thus, no constitutional violation occurs so long as “the purpose for the detention is legitimate, the duration of the detention remains reasonable, and the investigation remains diligent throughout.” 11
And here, it is undisputed that the officer was still in the process of conducting the traffic investigation when appellants consented to the search of the vehicle. Specifically, the officer had not yet received the computer information confirming appellants' identities and the status of Betancourt's license—which he was actively pursuing, and which he needed in order to issue the traffic citations. And although a delay in the computer response time would not justify appellants' detention indefinitely, their consent to search the vehicle was obtained approximately 20 minutes after the initial stop, upon the arrival of the translating officer. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the detention was not unreasonably prolonged beyond the time required to fulfill the purpose of the traffic stop.12
(b) Hernandez contends that the scope of the officer's search exceeded the scope of appellants' consent to search the vehicle. In support of this argument, he relies on his voluntary offer to allow the officer to “check” the vehicle and asserts that his statement did not authorize a complete search. But after Hernandez made the voluntary offer and Betancourt gave his contingent consent to search, the officer returned to Hernandez and specifically asked if the vehicle contained “guns or anything illegal,” including “drugs or currency...
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