Bethel Park School Dist. v. Bethel Park Federation of Teachers, Local 1607, Am. Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, AFL-CI

• Decision Date: 24 September 1980
• Docket Number: A,AFL-CI
• Citation: 420 A.2d 18,54 Pa.Cmwlth. 49
• Parties: , 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2078 BETHEL PARK SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Second Class School District, Appellant, v. BETHEL PARK FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1607, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,ppellee. BETHEL PARK FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1607, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,ppellant, v. BETHEL PARK SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Second Class School District, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 18

420 A.2d 18

54 Pa.Cmwlth. 49, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2078

BETHEL PARK SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Second Class School District, Appellant, v. BETHEL PARK FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1607, AMERICAN

FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Appellee.

BETHEL PARK FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1607, AMERICAN

FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Appellant, v. BETHEL PARK SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Second Class School District, Appellee.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 4, 1980.

Decided Sept. 24, 1980.

Sandra Reiter, Kushner, Louis B. Kushner, Stephen J. Jordan, Ronald G. Backer, Rothman, Gordon, Foreman & Groudine, P.A., Pittsburgh, for Bethel Park Federation of Teachers.

Donald T. O'Connor, John S. Brendel, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle & Buerger, Pittsburgh, Reed B. Day, Washington, for Bethel Park School Dist.

Before CRUMLISH, President Judge, and WILKINSON, ROGERS, BLATT, CRAIG, MacPHAIL and WILLIAMS, JJ.

OPINION

CRUMLISH, President Judge.

In Bethel Park School District v. Bethel Park Federation of Teachers, ---Pa Cmwlth. ---, 414 A.2d 145 (1980), this Court approved an Allegheny County Common Pleas Court Chancellor's preliminary injunction ordering teachers' union members to immediately return to work but, in doing so, rejected that portion of the order which fixed the school's calendar year and the teachers' working terms and conditions in concert with the school district's last negotiation offer to the union. We concluded that the Chancellor exceeded those equitable powers provided for the purpose of ending a strike by judicially imposing a "back-to-work order which incorporated terms of employment never previously in effect nor subsequently agreed upon by the bargaining parties."

On October 22, 1979, the court below, in issuing a decree nisi, declared that the strike was a clear and present danger to the public's health, safety and welfare, adopted verbatim the terms and conditions provision of the Chancellor's October 17 decision contested and decided in Bethel Park, and ordered the strike ended. On October 26th, the Chancellor issued his adjudication, to which both the school district and the teachers' union filed timely exceptions. On January 3, 1980, the exceptions were dismissed and the decree nisi affirmed. Cross appeals by the school district and union followed.

Section 1003 of the Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1101.1003, specifically provides judicial authority for equitable relief after the collective bargaining processes have been completely utilized and exhausted only if the strike jurisdiction's court of common pleas "finds that the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public." In Armstrong Education Association v. Armstrong School District, 5 Pa.Cmwlth. 378, 384, 291 A.2d 120, 124 (1972), we elaborated upon the import of this section:

"By enacting Act No. 195 which authorizes such strikes, the Legislature may be understood to have indicated its willingness to accept certain inconveniences, for such are inevitable, but it obviously intended to draw the line at those which post a danger to the public health, safety or welfare."

In Bristol Township Education Association v. School District of Bristol Township, 14 Pa.Cmwlth. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974), we concluded that our scope of review is limited to whether apparently reasonable grounds existed for the equitable relief ordered by the court below. Further, if support does exist for the Chancellor's...