Beverly v. GatesHudson
| Citation | 537 F.Supp.3d 862 |
| Decision Date | 06 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-1517 |
| Parties | Joyce A. BEVERLY, Plaintiff, v. GATESHUDSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Maynard M. Henry, Sr., Maynard M. Henry Sr., Attorney at Law PC, Fairfax, VA, for Plaintiff.
Dennis Danh Duc Chong, Carr Maloney PC, Washington, DC, for Defendants Gatehudson, Karen Loving.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion (Dkt 13) to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint (Dkt. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This dispute stems from a property management company's purported failure to accommodate a disabled resident, leading to her harm. Plaintiff Joyce Beverly is a retired 100% disabled veteran who leased an apartment managed by Virginia-based Defendant GatesHudson, Inc., for the lease term March 30, 2019 through March 29, 2020. Dkt. 1, at 2, ¶ 2.
When Ms. Beverly moved into the apartment, she was given "open" parking with no assigned spaces. Id. at 4, ¶ 13. A week later, she was hospitalized due to severe breathing difficulties. Id. ¶ 15. A short time after she was discharged from the hospital, on April 22, 2019, the apartment complex implemented an assigned parking system. Id. ¶ 16. Ms. Beverly was assigned a parking spot that was too far from the entrance of the apartment complex to accommodate her respiratory illness, which inhibits her ambulation. Id. ¶ 17. She met with the lease manager of the complex to request a spot reassignment based on her disability and offered to provide medical documentation. Id. However, the lease manager informed Ms. Beverly that the apartment complex would "not get into the business of reassigning spaces for anyone," even though "only 9 cars were parking on [Ms. Beverly's] garage level" and there were many spaces open. Id. Shortly after this conversation, Ms. Beverly was admitted to the hospital for her respiratory illness. Id. at 5, ¶ 18.
On May 24, 2019, Ms. Beverly submitted a typed letter by mail to the same lease manager requesting a new handicapped parking space close to an elevator. Id. ¶ 19. In this letter, Ms. Beverly "stated she was a 100% disabled veteran and does not breathe well outside." Id. She complained that the "space she was assigned was very far from all doors." Id. She did not receive a response, so she went to the Leasing Office. Id. ¶ 21. There, she was informed that the letter never arrived. Id. She was again denied a parking space reassignment by the lease manager.
In the ensuing months, Ms. Beverly was forced to check herself into the hospital on numerous occasions for breathing issues. Id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 18, 22, 24. Ms. Beverly attributes these hospitalizations, in part, to the location of her parking spot. See id. at 5, ¶ 18.
Ms. Beverly's issues with Defendants were not limited to her parking space assignment. "In or around August 2019," the Defendants’ failure to maintain the property resulted in animal waste accumulating in the indoor hallways outside Ms. Beverly's apartment, which further aggravated her respiratory issues. See id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 18, 24–25. The pet waste problem caused Ms. Beverly's health to deteriorate "to the point where she was afraid for her life," because "all her respiratory medication was increased to the maximum dosage, and every time she stepped foot into the building she was struck with breathing problems." Id. 26. As time passed, "she had severe chest pains and shortness of breath consistently." Id. She alleges that her Pulmonologist opined "that the enormous amount of triggers at [the apartment] would continue to cause irreversible damage to her lungs, and possibly death." Id. Ms. Beverly notified the lease manager of the pet waste issue at least as early as mid-August. Id. ¶ 25. The lease manager's response did not assuage Ms. Beverly's concerns, id. , so she "sent a notice [to vacate the property] through the resident portal" on September 1, 2019. Id. ¶ 26.
Ms. Beverly did not receive a reply to her notice to vacate through the resident portal, and the pet waste issues persisted. Id. at 6–7, at ¶¶ 27–28. A month later, on October 9, 2019, she "hand carried a letter to the Leasing Office and mailed a letter overnight to Defendants." Id. at 7, ¶ 28. Her messages notified Defendants that she was "moving because of serious concerns for her health that deteriorated significantly during her [residency]." Id. These messages apparently prodded Defendants into action; they offered to give Ms. Beverly a different parking spot if she stayed, and cleaned the carpet in front of her apartment for "the first and only time" since she moved into the complex. Id. ¶ 29.
