Beville v. Jones

• Citation: 11 S.W. 1128
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Decision Date: 28 May 1889
• Parties: BEVILLE <I>et al.</I> v. JONES.

11 S.W. 1128

BEVILLE et al. v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 28, 1889.

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from district court, Wise county.

Carswell, Bullock & Fuller, and Gordon & McMurray, for appellants. Mr. Ferguson and W. D. Gose, for appellee.

HOBBY, J.

This was a formal action of trespass to try title, brought by plaintiff, Mrs. Anna Jones, on April 24, 1885, against the defendants Clara Beville and her husband, R. M. Beville, to recover lot No. 1, in block 39, in the town of Decatur, Wise county. The only answer filed was a plea of not guilty. There is nothing in the plaintiff's petition, on the one hand, indicating upon what ground a recovery was sought, nor can it be inferred from the answer alone what defense was relied on to prevent a recovery. It is admitted by the parties that prior to October 1, 1879, the title to the lot was in the plaintiff. And it appears from the evidence that on that day a deed in proper form, duly acknowledged by the plaintiff, and recorded, was executed to defendant Clara Beville, the daughter of plaintiff, in consideration of love and the sum of one dollar. It further appears from the testimony that the purpose of the suit was to vacate and set aside this deed upon the ground of mental imbecility upon the part of plaintiff at the time of its execution, and that it was not read over and explained to plaintiff by the notary public certifying to the acknowledgment. In addition to the legal title, evidenced by the deed, it also appears from the testimony developed on the trial that defendants relied upon a ratification of the same by the conduct and declarations of plaintiff subsequent to its execution, in permitting and encouraging the erection of valuable improvements on the lot by them, and repeated admissions that she had conveyed the property as alleged. The facts in this case upon which the judgment was rendered vacating the deed were that in the summer of 1879 the plaintiff, who appears to have been advanced in years, lost her husband, and was much troubled in mind. She was at that time in bad health, and afflicted with what her physician testified was commonly known as "hippo," and "imagined she would die soon." "This condition continued for four or five months subsequent to the death of her husband, when she recovered, and has been in sound health since." She testified that in the fall of 1879 Newton, the notary public, brought a paper to her to sign, which he stated was a deed to Clara, (the defendant,) her daughter; and in response to her inquiry he informed her that the deed was all right. She did not know, however, that she was giving her place away. That the officer did not read or explain it to her. She was unable to read or write, and he held her hand that she might make her mark. She testifies also that defendant R. M. Beville, husband of her daughter, was loitering about the yard during the officer's interview with her, and left with him. It is shown by billls of exception that plaintiff was permitted to testify that in 1883 she stated to one Barnes and one Sewell that "Beville was speaking of selling the lot; that it was her property, and they could not sell it." And further, that Beville had often ordered her away, threatened to kick her out, and she was locked out one night, and remained in the street, etc. He had also thrown her furniture out of the house, and had told her that he and Newton were too sharp for her. Her declarations with reference to the lot, made in 1883 to Barnes and Sewell, were admitted over objections of the defendants, upon the ground that they were not binding on defendants, who were not present, and were the declarations of plaintiff. Her statement as to the treatment of her by defendants was objected to also, because it was immaterial and irrelevant. There are few principles of law more firmly settled than that the declarations or conclusions of the owner of the land after he has parted with the title and possession cannot be received to impeach or disparage the title of the vendee, and in the absence of the latter. Thompson v. Herring, 27 Tex. 282; Grooms v. Rust, Id. 231; Schmick v. Noel, 64 Tex. 406; Hamburg v. Wood, 66 Tex. 168. There are exceptions to this rule where the question of fraud or a fraudulent conspiracy constitutes an element in the case. But there is nothing in the present case which takes it out of the operation of the general rule.

The evidence with respect to the treatment of the plaintiff by defendant R. M. Beville was (as the case is presented in the record) inadmissible. If the suit had been instituted for, and appropriate allegations had sought, the cancellation of the conveyance upon the ground of false promises and deception upon the part of the defendants to provide a home for and kindly treat the plaintiff in consideration of the deed, which promises had been violated, and by reason of which she had been overreached and imposed upon, this, in connection with the alleged mental incapacity of the plaintiff, might have laid the foundation for the introduction of such testimony in support of these or kindred averments. But as far as we can ascertain from the proof, the grounds relied on to rescind the conveyance were the mental incapacity of the plaintiff at the time of the execution of the same. And, such being the case, it was obviously an inquiry not pertinent or germane, as to what may have been the treatment of plaintiff by defendant Beville subsequent to the deed, unless this treatment became an issue in the cause by reason of the fact that it constituted in part a consideration for the conveyance It not being shown that the deed was executed upon such consideration, it is clear that the facts testified to were irrelevant, and, being of that character, tending to excite indignation against defendants and sympathy for plaintiff, it was necessarily prejudicial to the former. The deed was in form a perfect legal conveyance to defendant Clara Beville, and it is not believed that the conduct detailed by the witness towards her of the grantee's husband, however reprehensible morally, not ratified by her and as to which she is not shown to have any knowledge or connection, could affect her legal rights. We do not think the evidence was admissible as the pleadings were formed.

These views apply also to the testimony of the witnesses R. H. Smith and Trenchard to the effect that they had heard R. M. Beville state to Mrs. Anna Jones, the plaintiff, that he and Newton "were too sharp for her," referring to the manner in which the deed was obtained, it is to...