Betts v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-1861 (CKK)
• Parties: AMANDA BETTS, Plaintiff v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

AMANDA BETTS, Plaintiff v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant

Civil Action No. 21-1861 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge

Plaintiff Amanda Betts brings this employment discrimination action against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“Defendant” or “WMATA”). Plaintiff's five-count Complaint raises the following claims: (1) hostile work environment based on sex (female) disability (pregnancy), race (African-American), and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973^[1]; (2) discrimination based on disability (pregnancy) in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) discrimination based on sex (female) in violation of Title VII; (4) discrimination based on race (African-American) in violation of Title VII; and (5) retaliation against protected activity in violation of Title VII.

Pending before the Court is WMATA's [5] Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. WMATA contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her Title VII claims, and that all of her claims are time-barred by Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act. In its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), the Court shall convert the portions of WMATA's motion addressing these exhaustion and timing requirements into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 and shall consider matters outside the pleadings. WMATA also argues that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief as to each of her claims and, as to her discrimination and retaliation claims, that it has offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. The Court shall assess these arguments under the framework provided by Rule 12(b)(6).

Upon consideration of the pleadings,^[2] the relevant legal authority, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART WMATA's motion:

• The Court GRANTS IN PART summary judgment to WMATA as to Plaintiff's Title VII claims for sex discrimination (Count Three), race discrimination (Count Four), and retaliation (Count Five) due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies insofar as these claims rely on the following acts or events: July 2012 transfer assignment, July 2012 denial of two transfer reconsideration requests, surrender of service weapon alleged verbal harassment that occurred prior to October 31, 2012 (including the alleged interaction in June 2012 with Lieutenant Boehm), and April 12, 2013 dereliction reprimand. The Court DENIES the remainder of WMATA's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment as to Counts Three, Four, and Five.

• The Court GRANTS IN PART summary judgment to WMATA as to Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act Claim for disability discrimination (Count Two) insofar as this claim relies on the following acts or events: July 2012 transfer assignment, July 2012 denial of two transfer reconsideration requests, surrender of service weapon, and alleged verbal harassment that occurred prior to October 31, 2012. As to the remaining acts underlying Count Two, the Court GRANTS WMATA's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim and DISMISSES Count Two of the Complaint.

• The Court GRANTS WMATA's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII (Count One) and DISMISSES Count One of the Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

As addressed by the Court infra Section III, the Court shall convert only the portions of WMATA's pending motion addressing exhaustion and statutory timing issues to a motion for summary judgment. In presenting the facts pertinent to the Court's analysis of WMATA's exhaustion and timing arguments, the Court considers not only the pleadings, but also the evidence submitted by the parties. The Court shall also cite directly to the record, where appropriate, to provide additional information. As to the balance of WMATA's arguments, the Court shall assess the motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and therefore shall consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint,” documents “incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the court may take judicial notice.” Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 319 F.Supp.3d 358, 366 n.2 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002)) (additional citation omitted). Following the general practice of other courts in this jurisdiction, the Court shall take judicial notice of Plaintiff's EEOC charges, and amendments and clarifications thereto. See id.; Leftwich v. Gallaudet Univ., 878 F.Supp.2d 81, 93 n.5 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted).

As detailed below, Plaintiff submitted three separate charges to the EEOC, complaining of various actions taken by WMATA that she contends were discriminatory, retaliatory, and/or created a hostile work environment. The Court shall present the facts underlying these charges in chronological order to contextualize the timing of Plaintiff's EEOC charges and the factual allegations underlying each.

A. First EEOC Charge

Beginning in November 2005, Plaintiff was employed as a police officer in WMATA's Metro Transit Police Department (“MTPD”). Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. M, First EEOC Charge at 2, ECF No. 7-15.^[3] As of June 2010, Plaintiff worked in Landover, Maryland at the Metro Supply Facility as a detective in MTPD's Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”). Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. N, Pl.'s Letter Clarifying First EEOC Charge at 2, ECF No. 7-16.

Plaintiff alleges that in the spring of 2012 she participated as a witness in an EEOC investigation initiated by a female colleague. See id.; First EEOC Charge at 2. Plaintiff claims that her supervisors knew that she participated as a witness in this EEOC investigation. Pl.'s Letter Clarifying First EEOC Charge at 2. Around the same time, Plaintiff notified MTPD that she was pregnant. Id. Plaintiff claims that she started to experience differential treatment as her co-workers became aware of her participation in the investigation of her colleague's EEOC complaint and her pregnancy. Id. She claims that she was “demeaned and berated” by supervisors. Id.

In June 2012, Plaintiff submitted a doctor's letter to her supervisor, requesting that she be transferred to light duty or administrative duty by July 8, 2012 due to “complications” related to her pregnancy. Id. On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff was informed that her request was approved, and that she would be transferred to the Background Investigations Unit in Washington, D.C. effective July 16, 2012. Id. Plaintiff claims that after she learned about this transfer, she sought reconsideration of her new assignment-requesting that she be permitted to stay with CID in Landover, Maryland and assigned to light or administrative duty. Id. at 2-3. After a supervisor informed her that he needed additional information regarding whether an “accommodation” was required due to complications from her pregnancy, Plaintiff submitted a second request. Id. at 3. Plaintiff's requests to remain at CID were denied. Id. She claims that she had not been required to transfer positions during an earlier pregnancy in 2010, but had instead been permitted to remain in her position with CID. Id. at 3-4.

Plaintiff began a “limited/administrative duty” assignment with the Background Investigations Unit. Id. at 3. In late July 2012, Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to complete her duties in the Background Investigations Unit at MTPD's Landover, Maryland location or from her home. Id. at 2-3. She claims that other detectives had been allowed to do so. Id. WMATA denied her request. Id. Plaintiff worked in the Background Investigations Unit until she went on maternity leave in the fall of 2012. According to WMATA, the last day on which Plaintiff received pay before she went on maternity leave was October 6, 2012. Def.'s Reply Ex. 1 Declaration of Annette Edmonds (“Edmonds Decl.”) ¶¶ 10-12, ECF No. 8-2.

Plaintiff claims that at some point during this same time period, she was required to surrender her service weapon. First EEOC Charge at 2. The record regarding the date on which Plaintiff surrendered her service weapon is not clear-cut. WMATA has submitted the declaration of Chief Ronald A. Pavlik, who indicates that the surrender of Plaintiff's service weapon occurred “because she requested, and was placed on, limited duty due to her pregnancy[.]” Def.'s Mot. Ex. 11, Declaration of Ronald A. Pavlik (“Pavlik Decl.”) ¶ 14, ECF No. 5-14. In other words, Chief Pavlik attests that Plaintiff would have surrendered her service weapon upon being assigned to limited duty. That assignment began on July 16, 2012. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. J, Pl.'s First Request for Reconsideration of Transfer Assignment at 2, ECF No. 7-12. Plaintiff offers no evidence to controvert WMATA's evidence that her reassignment in July 2012 would have obligated her to surrender her service weapon. Notably, her own claim of “differential treatment” relies on her allegation that other officers assigned to Background Investigations were allowed to keep their service weapons, but she was required to surrender hers. See, e.g., Pl.'s Stmt. of Disputed Material Facts (“Pl.'s Stmt.”) ¶¶ 16-17, ECF No. 7-2. Plaintiff claims that the latest date on which she could have surrendered her service weapon and requested transfer to light or administrative duty “could have been” after October 11, 2012, but fails to provide evidence to support this claim. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 9. Accordingly, the evidence on the present record indicates that Plaintiff surrendered her service weapon sometime in July 2012.

In...