Bethman v. Faith

• Decision Date: 09 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. ED 101896,ED 101896
• Citation: 462 S.W.3d 895
• Parties: Tony Bethman, et al., Appellants, v. Sally A. Faith, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

462 S.W.3d 895

Tony Bethman, et al., Appellants

v.Sally A. Faith, et al., Respondents.

No. ED 101896

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO .

Filed: June 9, 2015

Daniel L. Goldberg, 228 North Main Street, St. Charles, Missouri 63301, Timothy A. Kohlenhoefer, 708 First Capitol, Suite 100, St. Charles, Missouri 63301, Jonathan F. Andres, Martin M. Green, Green Jacobson, P.C., 7733 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 700, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, for appellant.

Robert J. Golterman, Sarah E. Mullen, Lewis Rice, LLC, 600 Washington Avenue, Suite 2500, St. Louis, Missouri 63101–1311, for respondent.

Philip M. Hess, Judge

Introduction

Plaintiffs Tony Bethmann and Justin Rinaldi appeal the dismissal of their petition for writ of mandamus and civil negligence action brought against the City of St. Charles (City) and numerous city officials (collectively, “Defendants”). In their mandamus action, Plaintiffs sought to compel city officials to collect allegedly unpaid license taxes from restaurant businesses in the City. In their civil suit, Plaintiffs sought monetary damages against the City and city officials based on claims of negligence and respondeat superior. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's dismissal of both actions for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.¹ We affirm.

Factual Background

On December 30, 2013, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and “others similarly situated,” filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the Mayor of the City of St. Charles, the Director of Finance, and several Council Members. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to compel the collection of allegedly unpaid license taxes “from all persons responsible for the payment of the same under Chapter 620 from January 1, 2009 to the present.”² Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had failed to properly collect license taxes from “all entities engaged in the business of a restaurant as defined in Chapter 620.” Plaintiffs based their right to mandamus relief on their status as taxpayers, asserting that they had “a special interest, distinct from the general public, in the collection and expenditure of the funds generated by the [l]icense [t]ax.” On December 31, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a “Class Action Petition,”³ on behalf of themselves and “others similarly situated,” against the City of St. Charles and numerous current and former city officials, seeking actual and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs based on claims of negligence and respondeat superior for “failing to properly and fully collect the [l]icense [t]ax” from 2009 to the present. The petition also included a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which was later dismissed by Plaintiffs.⁴

In January 2014, the trial court entered a preliminary order directing Defendants to “take all actions to collect the [l]icense [t]ax as provided for in Chapter 620 of the [o]rdinances of the City of St. Charles ... from all entities located in the City ... which operate a ‘restaurant’ as defined in Chapter 620.” Defendants filed a motion to quash the preliminary order and motions to dismiss both the mandamus action and the civil suit asserting that Plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim. Following a hearing and arguments by counsel, the trial court granted Defendants' motions and dismissed both actions based on the grounds alleged. Plaintiffs appeal.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of a trial court's dismissal for lack of standing is de novo. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Oneok, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Mo.App.W.D.2009). The issue of standing is determined “as a matter of law on the basis of the petition, along with any other noncontested facts accepted as true by the parties at the time the motion to dismiss was argued, and resolve the issue as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed facts.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). We will affirm the dismissal if it is supported by any ground raised in the motion to dismiss. Dujakovich v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Mo. banc 2012).

Failure to Comply with Rule 84.04

As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiffs' opening brief contains deficiencies that do not comply with Rule 84.04.⁵ Compliance with the Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory and a brief that fails to comply with the specified requirements preserves nothing for our review.

Osthus v. Countrylane Woods II Homeowners Ass'n, 389 S.W.3d 712, 714 (Mo.App.E.D.2012) (citation omitted). Failure to comply with Rule 84.04 also constitutes grounds for dismissal. See Thornton v. City of Kirkwood, 161 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Mo.App.E.D.2005). Specifically, Rule 84.04(c) provides that “[t]he statement of facts shall be a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument.” Rogers v. Hester ex rel. Mills, 334 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Mo.App.S.D.2010). Interspersing argument throughout the statement of facts violates Rule 84.04(c). Id. at 534. As Defendants point out, Plaintiffs' “Statement of Facts” improperly contains legal conclusions and argument. Primarily, the deficiencies involve conclusory assertions that the duties imposed by the City Charter and Chapter 620 are “ministerial, not discretionary.”

