Betz v. First Credit Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 15-01376 (RC) |
| Parties | NAEEM BETZ, Plaintiff, v. FIRST CREDIT SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
On August 25, 2015, pro se Plaintiff Naeem Betz filed this action against Defendant First Credit Services ("First Credit") alleging various violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227, the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and the District of Columbia Debt Collection Law ("DCDCL"), D.C. Code § 28-3814 et seq.. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss, addressing all the claims except the TCPA claim. See Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and V of the Complaint.
First Credit sent a letter to Naeem Betz, dated October 28, 2014, informing him that one of its clients, Gold's Gym, referred Mr. Betz's account to it for collection. See Compl. Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 1-1. The letter stated that it is seeking to collect $249.92, the remaining balance from his membership account with the gym. Id.
In the letter, underneath a table displaying the amount he owes, was a note that included the following disclaimer:
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THIS DEBT OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL ASSUME THE DEBT IS VALID.
Id.1 Below this note, the letter contained a footer, also in all capital letters, that says "This communication is from a debt collector." Id.2
During this time, Mr. Betz claims he also received several "harassing telephone calls" by First Credit "attempt[ing] to collect the alleged debt." Compl. at 4.3 In response, on November 13th, Mr. Betz sent First Credit an e-mail and a fax requesting it to "cease and desist any and all collection activity until [First Credit] provides . . . verification/proof of claim." Compl. Ex. B at 12-1, ECF No. 1-1.4
More than a month later, on December 26th, Mr. Betz received an e-mail alert notifying him that a new account had appeared on his credit report from Transunion, a credit reporting agency. Compl. at 16; see Compl. Ex. D at 22, ECF No. 1-1. Prompted by the notification, Mr. Betz obtained this credit report and confirmed that the new "adverse account" was reported by First Credit. Compl. at 6; see Compl. Ex. D at 24. Mr. Betz immediately contacted Transunion to dispute the alleged debt and request an investigation.5 Compl. at 6. Three days later, Transunion updated Mr. Betz's credit report by deleting the adverse account from his profile. Compl. at 6; see Compl. Ex. E at 27, ECF No. 1-1.
In a related incident, two separate letters, dated December 23, 2014, and addressed to Mr. Betz, show that First Credit responded to complaints received by the Better Business Bureau ("BBB") and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB").6 Compl. Ex. E at 30-3. In these letters, First Credit wrote that Mr. Betz expressly consented to being contacted via telephone but that it "will consider [his] . . . complaint a written cease and desist request and cease all activity on the account." Id.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim" in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Redding v. Edwards, 569 F. Supp. 2d 129, 131 (D.D.C. 2008). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2010).
Nevertheless, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
A pro se complaint, however, is held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But even pro se litigants "must plead 'factual matter' that permits the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Moreover, "[a] pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted." Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
Plaintiff alleges violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a) and 1692e. See Compl. at 7-10. The relevant portions of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) set requirements relating to the validation of debts by establishing the specific information debt collectors must include in their initial communications with the consumer. Plaintiff's allegations focus specifically on sub-provision (3), which states that a debt collector must communicate to the debtor, either in the initial communication or within five days of the initial communication, information that includes "a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
Plaintiff's claims are based on a difference between the language used in the statute and the language used in one sentence of Defendant's letter. While the rest of the sentence in question is identical to the statute's, the last clause contains a deviation: the statute states, "the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector," but the disclaimer in Defendant's letter instead reads, "this office will assume the debt is valid." Compl. Ex. A at 2. Plaintiff contendsthis difference "conveys to the least sophisticated consumer that the Debt will be assumed to be valid by anyone, not just Defendant," and leads Plaintiff to believe that the "failure to dispute this alleged debts [sic] within thirty (30) days after receipt of the [Dunning Letter] will result in Plaintiff losing or waiving the ability/right to ever dispute their debts with any other entity." Compl. at 8.
Although Plaintiff identifies a narrow difference in text, his claim ignores that the meaning of the letter's language is indistinguishable from the statute's.7 In addition to substituting "this office," Plaintiff adds a disclaimer on the bottom of the same page that states (in all capital letters), "This communication is from a debt collector." Compl. Ex. A at 2. Thus, the letter makes clear that Plaintiff's debt will be assumed valid by a specific entity, "the office," and not "by anyone." See id. The language leaves no uncertainty the letter is being sent from a debt collection office - exactly what the statute's validation requirements command.
Additionally, while the Court acknowledges the Plaintiff's reference to the "least sophisticated consumer" standard, already adopted by multiple Circuit Courts, our own Circuit has not yet decided whether this standard governs contested language in collection letters under the FDCPA.8 See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008);Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000); Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 502 F.3d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 1996). Even if applied, this standard would not save Plaintiff's claims. While its purpose is "to ensure that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd," the standard still "preserves a quotient of reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care." Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354-55 (citing Nat'l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 136).
Construed under this liberal standard, Plaintiff's assertions still fail to demonstrate a reasonable interpretation of Defendant's letter that would be meaningfully different from the validation requirements of 1692g(a)(3).9 The Court does not see how any possible interpretation of the letter's text could lead a reasonable consumer to believe something different than what the FDCPA demands; and this Court, like others, does not believe that debt collectors are resigned to a word-for-word replication of the statute's language in order to comply with its requirements. See, e.g., Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC, 2 F. Supp. 3d 813, 822-23 (...
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