Bevins v. Klinger

• Decision Date: 26 August 1966
• Docket Number: No. 20407.,20407.
• Citation: 365 F.2d 752
• Parties: George Thomas BEVINS, Appellant, v. John H. KLINGER, Warden, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

365 F.2d 752 (1966)

George Thomas BEVINS, Appellant, v. John H. KLINGER, Warden, Appellee.

No. 20407.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

July 22, 1966.

On Rehearing August 26, 1966.

George Thomas Bevins, Los Padres, Cal., in pro. per.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas Kerrigan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before MADDEN, Judge, United States Court of Claims, and BARNES and ELY, Circuit Judges.

BARNES, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, after conviction and appeal in the state courts.

Jurisdiction existed below pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and exists here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

Since this case has been placed on our calendar, appellant has requested leave, in writing, "to drop every other contention regarding my case and abandon my appeal excepting for the adjudication of the Habitual Criminal Act."¹

People v. Taylor, 155 Cal.App.2d 26, 317 P.2d 167 (1957), is the California State court decision on which appellant now desires to rest his appeal.² In support of assignment of error IV the appellant here points out that in Taylor, supra, where the defendant had admitted three prior felony convictions, two of which were foreign convictions, the court said (155 Cal.App.2d at 28, 317 P.2d at 170):

"Since there was no proof that the two prior foreign convictions meet the minimum requirements of the habitual criminal statute, the finding that defendant is an habitual offender cannot be permitted to stand. Although Taylor admitted having suffered the previous convictions as alleged in the information, this is not to be construed on the appeal as an admission that the two Oklahoma convictions are competent to support a finding that he is an habitual criminal within the meaning of section 644, subdivision (6)." (Notes omitted.)

Appellant then points to what he alleges is contrary language in People v. Gillette and Bevins, 171 Cal.App.2d 497, 506, 341 P.2d 398, 403 (1959), (wherein this defendant's conviction of robbery with a deadly weapon, a felony, was affirmed):

"When a defendant has admitted a prior conviction, there is no requirement that the prosecution produce evidence of the nature of the conviction."

These two statements of law are inconsistent on their face. But we must read the rest of each opinion; the facts on which such statements were based; and the law which each relied upon to establish the validity of their respective pronouncements.

We think appellant would agree that if, on his trial, he had admitted prior convictions, and further, had admitted that said convictions were for offenses enumerated in section 644 of the California Penal Code, then there would be no issue for the state to prove against him, and no obligation on the state to produce proof of the nature of the foreign convictions.

In Taylor, supra, the defendant admitted two convictions for burglary in Oklahoma in 1939 and 1941, and a similar conviction for burglary in California in 1947. The court in Taylor points out that the three convictions admitted did not prove three convictions coming within section 644(b) of the California Penal Code. The Taylor opinion went on (155 Cal.App.2d at 28, 317 P.2d at 169):

"In California, burglary is committed by the entry into certain specified structures `with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony * * *\'. Pen.Code, § 459. Under the Oklahoma statutes, first degree burglary is defined as the breaking and entering into the dwelling house of another in the nighttime `with intent to commit some crime therein.\' 21 Okl.St. Ann. § 1431 p. 563. The requisite intent for second degree burglary is an `intent to commit some crime\' (sections 1432 p. 567, 1433 p. 567, 1434 p. 568), except that second degree burglary may also be committed by breaking and entering into certain specified structures `with intent to steal therein or to commit any felony.\' 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 1435 p. 568. The information merely alleges that defendant was convicted in Oklahoma of `burglary, a felony\' in 1939 and 1941 and that he served prison terms on each conviction. The records of the Oklahoma convictions are not before us. It may well be that defendant was prosecuted under the statutes which permit a conviction of burglary for breaking and entering with intent to commit some misdemeanor other than petit theft, and we must presume on the appeal that he was convicted of the least offense. People v. Lohr, 28 Cal.App.2d 397, 399, 82 P.2d 615. See, also, People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 540, 169 P.2d 44." (Notes omitted.)

Justice Shinn (author of the opinion in Taylor) then followed with the statement quoted above by appellant (155 Cal. App.2d at 28, 317 P.2d 167), and pointed out that the case was required to be remanded for further proof of the nature of the convictions taking place under Oklahoma law.

