Betts v. Ann Arbor Public Schools

• Citation: 403 Mich. 507,271 N.W.2d 498
• Decision Date: 20 November 1978
• Docket Number: N,No. 12,12
• Parties: Nathaniel J. BETTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee. ov. Term. 403 Mich. 507, 271 N.W.2d 498
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 498

271 N.W.2d 498

Nathaniel J. BETTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12, Nov. Term.

403 Mich. 507, 271 N.W.2d 498

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 3, 1977.

Decided Nov. 20, 1978.

Zussman, Doctoroff & Wartell, Martin M. Doctoroff, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant; Ronald D. Feldman, Oak Park, of counsel.

Lacey & Jones by John L. Salter, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, James E. Tobin and Gillian Steinhauer, Detroit, amicus curiae for Michigan Association of School Boards and its 580 Member Boards of Education.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

In 1971 plaintiff Betts was a student majoring in physical education at the University of Michigan. One of the requirements for his degree was that he train under the supervision of a certified teacher for a short period commonly referred to as "student teaching," or "practice teaching". Betts student-taught at a junior high school in the Ann Arbor public school system from January to April, 1971. Plaintiff conducted two physical education classes each school-day morning during his four-month student-teaching period. At the time plaintiff was with a class, his supervising teacher, the head of the physical education department, graded papers and did other work around the school.

Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim arising from an injury which occurred on his last day of student teaching, April 29, 1971. He described the event in a hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Bureau:

"It was the end of a class period. It was my last class. I was taking absentees and getting them ready to send up to the office. I was still in the gym and went into the locker room, and as I walked in, about thirty of my students grabbed me, and I guess it was traditional, you know, to throw a teacher in the pool. I didn't really feel like going in that morning and I tried to put up a fight, but I didn't succeed and they pulled me in. As I was going into the pool, one of them must have grabbed the whistle that was on the elastic band and it hit me in the eye."

Betts lost his left eye as a result of the incident.

The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) awarded Betts benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding plaintiff not to be an employee of the Ann Arbor Public Schools at the time of his injury. We granted leave to appeal to consider whether, under Michigan's Worker's Disability Compensation Act, 1969 P.A. 317, M.C.L. § 418.101 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.237(101) Et seq., a student teacher is an employee of the school district in which he seeks to fulfill his student teaching requirement.

Whether or not Betts was an employee of the school district is governed by M.C.L. § 418.161(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.237(161)(1)(a). A public "employee" ¹ is defined as:

"Every person in the service of the state or of any county, city, township, village or school district, Under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written." (Emphasis supplied.)

The WCAB controlling opinion says that Betts served the Ann Arbor Public Schools under an appointment. We agree with the board's construction of M.C.L. § 418.161(1)(a); M.S.A. § 17.237(161)(1)(a): ²

"Thus, a person in the service of a school district meets the definition of employee if he is (a) under any appointment, express or implied, oral or written or (b) under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. By setting off 'or contract of hire' with commas, it is clear that the Legislature intended 'of hire' to modify only 'contract.' Moreover, MCLA 418.151 which defines employer is more restrictive in its definition of a private employer than it is of a public employer. Reading the difference in definition of an employee of a public employer and the definition of an employee of a private employer in conjunction with the differing definitions of employer in MCLA 418.151, one can draw but one conclusion, that the definition of public employee was meant to be broader than the definition of employee in the private sector.

"Unless the context of the statute suggests otherwise, words in a statute are to be given their plain meaning. Hammons v. Franzblau, 331 Mich. 572, 574, 50 N.W.2d 161 (1951). Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines appointment as a 'designation of a person to hold a nonelective office or perform a function.' Thus a person in defendant's service who has been designed (sic) to hold a nonelective office or who has been designated to perform a function of defendant is an employee within the meaning of MCLA 418.161(1)(a)."

The WCAB majority's decision that Betts was an employee of the Ann Arbor Public Schools rested primarily on its finding that Betts served under an implied contract of hire. Again, we find the board correct.

Both plaintiff and defendant cite Blust v. Sisters of Mercy, 256 Mich. 1, 239 N.W. 401 (1931), as authority for their arguments on whether or not a contract of hire existed here.

