Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-1852,19-1852
• Citation: 958 N.W.2d 611 (Table)
• Parties: Larry C. BEVERAGE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles E. Beverage, deceased, Linda K. Anderson, and Bonnie K. Valentine, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ALCOA, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc., successor-in-interest to Iowa Illinois Thermal Insulation, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

958 N.W.2d 611 (Table)

Larry C. BEVERAGE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles E. Beverage, deceased, Linda K. Anderson, and Bonnie K. Valentine, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.ALCOA, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc., successor-in-interest to Iowa Illinois Thermal Insulation, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-1852

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed March 17, 2021

Lisa W. Shirley of Dean Omar Branham Shirley, LLP, Dallas, Texas, and James H. Cook of Dutton, Daniels, Hines, Kalkhoff, Cook & Swanson, PLC, Waterloo, for appellants.

Kevin P. Horan, Douglas M. Sinars, and Owen Blood of Sinars Slowikowski Tomaska, LLC, Chicago, Illinois, for appellee Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc.

Robert M. Livingston and William R. Hughes, Jr. of Stuart Tinley Law Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs, and Donna R. Miller of Miller, Zimmerman & Evans, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee Arconic, Inc., f/k/a Alcoa, Inc.

Mark Behrens of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Washington, DC, and Matthew McKinney and Thomas Story of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross & Baskerville, P.L.C., Des Moines, for amici curiae Iowa Association of Business and Industry, Iowa Insurance Institute, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, and Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc.

Heard by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.

MAY, Presiding Judge.

Charles Beverage spent many years working inside an aluminum plant. The plant contained asbestos. After Charles's death, his estate and children (Beverage) brought asbestos-related claims against the plant's owner, Alcoa, Inc. (Alcoa), as well as an installer of insulation, Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc. (IITI). The district court concluded Beverage's claims are barred by Iowa Code section 686B.7 (2017). We agree and affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Between the 1950s and mid-1970s, Charles was exposed to asbestos while working as an independent contractor inside an aluminum plant. Alcoa owned the plant. IITI installed much of the plant's asbestos insulation.

In 2015, Charles was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma

. He died that October.

In July 2016, Beverage brought a products liability suit against Alcoa and several other defendants (not including IITI) in Missouri state court. Alcoa filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. Beverage voluntarily dismissed their Missouri action.

In September 2017, Beverage commenced this action. Beverage named only two defendants: Alcoa and IITI.

Alcoa and IITI filed motions for summary judgment. They claimed Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) provided them immunity. The district court agreed and granted their motions. This appeal follows.

II. Standard of Review

"Our review is for the correction of legal error." In re Estate of Franken , 944 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Iowa 2020). "Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " Id. at 858 (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) ).

Summary judgment plays a special role in immunity cases. As our supreme court explained in Nelson v. Lindaman :

Summary judgment is an important procedure in statutory immunity cases because a key purpose of the immunity is to avoid costly litigation, and that legislative goal is thwarted when claims subject to immunity proceed to trial. See Plumhoff v. Rickard , (2014) ("[T]his [immunity] question could not be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment because by that time the immunity from standing trial will have been irretrievably lost."); Hlubek [v. Pelecky ], 701 N.W.2d [93,] 98 [(Iowa 2005)] (noting statutory immunity removes the " ‘fear of being sued’ " and affirming summary judgment (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) )). Indeed, in Hlubek , we recognized the defendants’ observation that "statutory immunity, like common-law immunity, provides more than protection from liability; it provides protection from even having to go to trial in some circumstances." 701 N.W.2d at 96. Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

867 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (second and third alterations in original).

III. Discussion

In their appellant brief, Beverage argued (1) the district court incorrectly interpreted section 686B.7(5) ; (2) alternatively, section 686B.7(5) violates their due process rights under the United States and Iowa constitutions; and (3) alternatively, section 686B.7(5) violates equal protection under the United States and Iowa constitutions. In their reply brief, however, Beverage expressly stated they are "no longer challenging Iowa Code § 686B.7(5) on equal protection grounds." We treat this as a waiver of Beverage's equal protection arguments. So we focus instead on Beverage's statutory and due process theories.

