Betts v. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1894
• Citation: Betts v. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 60 N.W. 623, 92 Iowa 343 (Iowa 1894)
• Parties: BENJAMIN BETTS et al. v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

60 N.W. 623

92 Iowa 343

BENJAMIN BETTS et al. v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 22, 1894

Appeal from Keokuk District Court.--HON. HENRY BANKS, JR., Judge.

ACTION for injury to stock shipped on defendant's line of road. Judgment for plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.

Affirmed.

Thomas S. Wright, Robert Mather, and Craig, McCrary & Craig for appellant.

J. F Smith for appellees.

OPINION

GRANGER, C. J.

I.

Plaintiffs shipped from Des Moines to Keokuk, Iowa on defendant's line of road, a car load of horses and mules. When the car reached its destination, it was found that some of the slats forming the sides and inclosure of the car had been broken and that one horse and two mules were injured. Just how the injury occurred does not conclusively appear, but it is appellant's theory that it was caused by the kicking of the animals, and such a conclusion has support in the evidence. The petition is in three counts, and appellant contends that it is apparent from the record that the findings for the plaintiffs are based on the averments of the third count, and that view may obtain in our consideration of the case. The grounds of recovery, as stated in the third count, are that the car "was unfit for the purposes of shipping stock, by reason of its weakness and unfitness." The following instructions are made a ground of complaint: "It was the duty of the defendant railway company to provide a suitable car and one of sufficient strength for the purpose of shipping mules and horses; and if the defendant failed to do so, and, by reason of such failure or neglect, some of the animals shipped in said car were injured, the defendant is liable for the injury caused thereby to said animals. When a railway company undertakes to carry horses and mules, they are bound to furnish such cars as are strong enough to hold such animals from injuring themselves by reason of the weakness of such car; and if you find the car was broken in which the stock of plaintiff was shipped from Des Moines, and that same was broken by the ordinary acts and usual conduct of such stock when carried on cars on a railway, then, as to this issue, you will find for plaintiff." Defendant asked instructions embodying the rule that if the car was reasonably safe for the purpose of carrying stock, and that the "stock, by reason of fear, anger, excitement, or from any other cause in the nature of the animal to kick, did kick, and break holes in the sides of the car, whereby some of the legs of the animals were skinned, and they injured themselves from their own vicious natures, * * * without fault or negligence on the part of defendant," it would not be liable. Properly considered, we do not think there is an essential difference between the rule asked and the one given. We understand the rule to be that the company must provide a reasonably safe car for the transportation of stock, and that when such a car is provided, and stock is injured because of its viciousness or disposition to kick or otherwise so act as to injure itself, or one animal injures another, where the injury is not a result of neglect on the part of the company to properly care for the stock, the company is not liable. This is the rule of McCoy v. Railway Co., 44 Iowa 424; Kinnick v. Railway Co., 69 Iowa 665, 29 N.W. 772. It is not, however, to be understood that a reasonably safe car is one that will merely hold or confine the stock for transportation, but it must be a car reasonably safe for transporting the stock without injury from any causes that should be reasonably anticipated. In Kinnick v. Railway Co., supra, the McCoy Case is referred to, and the rule is announced "that, when the cause of damage for which recompense is sought is connected with the character or propensities of the animals undertaken to be carried, the ordinary responsibility of the carrier does not attach." Appellant relies on this rule, and insists that the company was not...