Betterman v. Mont.

• Decision Date: 19 May 2016
• Docket Number: 14–1457.
• Parties: Brandon Thomas BETTERMAN, Petitioner v. MONTANA.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

578 U.S. 437

136 S.Ct. 1609

194 L.Ed.2d 723

Brandon Thomas BETTERMAN, Petitioner

v.MONTANA.

No. 14–1457.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 28, 2016.

Decided May 19, 2016.

Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles, CA, for petitioner.

Dale Schowengerdt, Solicitor General, for respondent.

Ginger D. Anders for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondent.

Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, CA, Chad Wright, Koan Mercer, Office of the Appellate Defender, Helena, MT, Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Daniel B. Levin, Thane M. Rehn, Cathleen H. Hartge, Eric C. Tung, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioner.

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Dale Schowengerdt, Solicitor General, C. Mark Fowler, Appellate Bureau Chief, Tammy A. Hinderman, Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorneys General, Montana Department of Justice, Helena, MT, for respondent.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." Does the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee apply to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution? That is the sole question this case presents. We hold that the guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges. For inordinate delay in sentencing, although the Speedy Trial Clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner Brandon Betterman, however, advanced in this Court only a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. He did not preserve a due process challenge. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. We, therefore, confine this opinion to his Sixth Amendment challenge.

I

Ordered to appear in court on domestic assault charges, Brandon Betterman failed to show up and was therefore charged with bail jumping. 378 Mont. 182, 184, 342 P.3d 971, 973 (2015). After pleading guilty to the bail-jumping charge, he was jailed for over 14 months awaiting sentence on that conviction. Id., at 184–185, 342 P.3d, at 973–974. The holdup, in large part, was due to institutional delay: the presentence report took nearly five months to complete; the trial court took several months to deny two presentence motions (one seeking dismissal of the charge on the ground of delay); and the court was slow in setting a sentencing hearing. Id., at 185, 195, 342 P.3d, at 973–974, 980. Betterman was eventually sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, with four of those years suspended. Id., at 185, 342 P.3d, at 974.

Arguing that the 14–month gap between conviction and sentencing violated his speedy trial right, Betterman appealed. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, ruling that the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to postconviction, presentencing delay. Id., at 188–192, 342 P.3d, at 975–978.

We granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 582, 193 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015), to resolve a split among courts over whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies to such delay.¹ Holding that the Clause does not apply to delayed sentencing, we affirm the Montana Supreme Court's judgment.

II

Criminal proceedings generally unfold in three discrete phases. First, the State investigates to determine whether to arrest and charge a suspect. Once charged, the suspect stands accused but is presumed innocent until conviction upon trial or guilty plea. After conviction, the court imposes sentence. There are checks against delay throughout this progression, each geared to its particular phase.

In the first stage—before arrest or indictment, when the suspect remains at liberty—statutes of limitations provide the primary protection against delay, with the Due Process Clause as a safeguard against fundamentally unfair prosecutorial conduct. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ; see id., at 795, n. 17, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (Due Process Clause may be violated, for instance, by prosecutorial delay that is "tactical" or "reckless" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause homes in on the second period: from arrest or indictment through conviction. The constitutional right, our precedent holds, does not attach until this phase begins, that is, when a defendant is arrested or formally accused. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320–321, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Today we hold that the right detaches upon conviction, when this second stage ends.²

Prior to conviction, the accused is shielded by the presumption of innocence, the "bedrock[,] axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 4, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Speedy Trial Clause implements that presumption by "prevent[ing] undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, ... minimiz[ing] anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation [,] and ... limit[ing] the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." Marion, 404 U.S., at 320, 92 S.Ct. 455 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–533, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). As a measure protecting the presumptively innocent, the speedy trial right—like other similarly aimed measures—loses force upon conviction. Compare in RE winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.ct. 1068, 25 L.ed.2d 368 (1970) (requiring "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime"), with United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224, 130 S.Ct. 2169, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010) ("Sentencing factors ... can be proved ... by a preponderance of the evidence."). Compare also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (bail presumptively available for accused awaiting trial) with § 3143 (a) (bail presumptively unavailable for those convicted awaiting sentence).

Our reading comports with the historical understanding. The speedy trial right, we have observed, "has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna Carta (1215)...." Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). Regarding the Framers' comprehension of the right as it existed at the founding, we have cited Sir Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England. See id., at 223–225, and nn. 8, 12–14, 18, 87 S.Ct. 988. Coke wrote that "the innocent shall not be worn and wasted by long imprisonment, but ... speedily come to his tria[l] ." 1 E. Coke, Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 315 (1797) (emphasis added).

Reflecting the concern that a presumptively innocent person should not languish under an unresolved charge, the Speedy Trial Clause guarantees "the accused " "the right to a speedy ... trial ." U.S. Const., Amdt. 6 (emphasis added). At the founding, "accused" described a status preceding "convicted." See, e.g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 322 (1769) (commenting on process in which "persons accused of felony ... were tried ... and convicted " (emphasis added)). And "trial" meant a discrete episode after which judgment (i.e., sentencing) would follow. See, e.g., id., at 368 ("We are now to consider the next stage of criminal prosecution, after trial and conviction are past ...: which is that of judgment .").³

This understanding of the Sixth Amendment language—"accused" as distinct from "convicted," and "trial" as separate from "sentencing"—endures today. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 26 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "accused" as "a person who has been arrested and brought before a magistrate or who has been formally charged " (emphasis added)); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (governing "Sentencing and Judgment," the rule appears in the chapter on "Post–Conviction Procedures," which follows immediately after the separate chapter headed "Trial").⁴

This Court's precedent aligns with the text and history of the Speedy Trial Clause. Detaining the accused pretrial, we have said, disadvantages him, and the imposition is "especially unfortunate" as to those " ultimately found to be innocent." Barker, 407 U.S., at 532–533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. And in Marion, 404 U.S., at 320, 92 S.Ct. 455 addressing "the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee," we observed: " Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends." We acknowledged in Marion that even pre-arrest—a stage at which the right to a speedy trial does not arise—the passage of time "may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself." Id., at 321, 92 S.Ct. 455. Nevertheless, we determined, "this possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper [arrest or charge triggered] context." Id., at 321–322, 92 S.Ct. 455. Adverse consequences of postconviction delay, though subject to other checks, see infra, at 1617 – 1618, are similarly outside the purview of the Speedy Trial Clause.⁵

The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right—dismissal of the charges, see Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973) ; Barker, 407 U.S., at 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182 —fits the preconviction focus of the Clause. It would be an unjustified windfall, in most cases, to remedy...