In addition, Plaintiffs' first point relied on is multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d)(1), in that, Plaintiffs have attempted to challenge two separate rulings in a single point relied on. See Pool v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins., 311 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo.App.S.D.2010). The point also contains multiple grounds and legal issues (e.g., standing and failure to state a claim).⁶ Separate legal issues must be set out in separate points relied on. Law Offices of Gary Green, P.C. v. Morrissey, 210 S.W.3d 421, 424 (Mo.App.S.D.2006). Although these violations constitute grounds for dismissal, it is within this Court's discretion to consider the claims if the briefing deficiencies are not so serious as to impede appellate review. See Bolt v. Giordano, 310 S.W.3d 237, 241–42 (Mo.App.E.D.2010). Because we find that the deficiencies in Plaintiffs' brief are not so serious as to impede the disposition of this appeal, we will review the claims.

Discussion

Plaintiffs raise four points on appeal. In their first point, Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in dismissing their actions against Defendants for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. In their second point, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their actions because Defendants are not shielded from liability by sovereign immunity, official immunity, or the public duty doctrine. In their third point, Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in dismissing their civil negligence suit because they alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action based on claims of negligence and respondeat superior. In their fourth and final point, Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in denying their request for class action certification in their mandamus suit. Because we find that Plaintiffs' first point regarding standing is dispositive of the entire appeal, we address it alone.

Standing

In their first point, Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in dismissing their petition for writ of mandamus and their civil negligence action for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. While Plaintiffs' point is somewhat hard to follow, they appear to argue that they have taxpayer standing for both actions and/or they have general standing to pursue the writ of mandamus because the duties imposed on Defendants are ministerial rather than discretionary.

In response, Defendants assert that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs' actions because they lack standing to challenge the tax obligations and/or tax treatment of other taxpayers. Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action in mandamus because the challenged duties are discretionary, not ministerial. We agree.

“Standing is an antecedent to the right to relief.” Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Mo. banc 2011). The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that litigation is brought only by the appropriate parties having a present, substantial interest in the outcome, Hinton v. City of St. Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo.App.W.D.1994), as well as to prevent parties from “creating controversies in matters in which they are not involved and which do not directly affect them [.]” Schweich v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). Regardless of an action's merits, without standing, a court may not entertain the action. Id. If a party has no standing to bring a claim, the claim shall be dismissed because the court lacks authority to determine its merits. Weber v. St. Louis Cnty . , 342 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Mo. banc 2011).

The mere filing of a lawsuit is not enough to confer standing on a taxpayer. Eastern Missouri Laborers Dist. Council v. St. Louis Cnty . , 781 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Mo. banc 1989). The party seeking relief must have a legally protectable interest at stake so as to be directly and adversely affected by the challenged action. Id. Missouri courts have long held that taxpayers have a legally protectable interest in the proper use and expenditure of tax dollars. See, e.g., LeBeau v. Comm'rs of Franklin Cnty . , 422 S.W.3d 284 (Mo. banc 2014) ; Ste. Genevieve School Dist. R–II v. Bd. of Alderm e n, 66 S.W.3d 6 (Mo. banc 2002) ; Eastern Missouri Laborers, 781 S.W.2d at 46. Absent fraud or compelling circumstances, in order to establish taxpayer standing, the party seeking relief must demonstrate that one of three conditions exist: (1) a direct expenditure of funds generated through taxation; (2) an increased levy in taxes; or (3) a pecuniary loss caused by the challenged transaction of the municipality. Id. at 47.

In determining whether the trial court properly sustained Defendants' motions to dismiss both the mandamus action and the civil negligence suit, it is necessary to ascertain whether Plaintiffs' pleadings...