Notwithstanding Defendants’ late stage efforts to remedy the situation, Ms. Beverly refused to stay, explaining to Defendants that she had "already made arrangements to move[.]" Id. This prompted an email from the lease manager, who stated that the pet issues "did not start until early September." Id. at 7–8, at ¶ 31. The lease manager also offered to "provide [Ms. Beverly] a parking space closer to the elevator." Id. at 7–8, at ¶ 31. Ms. Beverly did not respond positively to this proposal, so the lease manager's supervisor sent her an email, providing excuses for the parking and pet waste issues. Id. at 8, ¶ 32. Ms. Beverly remained resolute. Ultimately, the lease manager sent her a "Reasonable Accommodation Request" form and a "Notice to Vacate" form on October 21, 2019. Id. ¶ 33. Ms. Beverly "turned in [her] door key, mailbox key, parking sticker, and key fob" to Defendants on October 31, 2019, and moved. Id. ¶ 34.
On November 6, 2019, Ms. Beverly "received a Collection Notice for $10,726.28 from Hunter Warfield," a debt collection agency, "for the balance of the tenancy through March 29, 2020." Id. ¶ 35–36. That week, she returned to her former apartment, only to find it occupied. Id. at 8–9, ¶ 36. Thereafter, Ms. Beverly received more collections letters from Hunter Warfield with inconsistent amounts due and owing. Id. at 9, ¶ 37–38. None of these amounts matched her ledger with Defendants, which showed a credit of $18.42. Id. ¶ 38. Ms. Beverly informed Hunter Warfield that it was to direct any future communications to her attorney. Id. ¶ 39. Nonetheless, they continued to call her, informing her of her outstanding balance and threatening to turn her account over to the credit bureau if the balance was not paid. Id. On March 31, 2020, Ms. Beverly's attorney received a letter from Hunter Warfield showing a balance owed in the amount of $1,016.23. Id. ¶ 40. She then received an electronic credit report notifying her of derogatory information that was put on her credit history by Hunter Warfield on December 27, 2019. Id. at 10, ¶ 41.
Ms. Beverly filed a complaint against Defendants on December 9, 2020. Dkt. 1. After she amended her pleading, Dkt. 12, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 13, 2021. Dkt. 13. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a Court evaluates a Plaintiff's claims under Twombly - Iqbal ’s plausibility standard. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Under this standard, the Court accepts as true the Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations, and views the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-movant. T.G. Slater & Son, Inc. v. Donald P. and Patricia Brennan LLC , 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004). The Plaintiff must provide more than merely "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Rather, it must "allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, stating a claim that is plausible on its face, rather than merely conceivable." Vuyyuru v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 2016 WL 356087, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2016) (citing Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
Ms. Beverly asserts two federal claims and two Virginia tort claims.
Ms. Beverly first claims that Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2), by failing to reasonably accommodate her by refusing to provide handicap parking or clean common areas from animal waste. Dkt. 12, at 10, ¶ 42. FHA discrimination encompasses a "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). To state an FHA "failure to accommodate" claim, Ms. Beverly must plead facts that show that her requested accommodation was "(1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford [her] equal opportunity to use and enjoy [her] housing." Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland , 124 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1997).
Defendants defend against Ms. Beverly's FHA claim on two grounds.
First, they insist that Ms. Beverly has "not alleged facts sufficient to show that the alleged denial of an assigned parking space closer to the door was ‘necessary’ to afford here [sic] ‘equal opportunity to use and enjoy’ her apartment," because she (1) "does not allege that she dutifully and regularly parked in her assigned parking space," (2) "does not allege that Defendants enforced a policy of towing any cars that were not parked in their assigned spaces," (3) "does not explain why she could not park in a different parking space, her assigned space notwithstanding," and (4) "does not allege that Defendants ever towed her car, or anyone else's car, for parking in a parking spot other than the one assigned to them." Dkt. 14, at 4.
In support of this position, Defendants cite Doran v. Prince William County...
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