Bewley Furniture Co., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 October 1973
• Docket Number: No. 53219,53219
• Parties: BEWLEY FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs Relators, Star Manufacturing Company et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 216

285 So.2d 216

BEWLEY FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs Relators Star Manufacturing Company et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. 53219.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 29, 1973.

Gordon E. Rountree, Frank M. Cook, Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, Shreveport, for Maryland Cas. Co. and others.

Charles B. Peatross, Wilkinson, Carmody & Peatross, Shreveport, for plaintiff-respondent Bewley Furniture Co., Inc.

Richard H. Switzer, Lunn, Irion, Switzer, Johnson & Salley, Shreveport, for Star Mfg. Co. and Home Indemnity Co.

Feist, Schober & Howell, James Fleet Howell, Shreveport, for Wesley D. Glassell, d/b/a W. D. Glassell Co.

Charles L. Mayer, Mayer & Smith, Shreveport, for U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

CALOGERO, Justice.

The case before us arose out of a suit by Bewley Furniture Company, Inc. (Bewley) against Paul C. and E. P. Mitchell Builders, Paul C. and E. P. Mitchell individually (collectively referred to as Mitchell), Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland), Wesley D. Glassell d/b/a W. D. Glassell Company (Glassell), United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (U.S.F. & G.), Star Manufacturing Company (Star) and Home Indemnity Company (Home). That suit, filed November 1, 1968, was for replacement of a defectively constructed roof and for damages allegedly resulting from leaks in the roof, of Bewley's new store and warehouse.

Bewley contracted with Mitchell for the construction of a large metal building to house its store and warehouse after a fire destroyed its original building. Mitchell contracted with Glassell as subcontractor to erect the building which Glassell (local representative of Star, a building components manufacturer and supplier) had designed with the help of Star's engineers. Star furnished the building components. Maryland provided a performance bond for Mitchell as general contractor (dated June 10, 1966) and later furnished a maintenance bond (for the period November 3, 1967 through November 3, 1968 inclusive). The building was completed in October of 1966 and Bewley began operations from it that November. Leaks appeared immediately after the building was occupied and continued despite numerous attempts to repair the roof.

Mitchell was sued as the general contractor on the project. Maryland was sued as Mitchell's surety. Glassell was sued as the subcontractor on the project in charge of erecting the building, as Bewley's project engineer and as a designer of the building.¹ U.S.F. & G. was sued as Glassell's insurer. Star was sued as the supplier of allegedly defective materials and as a designer of the building. Home was sued as Star's insurer.

The District Court rendered judgment in favor of U.S.F. & G. and Home sustaining their exceptions of prescription (of one year) and dismissing them from the suit. Judgment was awarded in favor of Bewley against Mitchell, his insurer Maryland, Glassell, and Star, in solido, in the sum of $44,699.00. Judgment was further awarded in favor of Bewley aaginst Mitchell, Glassell and Star, in solido, in the sum of $35,301.00. The trial court dismissed a third party demand by Mitchell and Maryland against Glassell, U.S.F. & G., Star and home.

The Court of Appeal, 271 So.2d 346 reversed in part and affirmed in part. It reversed the lower court judgment insofar as it sustained the prescription pleas of U.S.F. & G. and Home. It affirmed the $44,699.00 solidary judgment in favor of Bewley against Mitchell and Maryland, Glassell and Star. It reduced the second judgment in favor of Bewley from $35,301.00 to $35,000.00 and rendered that judgment solidarily against Mitchell, Glassell, and Star, and additionally against U.S.F. & G. and Home.

Writs were applied for by, and denied to, Bewley (No. 53,214 on our docket), 273 So.2d 839, Glassell (No. 53,221), 273 So.2d 839, U.S.F. & G. (No. 53,208), 273 So.2d 838, and Star and Home (No. 53,209), 273 So.2d 838. We granted the application of Maryland and Mitchell (No. 53,219), 273 So.2d 836, to consider the merit of their third party indemnity claim against Glassell, U.S.F. & G., Star and Home.

