Beuning Family Limited Partnership v. County of Stearns
| Decision Date | 23 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | 73-CV-10-4868,73-CV-11-3714 |
| Parties | BEUNING FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF STEARNS, Respondent. |
| Court | Tax Court of Minnesota |
This matter came before the Honorable Bradford S. Delapena, Chief Judge of the Minnesota Tax Court, on petitioner's motion for summary judgmemt as to classification in File Number 73-CV-10-4868, and for partial summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-11-3714.
Attorneys and Law Firms
David B. Galle and Stacy M. Lindstedt, Attorneys at Law represented petitioner Beuning Family Limited Partnership.
Brenda L. Theis, Assistant Stearns County Attorney, represented respondent Stearns County.
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The court, upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein now makes the following:
1. Beuning's motion for summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-10-4868 is granted.
2. Beuning's motion for partial summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-11-3714 is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED. THIS IS A FINAL ORDER AS TO FILE NUMBER 73-CV-10-4868. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY AS TO FILE NUMBER 73-CV-10-4868.
MEMORANDUMThese consolidated cases involve the proper classification of a vacant parcel of real property as of the January 2, 2008 and January 2, 2010 assessment dates. We previously determined that the same property was properly classified R-1 Residential as of the January 2, 2009 assessment date. Beuning now moves for summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-10-4868, and for partial summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-11-3714, arguing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires us to reach the same result for the surrounding assessment dates presently in issue. We agree, and grant Beuning's motions.
The subject property is owned, in part, by the Beuning Family Trust, and has been vacant since at least 2005.[1] It is located in LeSauk Township, Stearns County.[2] The subject property is vacant and unimproved; it is not being used for any identifiable purpose.[3]
Pursuant to a 1992 Joint Resolution for Orderly Annexation, LeSauk Township-in its entirety-is designated as an orderly annexation area for the City of Sartell.[4] The Joint Resolution provides for a Joint Planning Board with land-use and zoning authority over the orderly annexation area.[5] It also provides, however, that “[t]he zoning ... regulations shall be those currently being used by the Town and the City until and unless change is adopted....”[6]
Property owners in the orderly annexation area (LeSauk Township) must petition to have their property annexed into the City of Sartell.[7] As of the assessment dates for the years at issue, Beuning had not petitioned for annexation.[8] Zoning of the property on the assessment dates was therefore controlled by an un-superseded LeSauk Township zoning ordinance, and was R-1 Residential.[9] A future land use plan developed by the City of Sartell-LeSauk Township Joint Planning Board designates the property “general business.” Development of the subject property, upon annexation, must be consistent with this development plan.[10]
Despite the property's zoning as residential, the Stearns County Assessor reclassified the subject property in 2008, designating it as commercial property.[11] As relevant here, Beuning filed three actions in this court challenging, among other things, the County's reclassification of the subject property:
File Number
Assessment Date
Taxes Payable
73-CV-10-4868
January 2, 2008
2009
73-CV-10-3592
January 2, 2009
2010
73-CV-11-3714
January 2, 2010
2011
Our partial summary judgment decision in File Number 73-CV-10-3592 forms the basis of Beuning's present collateral estoppel argument.
In January 2011, Beuning and the County filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment in File Number 73-CV-10-3592 concerning the proper classification of the subject property as of January 2, 2009. Beuning argued that the property must be classified as residential, the County as commercial. Beuning Family LP v. Cnty. of Stearns, No. 73-CV-10-3592, 2011 WL 2517421, at *1 (Minn. T.C. June 21, 2011), cert. dismissed, 817 N.W.2d 122 (Minn.2012). The County argued, among other things, “that the zoning R-1 is a default zoning and should not be considered here.” Id. at *2. On this basis, the County asserted that “the proper classification for the Subject Property's highest and best use is as commercial property, as contemplated in the Joint Resolution [for Orderly Annexation] and as classified by the Stearns County Assessor.” Id.
We began our analysis by noting that under the controlling classification statute, “real property that is not improved with a structure and for which there is no identifiable current use must be classified according to its highest and best use permitted under the local zoning ordinance.” Id. (quoting Minn.Stat. § 273.13, subd. 33(b)). We concluded that the statute was clear as applied to the undisputed historical facts, and that “[u]nder the local zoning ordinance, the property was zoned R-1 residential....” Id.
We agreed with the County that the subject property “could not be developed as residential, ” and that under the Joint Resolution, it “could only be used as commercial property, once it was annexed into the City of Sartell.” Id. at *2. We concluded, however, that these considerations did not affect our analysis under section 273.13:
Id. at *3. Although future use upon annexation would be controlled by the Joint Resolution, and any zoning enacted thereunder, present zoning was controlled by the unsuperseded LeSauk ordinance:
Id. (citing Lifestyle Homes, Inc. v. Cnty. of Dakota, No. C3-94-7835, 1995 WL 376946 (Minn. T.C. June 19, 1995)). We thus concluded that subject property was properly classified as residential for the January 2, 2009 assessment date. Id. at *1.
We subsequently determined, based on a stipulation of the parties, that there was no just reason for delay and directed entry of judgment as to the classification issue under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54 .02.[12] The County obtained certiorari review in the Minnesota Supreme Court. The supreme court determined, however, that our order was not immediately reviewable by certiorari, and it therefore dismissed the County's writ of certiorari. Beuning Family LP v. Cnty. of Stearns, 817 N.W.2d 122, 130 (Minn.2012)
Beuning now moves for summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-10-4868 concerning the January 2, 2008 assessment date, and for partial summary judgment as to classification in File Number 73-CV-11-3714 concerning the January 2, 2010 assessment date. Beuning argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires us to apply our ruling in File Number 73-CV-10-3592 that subject property was properly classified as residential on January 2, 2009, to reach the same result for the two surrounding assessment dates.
Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, the record in the case, and any supporting affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03; DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.1997). Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05; Prawer v. Essling, 282 N.W.2d 493, 494 (Minn.1979). “Where the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue, there is no issue of material fact, and summary judgment is proper.” Barth v.. Stenwick, 761 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2009)
Collateral estoppel “precludes parties from relitigating issues which are identical to issues previously litigated and which were necessary and essential to the former resulting judgment.” Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc. 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn.1990). The doctrine may be applied to the judicial or...
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