Betts v. Rector and Visitors of University of Va.

• Decision Date: 23 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 3:96-00054.,CIV.A. 3:96-00054.
• Citation: 198 F.Supp.2d 787
• Parties: Robert W. BETTS, II, Plaintiff, v. RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

198 F.Supp.2d 787

Robert W. BETTS, II, Plaintiff, v. RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 3:96-00054.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

April 23, 2002.

Dexter Brock Green, Jones & Green, Charlottesville, VA, for plaintiff.

Richard Croswell Kast, Susan M. Davis, University of Virginia, Office of General Counsel, Charlottesville, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILSON, Chief Judge.

This is a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief by Plaintiff, Robert W. Betts, II, ("Betts"), against Defendants, Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia ("University"), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"); the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Virginia contract law; because the University denied him admission to the University's medical school. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 12133, 2000e-5.

On May 27, 1997, this court granted summary judgment to the University and dismissed all of Betts' claims. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this court's granting of summary judgment as to the § 1983 and state law claims, but reversed as to Betts' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and remanded for a determination of whether Betts is "disabled" under the ADA. See Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, No. 97-1850, 1999 WL 739415 (4th Cir. Sept.22, 1999) (unpublished opinion).

On September 11, 2000, this court granted summary judgment to the University and dismissed all of Betts' claims on the grounds that Betts was not "disabled" under the ADA because he did not have an actual disability under § 12102(2)(A) and the University did not regard him as having a disability under § 12102(2)(C). See Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 113 F.Supp.2d 970 (W.D.Va.2000). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that Betts did not have an actual disability under § 12102(2)(A), but reversed the court's grant of summary judgment because "the undisputed record reveals that the University regarded Betts as being disabled" under § 12102(2)(C) and remanded the case. Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 18 Fed. Appx. 114, *115, 2001 WL 1023115, *1 (4th Cir. September 7, 2001) (unpublished opinion).

This matter is again before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. The University argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars Betts' claims against the University, that Betts cannot establish the causation necessary for recovery under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, and that subsequent events have rendered the case moot. Betts contests these arguments and claims that he is entitled to summary judgment. The court declines to decide whether the Eleventh Amendment bars Betts' claim, and finds that the case is not moot and that the University denied Betts admission to the medical school for reasons wholly unrelated to its perception that Betts had a disability. Accordingly, because Betts cannot show that the University discriminated against him by reason of a disability, the court will grant the University's motion for summary judgment.

I.

After graduating from North Carolina Wesleyan College with degrees in biology and chemistry, Betts applied for admission in 1995 to the University's School of Medicine and the University placed him on the wait list. As an alternative to remaining on the wait list, the University offered Betts a spot in its Medical Academic Advancement Post-Baccalaureate program ("MAAP"), which was a one-year post college program designed to prepare minority and disadvantaged students for admission to the University's School of Medicine. The University guaranteed admission to the School of Medicine to every MAAP student who, inter alia, maintained a 2.75 GPA per semester, received no grade lower than a C, and met the requirement of satisfactory performance to be judged by a faculty committee.

Betts joined the MAAP program in the summer of 1995; however, he failed to meet the minimum requirements. After completion of the fall semester, Betts had a 2.2 GPA and a Din Physics. Nonetheless, the faculty committee decided that Betts could remain in the program on a probationary basis, on the condition that he receive tutoring and submit to testing for a learning disability. In addition, the faculty committee indicated that it would reevaluate his academic performance at the end of the spring semester and decide whether it would allow him to enter the School of Medicine with the 1996 entering class.

Betts agreed to these terms, and the University Learning Needs and Evaluation Center ("LNEC") examined him. The LNEC reported that Betts lacked "adequate strategies when information exceed[ed] the storage capacity of his short term memory," and that he "demonstrated a pattern of uneven cognitive processing skills consistent with a mild learning disability." The LNEC mistakenly concluded that Betts was actually disabled under the ADA and informed Betts' professors that under the ADA, "it is the responsibility of the faculty to implement reasonable and appropriate accommodations." The LNEC recommended that Betts receive double time on all exams.

Betts' professors adopted the LNEC's recommendations and allowed him double time for five of his exams in the spring semester. Betts achieved a 3.5 GPA for the five exams. However, because Betts took several of his spring semester exams prior to the double time accommodation, he only achieved a 2.84 GPA for the spring semester. His cumulative GPA for the entire year was a 2.53.

On May 28, 1996, the faculty committee met to re-evaluate Betts' performance and decided that, based on Betts' GPA for the entire academic year, Betts had failed to demonstrate that he was prepared to enter medical school and dismissed him from the program. In its recent opinion, the Fourth Circuit explained the reasons for the dismissal:

Because Betts failed to attain a 2.75 GPA, the Committee rescinded the conditional offer of acceptance to the University's School of Medicine. At the time of the Committee's decision, it knew that the LNEC had determined that Betts was disabled under the ADA and that he had been provided accommodations. The Committee nonetheless believed that Betts "needed a longer period of time to demonstrate that the accommodation would in fact allow him to do well."

Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 18 Fed. Appx. 114, *117, 2001 WL 1023115, *2 (4th Cir. September 7, 2001) (unpublished opinion).

Dr. Benjamin Sturgill testified in his deposition as to the motivating factor for the faculty committee's decision:

Q: What do you recall about the discussions of the committee at the May 28 meeting about the fact that he [Betts] had been determined to be disabled under the ADA and had been receiving accommodations?

A: The committee felt, as I recall, that he certainly might benefit from this accommodation but did not feel like we had enough information to allow him to begin medical school. The committee felt like that he needed a longer period of time to demonstrate that accommodation would in fact allow him to do well.

Q: Okay. But rather than give him a longer period of time, the committee decided to dismiss him totally from the program on May 28?

A. By longer period of time, I mean another academic year at least, because the remainder of the program consisted of MAAP Two, which we did not feel would be enough time to evaluate whether he could do medical school work.

(Sturgill Dep. at 23).

Betts appealed the decision to the Dean of the Medical School, Robert M. Carey, who notified Betts that he would uphold the faculty committee's decision. Betts then filed this lawsuit.

III.

In its summary judgment motion, the University argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit,¹ that Betts cannot establish the causation necessary for recovery under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and that the case is moot. Betts argues that the University waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by failing to raise it sooner and by accepting certain federal funds; that Congress constitutionally abrogated the University's Eleventh Amendment immunity; that despite the Eleventh Amendment, Betts is entitled to prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); that the University discriminated against Betts on the basis of a disability; and that since there is an available remedy, the claim is not moot.

Before addressing these arguments, however, the court must determine in what order to address them. The court finds that Betts cannot prove that the University discriminated against him on account of his perceived disability. The court finds that the causation ground clearly supports the University's summary judgment motion. Typically, "if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, and the other, a question of statutory construction or general law, the court should decide on the basis of the latter." Maryland v. E.P.A., 530 F.2d 215, 227 (4th Cir.1975) vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 1635, 52 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977). However, since mootness and Eleventh Amendment immunity are jurisdictional, the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), may require the court to address these issues first.

In Steel Co., the Supreme Court rejected the "doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction," that is, the practice of several courts of appeals of assuming Article III jurisdiction where the case can be more readily resolved on the merits in favor of the party objecting to jurisdiction. Id. at 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003. "`Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and...