Beverly R. ex rel. E.R. v. Mt. Carmel Acad. of New Orleans, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-2924 |
| Parties | BEVERLY R., ON BEHALF OF her minor child, E.R., Plaintiff v. MT. CARMEL ACADEMY OF NEW ORLEANS, INC., Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Christopher F. Edmunds, Chris Edmunds Law Office, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiff.
Albert Kirk Gasperecz, Adrienne C. May, Shelly Spansel Howat, Adams & Reese, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant.
SECTION: "E" (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Mt. Carmel Academy of New Orleans, Inc. ("Mt. Carmel") to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.1
This Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")2 and Rehabilitation Act3 case arises from claims of discrimination against a prospective student with disabilities when she sought admission to Mt. Carmel Academy, a Catholic high school for young women in New Orleans.4
Mt. Carmel received a Paycheck Protection Program loan from the United States Small Business Administration ("SBA"),5 which obligated it to comply with federal discrimination regulations for the duration of the loan. SBA regulations provide that "recipients of financial assistance may not: (a) Discriminate with regard to goods, services, or accommodations offered or provided by the aided business or other enterprise, whether or not operated for profit, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, or national origin of a person, or fail or refuse to accept a person on a nonsegregated basis as a patient, student, visitor, guest, customer, passenger, or patron."6 Plaintiff alleges Mt. Carmel received the loan on April 16, 2020.7 Mt. Carmel does not dispute the accuracy of this date. Plaintiff alleges and Mt. Carmel agrees that the academy obtained full forgiveness of the loan on November 24, 2020.8
Plaintiff (sometimes identified herein as "E.R.") is a 13-year old girl living in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.9 Plaintiff alleges she has spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy
and periventricular leukomalacia.10 She primarily uses a wheelchair but can walk using a walker for brief periods.11 Mt. Carmel does not dispute any of these allegations.
On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff's mother registered E.R. for an orientation event at the academy and contacted the admissions office to discuss accommodations E.R. would need to attend the event.12 This led to a discussion between Plaintiff's mother and Mt. Carmel's admissions director, Jeanne Rachuba, about accommodations for her daughter's "day-to-day school activities."13 Plaintiff's mother alleges Rachuba dissuaded her daughter from applying to the academy. In a telephone conversation that day, Rachuba told Plaintiff's mother that E.R. would not be a "good fit."14 On that same day, Mt. Carmel's president, Sister Camille Anne Campbell, left Plaintiff's mother the following voice message:
This is Sister Camille Anne from Mount Carmel Academy. The Admissions Director asked me to give you a call about your daughter attending a function here. ... I do want to tell you that we do not have the capabilities of accepting your child. She just is precious—one day perhaps I will meet her. However, we don't have the accommodations, and I do think our academic program would be substantially difficult for her. Mount Carmel today is not the Mount Carmel you and I were in—the number of buildings we have, the number of floors in the building, so many things have changed. And I'm very sad to have to say this to you, but I do believe it's best for the child.15
The parties agree Plaintiff did not submit an application to Mt. Carmel Academy,16 and that the application deadline for the upcoming school year passed on December 15, 2020.17 Plaintiff alleges Mt. Carmel has a "general policy of not accepting students in wheelchairs."18 Plaintiff points to Mt. Carmel's non-discrimination policy on its website, which states "Mount Carmel Academy does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, national or ethnic origin in the administration of its educational policies" but makes no mention of discrimination against persons with disabilities.19 Mt. Carmel does not address these allegations. For the purposes of this motion, the allegation is deemed to be true.
Mt. Carmel invited Plaintiff to submit an application after this lawsuit was filed.20 Plaintiff does not dispute this fact, but argues it is immaterial posturing for the sake of the instant litigation.
The instant motion is a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.21 "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims."22 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.23 Under Rule 12(b)(1), "[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case."24 The burden of proof on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is on the party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction exists.25 In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction "a court may evaluate: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts."26
The Fifth Circuit has distinguished 12(b)(1) motions between "facial attacks" and "factual attacks:"
Simply stated, if the defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true. If those jurisdictional allegations are sufficient the complaint stands. If a defendant makes a "factual attack" upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, the defendant submits affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials. In the latter case a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction.27
In considering a 12(b)(1) challenge, "the district court must resolve disputed facts without giving a presumption of truthfulness to the plaintiff's allegations."28
Mt. Carmel challenges this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction based on three arguments: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing because she has not suffered an injury-in-fact as she did not submit an application for admission; (2) Plaintiff's claims are unripe because she did not submit an application for admission; and (3) Plaintiff's claims are moot because the admission application deadline has passed and the SBA loan has been forgiven.29 The justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness derive from Article III's "case or controversy" requirement.30 The Court considers the three jurisdictional arguments in turn.
Mt. Carmel argues Plaintiff failed to demonstrate she has suffered an injury-in-fact and therefore lacks constitutional standing to bring this suit because she did not submit an application to the academy.31 Plaintiff argues she is not required to show she submitted an application because to do so would have been a futile gesture.32
Constitutional standing stems from Article III, which gives federal courts authority to hear cases and controversies. If a plaintiff lacks constitutional standing, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.33 Constitutional standing "address[es] the question of whether a federal court may grant relief to any plaintiff given the claim asserted."34 The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" contains three elements: (1) an injury-in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.35 Mt. Carmel questions only the first element: injury-in-fact.36 The Supreme Court has explained an injury-in-fact requires a showing of "an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent , not conjectural or hypothetical."37
Generally, a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact once she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's alleged conduct. This may arise from a final, unfavorable outcome following an administrative process, such as an internal disciplinary review process resulting in discipline,38 an application process resulting in rejection,39 or a denial of a formal request.40 Mt. Carmel points to Vaeth v. United States , to argue that an application and rejection is necessary for there to be an injury-in-fact.41 In Vaeth , the plaintiff sought a grant award from the Department of Energy ("DOE") and completed two of the three necessary application phases. After the second phase, DOE routinely encouraged or discouraged applicants to proceed with their grant applications. Discouraged applicants could nonetheless proceed to phase three and a few of those discouraged applicants were still, in fact, awarded grants. DOE formally discouraged the plaintiff from proceeding. Instead of proceeding to phase three, the plaintiff filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims found the plaintiff fell "short of the concrete and particularized injury necessary to convey Article III standing" because "he chose to forego [sic ] the submission of a full application in the final, and requisite, phase of that program."42
Plaintiff argues she has standing, even though she did not submit an application to the academy, because to do so would have been a futile gesture. According to Plaintiff, Mt. Carmel's administrators have already informed Plaintiff they cannot accommodate her. Plaintiff argues her mother's conversation with Rachuba and the voicemail left...
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