Bevel v. Marine Grp., LLC
| Decision Date | 03 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | 1150941 |
| Citation | 231 So.3d 1074 |
| Parties | Timothy BEVEL v. MARINE GROUP, LLC, et al. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Thomas C. Donald, Birmingham, for appellant.
Hugh M. Flanagan of Long & Flanagan, LLC, Guntersville, for appellees.
Timothy Bevel appeals from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration. We reverse and remand.
In March 2015, Bevel financed the purchase of a used Bennington brand boat and a Yamaha brand boat motor from Guntersville Boat Mart, Inc., and he rented a boat slip on Lake Guntersville to dock the boat. The sale and boat-slip rental are documented by a one-page bill of sale, which contains an arbitration provision. According to Bevel, the boat was seized several months after the transaction for allegedly defaulting on payments on the boat and boat-slip rental. Bevel disputes that he owed those payments.
Bevel sued Guntersville Boat Mart and related entities Marine Group, LLC, d/b/a Boat Mart, and JD & L Enterprises, Inc. In his complaint, Bevel asserted several claims, including breach of contract. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the bill of sale. Bevel argued that his claims were not subject to the arbitration provision in the bill of sale because, he said, he had not actually agreed to that provision. Bevel noted that he had not initialed a box directly below the arbitration provision, although he had signed or initialed the document in other places. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration. Bevel appealed to this Court under Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P., which authorizes an appeal from an order either granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration.
Cartwright v. Maitland, 30 So.3d 405, 408–09 (Ala. 2009).
Bevel argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion to compel arbitration because, he says, he did not agree to the arbitration provision in the bill of sale. Thus, he argues, the arbitration provision never became part of the contract between the parties. Bevel's argument focuses on what he did and did not initial or sign on the one-page bill of sale.
Bevel signed or initialed the bill of sale in two places—he initialed a box indicating that the boat was being sold "as is," and he signed on a line at the bottom of the document regarding his receipt of the boat and the acknowledgment of the boat's condition. He did not, however, initial the box under the arbitration provision, and he did not initial the box under the trade-in section (the sale did not involve a trade-in). The arbitration provision is on the bottom half of the bill of sale. Directly below the arbitration provision, on the left side of the document, is an indented box for the purchaser's initials. Bevel, however, did not initial that box. Also below the arbitration provision, on the right side of the document but slightly lower than the left-side box, is an indented box for the purchaser's initials labeled "BOAT SOLD AS IS"; Bevel did initial that box. Directly below the two boxes is the following text concerningBevel's receipt of the boat and the boat's condition:
Below that provision is a signature line, which Bevel signed.1
Bevel argues that, because he did not initial the box directly below the arbitration provision, he did not agree to that provision. Thus, Bevel argues, the arbitration provision is not part of the contract, and, therefore, he says, he is not bound by it. " '[A]rbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' " AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ). The issue whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes is determined by "ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995).
Bevel relies primarily on Ex parte Pointer, 714 So.2d 971 (Ala. 1997). Because this Court in Ex parte Pointer relied primarily on Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. McCarrell, 695 So.2d 615 (Ala. 1997), we will discuss Crown Pontiac first. In Crown Pontiac, McCarrell purchased an automobile from a dealership. McCarrell signed the contract in four places—under the trade-in section, in the disclaimer-of-warranties box, under the merger clause, and at the bottom of the page. However, McCarrell did not sign the box accompanying the arbitration provision in the contract.
The Court in Crown Pontiac concluded that the unsigned arbitration provision had not become part of the contract between the parties. Thus, the Court concluded that McCarrell could not be compelled to arbitrate the disputes arising from the purchase. The Court reasoned:
Crown Pontiac, 695 So.2d at 618–19.
Shortly after releasing Crown Pontiac, this Court decided Ex parte Pointer, a case very similar to Crown Pontiac. In Ex parte Pointer, Pointer purchased an automobile from a dealership. The contract included numerous sections enclosed in boxes, and each section contained a space for Pointer's signature or initials. Pointer signed or initialed each section except the section containing an arbitration provision. Pointer later sued the dealership, asserting, among other claims, breach of contract. When the dealership sought to compel arbitration, Pointer resisted, arguing that the unsigned arbitration clause was not a binding term of the contract. This Court agreed, relying on Crown Pontiac. Because "[t]here was no mutual agreement to submit to arbitration" Pointer's claims, he could not be compelled to arbitrate those claims. 714 So.2d at 972. The arbitration provision simply never became part of the contract.
In arguing that Bevel is bound by the arbitration provision, the defendants rely on America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey, 166 So.3d 655 (Ala. 2014). In Rampey, Rampey and a homebuilder entered into a contract calling for the homebuilder to build Rampey a house. After the house was built, Rampey sued the homebuilder, alleging, among several other claims, breach of contract. The contract contained several provisions with a line beside the provision for Rampey's initials. Rampey initialed all the applicable provisions—including an arbitration provision. Rampey also initialed a provision indicating that each of the other applicable provisions had been explained and that he " 'initial [ed] acceptance of same.' " 166 So.3d at 657 (emphasis omitted). Rampey also signed the bottom of the contract under a provision stating that the contact would be binding on the parties thereto.
Rampey pinned his hopes of avoiding arbitration on his argument that he had not signed a signature line under the arbitration provision; this was a different line from the one he initialed beside the arbitration provision. That signature line under the arbitration provision bore a signature purporting to be Rampey's, but he claimed the signature was forged. Rampey argued that his failure to sign the signature line below the arbitration provision indicated that he had not agreed to that provision. This Court disagreed, stating:
"The fact that Rampey's signature immediately beneath the arbitration provision was (allegedly) forged is of no consequence because his signature was not required immediately beneath the arbitration provision and, furthermore, Rampey assented to be bound by that provision when he admittedly wrote his initials on the line next to the arbitration provision."
In concluding that Rampey's signature beneath the arbitration...
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Farrell v. Rd. Ready United Statesed Cars, Inc.
...are based, at least in part, on allegedly wrongful charges contained in the Purchase Order. Finally, Farrell cites Bevel v. Marine Grp., LLC, 231 So.3d 1074 (Ala. 2017), where the Supreme Court of Alabama denied a motion to compel arbitration because the plaintiff did not check the box prov......