Beveridge v. Baer
| Citation | 241 N.W. 727,59 S.D. 563 |
| Decision Date | 15 March 1932 |
| Docket Number | 7345. |
| Parties | BEVERIDGE v. BAER, Director of Taxation, et al. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Original proceeding in certiorari by Harriet Beveridge against B. W Baer, as Director of Taxation of the State, and others.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Danforth & Davenport, Boyce, Warren & Fairbank, Christopherson & Melquist, Bielski & Elliott, Teigen & Davis, Blaine Simons Bailey & Voorhees, and Judge & Chapman, all of Sioux Falls for plaintiff.
M. Q Sharpe and Charles P. Warren, Attys. Gen., for defendants.
The plaintiff is the owner of real property together with a structure thereon located in the city of Sioux Falls. The structure on this property was assessed in 1931, by the local assessor, at the value of $15,100. At the meeting of the city board of equalization of Sioux Falls, O. S. Thompson, Carl Nielson, and Joseph E. Johnson, all taxpayers of Minnehaha county, personally, "and as a Tax Committee of Minnehaha County Farm Bureau," appeared and protested that the plaintiff's property had been undervalued by the assessor. The city equalization board made no change in the valuation, whereupon an appeal was taken by the above-named persons to the county board of equalization of Minnehaha county. The county board refused to make any change in the original assessment. Thereafter there was filed with division of taxation of the state "Exhibit B," which in words and figures is as follows:
There was also filed with the Division of Taxation an instrument, signed by the three men above named, asking that an investigation be made of the alleged undervaluation of the plaintiff's property and other property in Sioux Falls, by the division of taxation. Thereafter there was served upon the plaintiff a notice of hearing and order to show cause, setting forth that a hearing would be held in the courthouse, city of Sioux Falls, S. D., on the 11th day of August, 1931, at 3 o'clock p. m., and directing the plaintiff to show cause at such hearing why the assessment of her property should not be increased. The notice was signed "Division of Taxation, B. W. Baer, Director." The plaintiff appeared at the hearing, filed an objection to the jurisdiction of the division of taxation to raise her assessment, setting up that, should her assessment be raised as contemplated, it would be taking her property without due process of law, and submitted evidence to the effect that her property was not undervalued. The director of taxation made a further personal investigation and ordered the assessment of the structure on plaintiff's property increased to $22,000. By its order the division of taxation ordered the county auditor of Minnehaha county to correct the assessment records of his office for the year 1931 to the end that the assessed value of the structure on plaintiff's property will stand assessed and equalized at a value of $22,000. The case is here as an original proceeding upon a writ of certiorari issued by this court. The question for our determination is whether the increase of plaintiff's assessment was valid, under the facts above set out. Exceptionally well-prepared briefs have been submitted by counsel for both plaintiff and defendants. From a consideration of these briefs and the statutes of this state it is very apparent that there is no little confusion in our law with reference to the "State Tax Commission," "Board of Equalization," and "Division of Taxation," which should be clarified by legislative enactment.
The first question, necessary for our determination is: Was jurisdiction acquired to make the increase in the assessment, through the attempted appeal as set forth above? The statute authorizing an appeal from the county board of equalization to the state board of equalization is section 6734, Rev. Code 1919, which provides as follows: "Any person feeling aggrieved by the action of the county board of equalization relative to the assessment of his property may, within thirty days after the decision of such board, appeal to the tax commission as a board of equalization for a determination of such grievance; provided, nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent an appeal to the circuit court as provided in this chapter."
It is apparent from Exhibit B, the purported notice of appeal in this case, that there was no attempt to appeal from a decision of the county board with reference to any property of the purported appellants. The notice of appeal refers only to property owned by the plaintiff in this action. The statute only allows an appeal to any person feeling aggrieved relative to the assessment of "his property." There is no showing at what value appellant's property was assessed. So far as this record discloses, the purported appellants were perfectly satisfied with their own assessments; their only complaint was that this plaintiff was getting off too easy. The defendants here, however, take the position that a taxpayer is "aggrieved by the fact that other property of the same class is assessed at a lower comparative valuation than his own." That may be true, but there is no showing here what the comparative assessments were in Minnehaha county. Therefore, even under the contention of the defendants, there is no showing that the appellants to the state board were aggrieved in the assessment of their property. They (the appellants to the state board) are not complaining because of the assessment of their property. Had they complained because of the assessment of their property, an entirely different question would have been presented for our determination, should it then be contended that in the assessment of their property they were aggrieved because some one else was underassessed. Should the construction of the statute contended for by the defendants prevail there would be no good reason why a taxpayer in Lawrence county could not appeal from this decision of the Minnehaha county board the same as a taxpayer of Minnehaha county. True, the taxpayer in Lawrence county would be aggrieved only to the extent that state levies would be affected by the undervaluation of plaintiff's property, while a taxpayer of Minnehaha would be aggrieved to the extent that both state and county levies were affected, but the statute does not fix any degree of the extent a person must be aggrieved before he has the right of appeal. Further, the extent to which the taxpayer in Lawrence county or Minnehaha county would be aggrieved would be determined by the amount of property on which he paid taxes. We do not believe the construction of this appeal statute, as contended for by the defendants, is sound. There is no showing that the appellants were aggrieved in the assessment of their property. We therefore hold that no jurisdiction was acquired to increase this assessment by this attempted appeal. The defendants rely to some extent upon the case of Bagley Elevator Co. v. Butler, 24 S.D. 429, 123 N.W. 866, wherein this court held that a party whose property, though assessed at less than its value, is assessed much higher than that of other taxpayers, has only the remedy of asking that the value of other property be raised and not that his be lowered. Without affirming the correctness of the statement of the law as announced in that case, it is evident, under the construction we have herein placed upon the attempted appeal and the statute (section 6734, Rev. Code 1919), that the case is not helpful. In this connection it is also pointed out that the appellants to the state board, under section 6727, Rev. Code 1919, had their right of appeal from the decision of the county board to the circuit court, which right was saved for them in section 6734, Rev. Code, 1919.
No jurisdiction to increase this assessment having been acquired because of the attempted appeal, the next question which is presented is: Was there, under the facts presented, jurisdiction to increase the assessment independent of the appeal? Section 6735, Rev. Code 1919, provides as follows: "The tax commission shall have power to equalize the assessment of all property in this state between persons of the same assessment district, between cities, towns and townships of the same county, and between different counties of the state, and the property assessed by such commission in the first instance, such powers to be possessed by such commission regardless of any limitation of valuation."
Section 6736, Rev. Code 1919, chapter 105, Laws 1923 is in part as follows: ...
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