A. Statutory Interpretation

Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) provides: "A defendant in an asbestos action or silica action shall not be liable for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party." We find the Code's meaning in its words. Doe v. State , 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020) (noting "in questions of statutory interpretation, ‘[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means’ " and "[t]his is necessarily a textual inquiry as only the text of a piece of legislation is enacted into law" (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)); State v. Childs , 898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2017) ("Our court ‘may not ... enlarge or otherwise change the terms of a statute as the legislature adopted it.’ ‘When a proposed interpretation of a statute would require the court to "read something into the law that is not apparent from the words chosen by the legislature," the court will reject it.’ " (citations omitted)); Holland v. State , 115 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa 1962) ("Ours not to reason why, ours but to read, and apply. It is our duty to accept the law as the legislative body enacts it."); Moss v. Williams , 133 N.W. 120, 121 (Iowa 1911) ("We must look to the statute as it is written ....").

The district court carefully considered the words of section 686B.7(5), the record before it, and the arguments of the parties. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the asbestos products at issue were "made or sold by a third party,"¹ section 686B.7(5) provided Alcoa and IITI immunity against Beverage's asbestos-related claims.

On appeal, Beverage claims the district court's interpretation was incorrect in three ways. We address each claim in turn.

1. Meaning of "defendant" in section 686B.7(5)

Beverage first argues the district court erred in determining that, in the context of section 686B.7(5), the word "defendant" unambiguously means "any entity sued in an asbestos suit." Rather, in Beverage's view, "a better interpretation is that a ‘defendant’ is one that makes or sells an asbestos product." Beverage explains:

This definition of defendant as a product manufacturer is suggested by the modifier to the word "product[":] there is no liability if the product was "made or sold by a third party." Such qualification would only be necessary if the statute contemplated that the "defendant" is one who makes asbestos products.

The statute is making a distinction between a "product or component part made or sold by a third party" and "a product or component part made or sold by" the defendant.

We disagree. A three-part process helps us decide what "defendant" means in this context. Cf. De Stefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc. , 879 N.W.2d 155, 168 (Iowa 2016) ("Words or phrases that are [1] undefined in the statute or [2] for which there is no established legal meaning [3] are given their common, ordinary meaning in the context within which they are used." (citation omitted)). First, we consider whether "the legislature has defined" the term "defendant" in the statute. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 889 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Iowa 2017). If so, the legislature's definition "bind[s] us." Id. (citation omitted). Second, if the legislature has not provided a definition, we consider whether there is an "established legal meaning" for the term. De Stefano , 879 N.W.2d at 168. Finally, if a term is "undefined in the statute" and lacks an "established legal meaning," then it should be given its "common, ordinary meaning in the context within which [it is] used." Id. (citation omitted).

As Beverage notes, it does not appear the legislature defined the term "defendant" either in section 686B.7 or elsewhere in chapter 686B. So we consider whether "defendant" has an "established legal meaning." See id. It does. As Black's Law Dictionary explains, "defendant" means "[a] person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding." Defendant , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This is "the usual meaning ascribed by" courts to the term. See State v. Shafranek , 576 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1998). So "[t]he legislature is presumed ... to intend that meaning unless the context shows otherwise." Id.

We do not think "context shows otherwise." See id. Beverage describes chapter 686B as a "tort reform law." And its words show it is aimed at regulating civil lawsuits arising from asbestos and silica injuries. In this context, it is only natural for the legislature to use "defendant" to mean "[a] person sued in a civil proceeding." See Defendant , Black's Law Dictionary. This is the "common, ordinary meaning" of the term "in the context" of civil litigation like this. De Stefano , 879 N.W.2d at 168 (citation omitted).

So because Alcoa and IITI were both sued in this civil proceeding, it was right for the district court to treat them as "defendants." Conversely, we reject Beverage's suggestion that the district court should...