Bethel v. Thorn
Decision Date | 29 October 1999 |
Citation | 757 So.2d 1154 |
Parties | Raymond Victor BETHEL v. Rex THORN. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Michael K. Wright and Geoffrey S. Bald of Starnes & Atchison, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellant.
Richard A. Lawrence, Montgomery, for appellee.
Raymond Victor Bethel appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his claims against Rex Thorn for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We hold that while certain of Bethel's stated claims were claims upon which relief could not be granted against Thorn, certain others were claims upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In April 1998, Bethel sued Diesel "Repower", Inc. ("Diesel"), and its president, Thorn, alleging breach of contract (Counts I and II), fraud (Counts III through VI), fraudulent suppression (Count VII), and negligence (Count VIII) against Diesel and against Thorn individually. Bethel's allegations arise out of two contracts between him and Diesel. The first contract was for Bethel's purchase of a marine engine and transmission. The second contract was for Bethel's purchase of three generators. Because of the posture of this case, we must rely on the "Statement of Facts" appearing in Bethel's complaint:1
Thorn and Diesel each moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss Bethel's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After a hearing, the trial court granted Thorn's motion to dismiss, but denied Diesel's motion to dismiss.2 Bethel moved the trial court to "reconsider" its order granting Thorn's motion to dismiss. Thorn responded by moving the trial court for entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court denied Bethel's motion to reconsider and entered a final judgment in favor of Thorn, pursuant to Rule 54(b). Bethel appeals from the judgment of dismissal, but only insofar as it related to his fraud and fraudulent-suppression claims, Counts III through VII.
When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court, in determining the sufficiency of the complaint, construes the plaintiff's allegations in favor of the plaintiff and resolves all doubts concerning the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Boswell v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 643 So.2d 580, 581 (Ala.1994). "`"In so doing, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, only whether he has stated a claim under which he may possibly prevail."'" Id. (quoting Grant v. Butler, 590 So.2d 254, 255 (Ala.1991) (quoting Greene County Bd. of Educ. v. Bailey, 586 So.2d 893 (Ala.1991))) (emphasis added in Grant). Thus, "`"a dismissal for failure to state a claim is properly granted only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief."'" Id. Under Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P., a complaint is sufficient if it puts the defendant on notice of the claims against him. See Phillips Colleges of Alabama, Inc. v. Lester, 622 So.2d 308, 311 (Ala.1993) (). However, the rule of generalized notice pleading is qualified by Rule 9(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., where the plaintiff pleads fraud. Rule 9(b) provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all averments of fraud ..., the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity." But, as the Committee Comments to Rule 9(b) explain:
(Citations omitted.) Thus, under Rule 9, for a pleading to state a claim of fraud, "`"[t]he pleading must show [the] time, [the] place, and the contents or substance of the false representations, the facts misrepresented, and an identification of what has been obtained."'" Lester, 622 So.2d at 311 ( )(alterations in Lester); see also Robinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 So.2d 288, 290 (Ala.1981) (). Where the alleged fraud is "predicated upon a promise, it is essential that the [pleader allege that the] promisor intended not to perform at the time of making the promise." Robinson, 399 So.2d at 290.
Bethel argues that Thorn, as president of Diesel, can be held individually liable for the fraudulent acts or omissions he personally committed in his capacity as a corporate officer. We agree that this is a correct statement of law. See Ex parte Charles Bell Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac-GMC, Inc., 496 So.2d 774, 775 (Ala.1986) (...
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