Betts v. Board of Education of City of Chicago
Decision Date | 25 August 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1405.,72-1405. |
Citation | 466 F.2d 629 |
Parties | Goldie Ann BETTS, a minor, by her mother and next friend, Earline Betts, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, a body politic and corporate, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael A. Kreloff, Sheldon H. Roodman, Legal Aid, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
James W. Coffey, Robert J. Krajcir, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, PELL and STEVENS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Goldie Betts, a former Chicago high school student, by her mother and next friend, filed this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Count I alleged that the disciplinary proceeding culminating in Goldie's transfer from Bowen High School to Simeon Continuation School violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Count II alleged that her involuntary transfer to this continuation school was contrary to Illinois law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 122, §§ 13-1 to 13-9) since she was not regularly employed. Count III alleged that her transfer to the continuation school violated the Illinois compulsory school attendance laws (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 122, § 26-1).
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking her reinstatement immediately "to Bowen High School or some other high school in the Chicago public school system" pending a final disposition of the lawsuit. After hearing testimony and arguments of counsel, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. We affirm.
As shown by the verified complaint and by the testimony adduced at the hearing, Goldie Betts was a sixteen-year-old sophomore attending Bowen High School on April 19, 1972. On that date, three false alarms had been sounded, necessitating evacuation of four thousand students and two hundred faculty members for five to seven minutes on each occasion and requiring the presence of three fire department vehicles and their personnel. After the last false alarm, Goldie was interrogated by Paul N. Dravillas, Administrative Assistant to the Principal of the school, in the presence of an officer of the fire department. She was asked about the false alarm that had just occurred but denied being a participant.1 Dravillas told her that if she told the truth, the "school would handle it." She then admitted that she had twice pulled the fire alarms on that day in the company of two other students, one of whom broke the glass coverings on the alarm boxes. She also supplied a written statement that she, Brenda Smith and Derrick Burton were the three culprits. Thereupon Goldie was taken to the local police station.
Goldie's mother testified that Dravillas called her when Goldie was taken to the police station. He told Mrs. Betts that Goldie had pulled the fire alarms, had admitted so doing, and was presently at the police station. He asked Mrs. Betts to be at Bowen High School to discuss the matter at 8:30 the next morning. She then called for Goldie at the police station. Evidently no charges were preferred against the plaintiff, and she was permitted to leave with her mother.
The conference on the ensuing morning was attended by Dravillas, the plaintiff, her mother, and the plaintiff's high school counsellor. Dravillas informed Goldie and her mother that it was his considered recommendation that Goldie be transferred from Bowen to Simeon Continuation School, where she could attend classes once a week. Despite Mrs. Betts' protestations, Goldie's transfer was immediately effectuated. Dravillas said that someone saw Goldie pull the alarm on one of the occasions in question. After returning home, Goldie told her mother that Derrick broke the glass, Goldie pulled the alarms and Brenda just stood there and watched. Mrs. Betts later tried unsuccessfully to have her daughter reinstated at Bowen. Goldie now attends Simeon Continuation School once a week, but her attendance there will not give her credit for the time she missed at Bowen during the balance of her sophomore year.
Dravillas testified that he explained to Mrs. Betts and her daughter that Goldie would be eligible for summer school and possible might enroll this fall in Chicago Vocational School or some other fulltime high school, if it would accept a transfer from Simeon Continuation School.
At the hearing in court, Goldie admitted she had pulled the fire alarms and upon interrogation by defense counsel and by the trial court, she said "I don't have an answer" as to why she did so.
In its findings of fact, the district court noted that both plaintiff and her mother had an opportunity to say whatever they wished at the two-hour conference with Mr. Dravillas and Goldie's counsellor on April 20th. He also found that the plaintiff and her mother had been notified about the conference and had knowledge of Goldie's actions in causing the false fire alarms prior to the conference. The court concluded that plaintiff had not shown a clear right to a preliminary injunction, had failed to show sufficiently irreparable harm for the court to disturb the status quo and had failed to show a reasonable probability of ultimate success at the future trial. Therefore the preliminary injunction was denied.
