Bevan v. Cnty. of Lackawanna
| Decision Date | 12 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:17-CV-0919,3:17-CV-0919 |
| Parties | JAMES BEVAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LACKAWANNA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Presently before me is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) filed by Defendant County of Lackawanna (the "County" or Defendant"). James Bevan ("Bevan" or "Plaintiff"), a former corrections officer at the Lackawanna County Prison, contends that after he was granted intermittent medical leave from mandated overtime, Defendant adopted a policy in retaliation that resulted in the rapid depletion of Plaintiff's available leave time. Plaintiff alleges that once his available leave was exhausted and he refused to work mandated overtime, Defendant terminated his employment. Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff asserts, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S .C. § 12101 et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S .C. § 2601 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA/PHRA discrimination based on disability and failure to accommodate claims, as well as Plaintiff's FMLA interference and denial of benefits claims. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FMLA interference and denial of benefits claims will be granted because Plaintiff fails to allege that he was denied benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA. Plaintiff will, however, be permitted to proceed with his ADA/PHRA discrimination and failure to accommodate claims because the facts as alleged in the Complaint sufficiently state such causes of action.
The facts as pled in the Complaint are as follows:
Plaintiff was employed as a corrections officer at the Lackawanna County Prison until he was terminated on June 3, 2015. (See Doc. 1, ¶ 14). Plaintiff has a psychological impairment, namely, severe anxiety and depression. (See id. at ¶ 15). On account of this impairment, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, intermittent leave for any hours in excess of forty (40) hours per week and/or eight (8) hours per day under the FMLA beginning on September 16, 2014. (See id. at ¶ 17).
County corrections officers were routinely mandated to work overtime. (See id. at ¶ 24). When mandated, Plaintiff would decline the overtime based on his approved leave and the amount of overtime mandated to Plaintiff would be applied to his leave and subtracted from the allotment to which he was entitled. (See id. at ¶¶ 25-26). When he was first granted intermittent leave, Defendant treated intermittent leave in place of overtime "for the purpose of order of subsequent mandates, the same as for employees who had worked the mandated overtime." (Id. at ¶ 27).
Beginning on October 26, 2014, though, Defendant instituted a policy mandating Plaintiff for overtime more frequently than his co-workers and in a manner deliberately calculated to require Plaintiff to exhaust his available medical leave. (See id. at ¶¶ 23, 28-31). More specifically, every time Plaintiff took intermittent leave (Id. at ¶¶ 29-30). Plaintiff unsuccessfully objected to this policy. (See id. at ¶ 31). Plaintiff was terminated on June 3, 2015 after he refused mandated overtime without available time for intermittent leave. (See id. at ¶ 32). When he was terminated, Plaintiff had available unexhausted sick and vacation time per his union contract. (See id. at ¶ 33).
Plaintiff's employment with the County was governed by the terms of aCollective Bargaining Agreement (the "CBA"). (See Doc. 9, Ex. A, § 1).1 The CBA's overtime provision states, in pertinent part:
(Id. at Art. 20, § (B)).
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff commenced this action against the County on May 25, 2017. (See Doc. 1, generally). The Complaint sets forth the following claims: discrimination based on disability, failure to accommodate, and retaliation in violation of the ADA (Counts I-III); discrimination based on disability, failure to accommodate, and retaliation in violation of the PHRA (Counts IV-VI); and termination (retaliation), interference and obstruction, and denial of leave in violationof the FMLA (Counts VII-IX). (See id.).
On July 25, 2017, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss. (See Doc. 7, generally). Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's ADA and PHRA discrimination based on disability and retaliation claims (Counts I, II, IV, and V), as well as Plaintiff's interference and denial of leave claims (Counts VIII and IX). (See Doc. 8, generally). The motion to dismiss is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Under the 'notice pleading' standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court must consider no more than whether the complaint establishes 'enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements' of the cause of action." Trzaska v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F. 3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016)). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps: (1) identify the elements of the claim; (2) identify conclusions that are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) assume the veracity of the well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (citations omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
Defendant, as stated, seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's ADA and PHRA discrimination and failure to accommodate claims, as well as the FMLA interference and denial of leave claims. The sufficiency of the ADA and PHRA discrimination and failure to accommodate claims will be addressed first.2
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To plead a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege "(1) that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the job, with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) that he was subjected to an adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination." Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). "A plaintiff bringing an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim must establish: '(1) he was disabled and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been reasonably accommodated.'" Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006)). Defendant argues that these claims should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff is not a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; and (2) Plaintiff's request for exemption from mandatory overtime under the CBA is not a reasonable accommodation. (See Doc. 10, 5-10). These contentions will bediscussed in turn.
The ADA defines a qualified individual as one "who, with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). "'A two-part test is used to determine whether someone is a qualified individual with a disability.'" McNelis v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 867 F.3d 411, 415 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)). Id. (citation, internal...
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