Blust, a novice with the Sisters of Mercy at Mt. Mercy Academy in Grand Rapids, was training to become a teacher in the Catholic schools. She also performed menial services for the order; the order provided her with food, clothing, shelter and medical care. Blust was injured while working in the order's laundry.

This Court affirmed the Department of Labor and Industry's determination that Blust was not an employee of the Sisters of Mercy for workmen's compensation purposes. Defendant reads Blust as authority for the proposition that one in teacher training is not an employee. We agree with plaintiff and the WCAB that Blust does not stand for that proposition.

The majority in Blust rested its decision, in large part, on the fact that the order, as a charitable organization without pecuniary purpose, was not analogous to a commercial enterprise. Hence, those training for charitable work have a different status than those who train to qualify for work with pay. Justice Wiest wrote in Blust, pp. 11-12, 239 N.W. p. 404:

"I find no analogy between instances of work without pay in industrial and professional pursuits, in order to qualify for work with pay, and an instance of entering a charitable and religious order as a novitiate with intent to qualify for membership and a life devoid of pecuniary purpose. In the one instance there is the relation of master and servant and a semblance of hiring, though without wage, but with commercial earmarks, while in the other there is no relation of master and servant, no hiring, and no commercialism, but a devotion to charitable purpose without hope of pecuniary reward."

Justice Wiest further noted that the Sisters of Mercy did have employees working under contracts of hire. The order carried compensation insurance for those employees, but members and novices were not covered by that insurance. Additionally, the novice's relationship to the order was such that any compensation award would belong to the Sisters of Mercy rather than Blust herself. Thus "(i)t would be a strange situation, indeed, to permit the Sisters of Mercy, one defendant herein, to reimburse itself for expenses incurred in caring for a novitiate, in the manner here attempted". Blust, supra, p. 12, 239 N.W. p. 405. ³ Finally, the majority was not able to find a contract of hire. ⁴

While Blust's relationship with the Sisters of Mercy was a religious and charitable affiliation, Betts' relationship with the Ann Arbor Public Schools had the earmarks of a commercial relationship. Betts was not a volunteer, nor was the school district required to accept a student teacher. Those who perform services gratuitously are generally excluded from the definition of "employee", ⁵ but the payment necessary to establish a contract of hire need not be in money. As Larson ⁶ explains, "Compensation law * * * is a mutual arrangement between the employer and employee under which both give up and gain certain things."

We agree with the WCAB majority's finding of such an arrangement in the instant case.

"I find that an implied contract of hire did, in fact, exist between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant accepted plaintiff's beneficial services (teaching) for which compensation is normally paid or anticipated. This permitted Mr. Armstrong (plaintiff's supervising teacher) to perform other duties of benefit to defendant. In return, plaintiff was paid in the form of training, college credits towards graduation, and the meeting of the prerequisites for a state provisional certificate.

"Plaintiff, herein, is * * * an integral cog in defendant's business of education. His teaching was part of the larger task of educating the young people of Ann Arbor. The fact that the pay for this service was not in the coin of the realm but was in the form of training and qualification for a professional goal does not disqualify plaintiff from the designation of employee. He was helping to furnish the product of education. Should he now be asked to bear the cost of the injury incurred in the process of education or should the cost be borne by the taxpayers of the Ann Arbor School System? I vote for the latter."

The Court of Appeals decision is vacated. The case is remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Bureau for proceedings consistent with the opinion of the WCAB.

KAVANAGH, C. J., and LEVIN and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

MOODY, Justice (concurring).

I concur with Justice Fitzgerald that the plaintiff Betts served the Ann Arbor Public Schools as an employee under an "appointment". M.C.L. § 418.161(1) (a); M.S.A. § 17.237(161)(1)(a). It is unnecessary, therefore, to reach the question whether Betts served the school district as an employee under an implied "contract of hire".

RYAN, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the judgment of my colleagues in the majority and from what I perceive to be the strained construction they have given M.C.L.A. § 418.161; M.S.A. § 17.237(161). ¹ The conclusion is inescapable that...