Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation
| Decision Date | 27 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. C-1-85-1108.,C-1-85-1108. |
| Citation | 631 F. Supp. 1198 |
| Parties | June BETTS, Plaintiff, v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF MENTAL RETARDATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Robert F. Laufman, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Arthur M. Ney, Jr., Thomas E. Deye, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities.
Jeffrey J. Jurca and Andrew I. Sutter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief Counsel's Staff, Columbus, Ohio, for Ohio Public Employers Retirement System Bd.
This matter came on for consideration of the motion for summary judgment and declaratory judgment filed by plaintiff (doc. 6), memorandum in opposition by defendant Hamilton County Board of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (HCBMRDD) (doc. 10), and by defendant Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio (PERS) (doc. 11), supplement to memorandum in opposition by defendant PERS (doc. 12), reply memorandum to documents 10 and 11 by plaintiff (doc. 14), reply memorandum by defendant HCBMRDD (doc. 22), and supplementary memorandum on summary judgment by plaintiff (doc. 18). The defendants PERS and HCBMRDD have also filed their cross-motions for summary judgment (docs. 21 and 26) to which plaintiff has filed her memorandum in opposition (doc. 28) and the defendant PERS has filed its response (docs. 29 and 30).
This is an action for lost benefits and payment of attorney fees arising out of an alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. which provides in part:
Plaintiff alleges that defendants HCBMRDD and PERS violated the above-quoted section of the ADEA by compelling plaintiff to involuntarily retire by denying her disability retirement benefits because of her age.
Defendants make the following assertions in their responses to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and in their own motions for summary judgment. First, defendants maintain that plaintiff voluntarily retired in June 1985 and that such voluntary retirement precludes an action for age discrimination. Defendants argue plaintiff voluntarily chose to retire instead of undergoing a medical examination to prove the need for placing her on a medical leave of absence and therefore, age was not a factor in the events giving rise to this litigation. Second, defendants maintain that even if plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of age, its practice of denying disability retirement benefits to individuals sixty-years of age and over was consistent with the laws and regulations in effect in June 1985, that the disability retirement plan pre-existed the promulgation of the ADEA, and such discrimination is permissible under 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) which provides:
Finally, defendant PERS maintains that it is not an "employer" for the purposes of the ADEA, and therefore, cannot be held accountable for any discriminatory practices.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the narrow question we must decide is whether there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court cannot try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion, but is empowered to determine only whether there are issues to be tried. In re Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc., 668 F.2d 905, 908 (6th Cir.1982). The moving party "has the burden of showing conclusively that there exists no genuine issue as to a material fact and the evidence together with all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.) (emphasis original), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415 (1979). And, "while the movant's papers are to be closely scrutinized, those of the opponent are to be viewed indulgently." Id. at 63. "The District Court is obligated to consider not only the materials specifically offered in support of the motion, but also all `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions' properly on file and thus properly before the court." Id., quoting Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Summary judgment "must be used only with extreme caution for it operates to deny a litigant his day in court." Id.
For purposes of the cross-motion for summary judgment, the following facts were stipulated. In addition, the parties have fully briefed the issues, provided the Court with the applicable sections of the Ohio Revised Code setting forth the public employee retirement system at issue, and have presented their positions through oral arguments before the Court.
Plaintiff was sixty-one years of age and a six-year member of PERS when she was denied disability retirement benefits. For approximately five years, plaintiff was employed as a speech pathologist for defendant HCBMRDD. In 1984, plaintiff was not satisfactorily performing her duties as a speech pathologist and voluntarily accepted a transfer to the Beckman Adult Center to be employed as a workshop specialist. By September 1984, plaintiff was unable to satisfactorily perform her new job duties, apparently due to medical reasons. As a result, she voluntarily accepted a position as a Teachers' Aid with defendant HCBMRDD at a lower salary. By late May 1985, plaintiff's apparent medical problems continued and she was unable to perform her duties as a Teachers' Aid. At that time, HCBMRDD supervisory staff advised plaintiff that she could choose to voluntarily retire within ten days or they would begin steps to force her to take a medical leave of absence. Voluntary retirement would provide plaintiff with $139.14 per month income and continued medical benefits, while forced medical leave was without pay or medical benefits.
Subsequently, plaintiff's daughter contacted HCBMRDD and inquired about the possibility of her mother obtaining disability retirement benefits. She was told that the defendant PERS should be contacted, as it alone makes the determination of eligibility for disability retirement. On June 3, 1985, plaintiff met with HCBMRDD personnel and reviewed the only options available to her; that is voluntary retirement or forced medical leave. That same date, she signed a letter stating her intention to retire. Eleven days later, plaintiff filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the defendants.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed with HCBMRDD her application for disability retirement, a report of her attending physician indicating that she was permanently disabled, and a letter requesting HCBMRDD to disregard her letter of June 3, 1985. Plaintiff's application for disability retirement was denied pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 145.35 which provides in part:
The disability retirement plan provides that a retirant shall receive a retirement benefit in an annual amount no less than thirty percent of the retirant's final average salary. See Ohio Rev.Code § 145.36. Moreover, a disability retirant retains his membership status in PERS and is considered on leave of absence from his position during the first five years on the retired list. Within that period, he can be restored to his previous position and salary or to a similar position and salary. Ohio Rev.Code § 145.39. Had plaintiff qualified for disability retirement, she would have received $355.02 per month based upon thirty percent of her final average annual salary of $14,260.00 and would have been eligible for reinstatement at a comparable salary and position within the first five years of retirement in the event her disability ceased. To the contrary, plaintiff is receiving $158.50 per month on "voluntary retirement", based upon her six years of membership in the PERS and is ineligible for regular re-employment in any capacity pursuant to the voluntary and compulsory retirement provisions of Ohio Rev.Code § 145.32.
The ADEA forbids an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). There are two methods of proving age discrimination. The most easily understood type of discrimination is "disparate treatment" which is evident when the employer treats some people less favorably than others because of their age. In a disparate treatment case, proof of discriminatory motive is critical. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-64, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). A second method of proving age discrimination is by demonstrating that the use of a facially neutral employment practice or the use of subjective criteria had a disparate impact on individuals in the protected age group. Griggs...
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