As authority that there can be no waiver of the burden of proof resting on the prosecution, Justice Shinn cites and relies upon In re Pearson, 30 Cal.2d 871, 874, 186 P.2d 401 (1947), and cases cited.³ See also People v. Figuieredo, 146 Cal.App.2d 807, 304 P.2d 161 (1956).⁴

As authority that admission of the prior convictions is a waiver by defendant, relieving the prosecution from the burden of proving that they fall within California Penal Code § 644, Justice Fox (author of the opinion in People v. Gillette and Bevins, supra) cites People v. Herod, 112 Cal.App.2d 764, 766, 247 P.2d 127 (1952),⁵ People v. McConnell, 86 Cal.App.2d 578, 580, 195 P.2d 34 (1948),⁶ People v. Lyle, 21 Cal.App.2d 132, 68 P.2d 378 (1937).⁷

Justice Fox's opinion goes on to consider the Nebraska law as to burglary and the Iowa law as to receiving stolen property, and finds each a crime falling within California Penal Code § 644.⁸ This becomes the law of this case, and eliminates one of the two matters described in In re Pearson, supra (see italicized portion of note 3 supra), permitting relief to a prisoner through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Justice Fox was able, by a study of the Nebraska law of burglary, to determine that state had a burglary statute that fell within § 644 — Justice Shinn was not able to make the same finding with respect to the Oklahoma law of burglary in Taylor, supra.

Appellant thus has but one possibility left from his reliance on People v. Taylor, supra (based in turn on In re Pearson, supra), i. e., the presentation of satisfactory proof that as a matter of law the prior convictions were of crimes which did not meet the definition of an offense included in said § 644. This burden is on petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding; not on the prosecution, as it was at the trial until a waiver took place.

The same question petitioner now seeks to raise was raised on the appeal, and decided by Justice Fox adversely to petitioner's present assertions:

"Relying on People v. Morton, 41 Cal.2d 536, 261 P.2d 523, appellant points out that before his burglary conviction in Nebraska could properly be considered in adjudging him an habitual criminal the crime of burglary in Nebraska must have substantially the same elements as the crime of burglary in California. He argues that the elements of the crime are not the same in the two jurisdictions. But a comparison of the statutes defining burglary in the two states clearly refutes his argument. What has been said about appellant\'s burglary conviction in Nebraska applies generally to his conviction in Iowa for receiving stolen property. There can be no doubt that the trial court was entitled to take both of these admitted felonies into account in adjudging appellant an habitual criminal under Penal Code section 644." (People v. Gillette and Bevins, 171 Cal.App.2d at 506, 341 P. 2d at 403.)

We have attempted to examine any authority in California subsequent to both People v. Taylor, supra, and People v. Gillette and Bevins, supra. People v. Taylor, supra, has been cited but three times since 1957.⁹

At least one later case in California inferentially supports the legal theory that (a) when the previous offenses and convictions; (b) the courts where the convictions took place; (c) the dates of the judgments; and (d) the fact there were separate terms of punishment are all set forth, then the proof of all those facts by the defendant's admission proves the issue beyond a reasonable doubt, and removes any burden of proof therefor existing on the prosecution to go further in its proof.

"While we are not here concerned with the habitual criminal law (Pen. Code, § 644) and thus are not involved with the problem indicated in the quotation heretofore made from In re McVickers 29 C.2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946), still it is clear that, if the point had been appropriately raised in the trial court, the People would have been required to prove that appellant\'s conviction in Louisiana, for what that state denominated `manslaughter,\' could not have been for conduct which California did not punish as a felony, either under the same or under some other name. However, we think that a defendant, if he desires to question the felonious character of his prior offense, as tested by California law, must call that issue to the attention of the trial court, either at the time he is arraigned on the allegation of the prior conviction, or at the time of sentence. If, as here, he admits the prior felony as charged, he cannot thereafter object that proof was not made that the offense was a felony under California law. When he admits the prior felony conviction he does so for all purposes unless he qualifies the admission in some particular thereby putting the People to proof." People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 758-759, 39 Cal.Rptr. 11, 17 (1964). (Emphasis added.)

In People v. Gillette and Bevins, supra, a petition for rehearing was denied by the District Court...