In this Court plaintiff argues that she was denied equal protection of the laws in that the procedural safe-guards afforded to her were not comparable to those required by the Illinois statutes for students in areas other than Chicago.2 However, the equal protection clause was not mentioned in any of the counts of the complaint on which the motion for a preliminary injunction was grounded and therefore will not be considered on appeal.3 On the other hand, upon remand plaintiff may as a matter of course amend her complaint to allege violation of the equal protection clause. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If such an amendment is forthcoming, the district court may well decide that the equal protection clause has been violated by affording lesser procedural safeguards to Chicago students in disciplinary proceedings than in other Illinois school districts, unless the defendants can show the distinction to be rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state goal.4
As to procedural due process, it is beyond question that the plaintiff's interest in continuing her high school education is within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 27.01, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). As to what process is due, it is important that the plaintiff unequivocally admitted the misconduct with which she was charged. In such a circumstance, the function of procedural protections in insuring a fair and reliable determination of the retrospective factual question whether she in fact activated the false fire alarms is not essential. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472-480, 486-490, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2594-2600, 2603-2605, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). However, due process may also contemplate affording the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the question of what discipline is warranted by the identified offense. See id. 408 U.S. at 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2598-2600, 2603-2605. Although the meting out of disciplinary punishment is a matter left largely to the discretion of the school authorities, since a penalty which is tantamount to expulsion was involved, and since that penalty was discretionary rather than prescribed, the school authorities were plainly required to give the plaintiff and her parent some opportunity to present a mitigative argument.
As we recently held in Linwood v. Board of Education of the City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763, at 770 (7th Cir., 1972):
Keeping in mind the limited function to be served by procedural protections on the facts of this case, in our view plaintiff did not show a reasonable probability of successfully proving she was denied those essential to due process. What appears is that she and her mother received adequate notice of the charges, had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting, were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision. No more is required. Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 894 (E.D.Ill.1970).
As the district court found, Goldie and her mother knew of the charges against her and received notice of the April 20th conference. It is clear that they were aware the meeting was arranged to deal with Goldie's conduct in setting off the false fire alarms. Since she was given a full chance to contest the transfer to Simeon on and after April 20th, we cannot say that Mr. Dravillas' April 19th failure specifically to advise Mrs. Betts of the possible transfer denied plaintiff due process.5 Surely plaintiff and her mother realized from Mr. Dravillas' April 19th phone call, the episode at the police station, and the seriousness of the misconduct that some form of grave discipline would be invoked at the meeting. Under the Chicago Board of Education rules (note 7 infra), Goldie's complete exclusion by the General Superintendent of Schools was a possible penalty, but instead the somewhat less drastic transfer to Simeon was selected as the appropriate discipline.
As the district court also found, Bowen's principal directed that Goldie be transferred to Simeon Continuation School upon Mr. Dravillas' recommendation. This was because of the detrimental influence occasioned by her misconduct.6 The...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Com. v. Tavares
...States, 380 F.2d 305, 309-310 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992, 88 S.Ct. 489, 19 L.Ed.2d 484 (1967); Betts v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972). A jury, however, may consider whether the waiver was voluntary in its overall determination of voluntariness. "(E)vid......
-
State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. Lucas
...in nature. Pangle v. Bend–Lapine School Dist., 169 Or.App. 376, 10 P.3d 275 (2000). Others have not. Betts v. Board of Ed. of City of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.1972). The corporation commission, the industrial commission, and board of adjustment have all been recognized as acting in an......
-
Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc.
...of the offense charged." Doe v. Rockingham Cty. Sch. Bd. , 658 F.Supp. 403, 407 (W.D. Va. 1987) ; see also Betts v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi. , 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[S]chool authorities [a]re plainly required to give the plaintiff and her parent some opportunity to present a mitig......
-
Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin School Dist.
...were plainly required to give the plaintiff and her parent some opportunity to present a mitigative argument." Betts v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir.1972) (citation omitted). In Wozniak itself, the court held that the defendant university was not required to hold a heari......
-
GOSS V. LOPEZ AS A VEHICLE TO EXAMINE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION ISSUES WITH ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS.
...are not entitled to due process before facing an involuntarily transfer to a disciplinary alternative school), with Betts v. Bd. of Educ, 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1972), and Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397, 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that students are entitled to procedural protec......