The Court of Appeal in their opinion noted that this third party demand had been rejected by the District Court and did not discuss it further. By affirming the trial court judgment in all particulars except as noted above, the Court of Appeal in effect affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the third party demand.²

We are first confronted with a question as to the scope of our present review. It is argued that we must first examine and affirm Bewley's basic judgments against the cast defendants before we may order indemnity in favor of certain of those defendants against others based upon those judgments. Bewley's right to the judgments and the defendants' liability on those judgments were matters which were denied review by this Court when we denied all of the writ applications except that of Mitchell and Maryland which protested only rejection of their third party indemnity claim.

The settled rule is that when this Court limits a writ of review to certain issues and denies it as to all others and/or when it grants a writ to only one of several applicants, the lower court judgment as to those issues denied review, and as to the claims of those applicants denied writs, are final and will not be reconsidered. As we stated in Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Company, 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151 (1971):

'Similarly, when (as here) both parties apply for review, this court's denial of the application of one constitutes its final determination upon the matters included therein. This court then will not pass a second time upon these matters at the hearing on the review granted through the application of the other party. Gastauer v. Gastauer, 152 La. 958, 94 So. 897 (1922).

'Under the present circumstances, therefore, our denial of the defendant's application for certiorari constitutes a final determination by us as to the issues presented therein.' 257 La. at 1001--1002, 245 So.2d at 153.

Thus for the purpose of our present review, we are only concerned with the question of indemnity possibly owed to Mitchell and Maryland by Glassell, U.S. & G., Star and Home.³ The right of Bewley to the judgments in its favor is final, as is the liability to Bewley of the several defendants, including Glassell, U.S.F. & G., Star and Home. The latter parties are also precluded from denying indemnity, on the basis of defenses which were raised by them against Bewley and as to which final unfavorable dispositions have been made in these proceedings.

U.S.F. & G. and Home urge in defense of the indemnity claim, one year prescription exceptions and insurance policy defenses. These same matters were urged in defense of Bewley's claim, and resolution of these issues unfavorably to U.S.F. & G. and Home are now final. Accordingly, we will not examine their merit in connection with this indemnity claim.

The causes of the roof's leaks have been established as inherent defects in design and faulty installation. The amount of damages, as to which there can be no further argument in these proceedings, is $44,699.00 (being coincidentally both the maximum amount of the Maryland maintenance bond and the determined cost of roof replacement) as well as $35,000.00 in consequential damages, representing $10,000.00 for loss of furniture, carpet and ceiling panels and $25,000.00 for reinsulating the interior of the roof.

Third party defendants have re-urged in this Court a defense pled in the District Court and not argued in brief or orally before the Court of Appeal, namely, that a March 3, 1967 release by Bewley of Glassell and U.S.F. & G. bars recovery of any character (including on the third party demands) from Glassell and from their solidary obligor, Star, and their respective insurers, U.S.F. & G and Home. The effect of that release and its bearing upon this litigations is not entirely clear from the record.⁴ While the reasons why the trial court and the Court of Appeal rejected this contention is not stated in the Courts' opinions, we need not and will not consider this question because of the finality of the judgments in this respect.

Turning now to the sole issue which is before us, namely the indemnity claim, Mitchell (the general contractor) and Maryland contend that Mitchell was not actually responsible for any of the defects and that they are thus entitled to indemnity from their subcontractor and supplier (third party defendants) who were actively at fault. It has long been held in Louisiana that a party not actually at fault, whose liability results from the faults of others, may recover by way of indemnity from such others. The cases have referred to this imposed liability variously as technical, constructive, vicarious and derivative. This indemnity, or recovery over, has been allowed a contractor from his subcontractor and/or supplier, so long as the exclusive fault producing liability has been that of such subcontractor and/or supplier. Appalachian Corporation v. Brooklyn Cooperage Company, 151 La. 41 91 So. 539 (1922); Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967); Joyner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 259 La. 660, 251 So.2d 166 (1971); Frees & Laine v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., Inc., 78 So.2d 187 (La.App.Orl.1955); Hunter v. Mayfield, 106 So.2d 330 (La.App.2d Cir. 1958); Pittman...