Bey v. Abrams, Case No.: 7:14-cv-02205-RDP

• Decision Date: 22 June 2015
• Docket Number: Case No.: 7:14-cv-02205-RDP
• Parties: FRESHUN FLOWERS BEY, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH ABRAMS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

FRESHUN FLOWERS BEY, Plaintiff,
v.
KENNETH ABRAMS, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 7:14-cv-02205-RDP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

June 22, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the court on the following motions: Defendants John Conger, Steven Westbrook, and Anthony Parker's (collectively "Defendant Officers") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17), filed February 17, 2015; Defendants Kenneth Abrams, Raymond Anderson, and Patrick Collard's (collectively "Defendant Sheriffs") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20); and Plaintiff's Motion for Judge's Rule (Doc. 28), filed April 23, 2015. The issues raised therein have been fully briefed by the parties and are now ripe for decision. (Docs. 23, 26, 27).

This case arises from the March 8, 2014, arrest and subsequent detainment of Plaintiff Freshun Flowers Bey. Essentially, Plaintiff brings two separate actions. First, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant Officers based upon his arrest at his home. Second, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant Sheriffs for abusive treatment during his subsequent detention at the Tuscaloosa County Jail. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has asserted numerous state and federal law claims. After careful review, the court finds Defendants' motions to dismiss are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

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I. Background ¹

Construed liberally, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) asserts the following causes of action in connection with his arrest and detention: Count One — state and federal law false arrest and false imprisonment claims against all Defendants (Doc. 13, ¶¶ 27-29); Count Two — Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims against Defendant Officers (id. at ¶¶ 30-37); Count Three — Fifth Amendment just compensation and due process claims against all Defendants (id. at ¶¶ 38-39); Count Four — Seventh Amendment excessive force claims against Defendant Sheriffs (id. at ¶¶ 40-41); Count Five — Eighth Amendment excessive bail claims against Defendant Officers and Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims against all Defendants (id. at ¶¶ 42-47); Count Six — state law assault and battery claims against Defendant Sheriffs (id. at ¶¶ 48-51); Count Seven — a generic 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim against Defendant Officers (id. at ¶¶ 52-56); Count Eight — claims for various unspecified human rights violations against Defendant Sheriffs (id. at ¶¶ 57-58); Count Nine — a state law negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against all Defendants (id. at

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¶¶ 59-63); and Count Ten — a claim for violation of the "Minimum Contact Doctrine" against Defendant Officers (id. at ¶¶ 64-65).²

On March 8, 2014, Defendant Officers, who were employed with the City of Northport, arrested Plaintiff Freshun Flowers Bey at his home at 1702 Martin Luther King Blvd. (Id. at ¶ 10; see also Doc. 13, Ex. A). Two police officers knocked loudly on his front door, and Plaintiff answered, "who is it?" (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13). Plaintiff alleges the officers yelled "open the fucking door." (Id. at ¶ 13). Plaintiff opened the door, and the officers stated they had an arrest warrant for "Tammie Smith," known by Plaintiff as Tammie Smith Bey ("Tammie" or "Tammie Smith Bey").³ (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15). Plaintiff claims he asked for the officers to identify themselves and to show him the warrant, but the Defendant Officers refused to do so. (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff then presented the officers with his and Tammie's "American National I.D.'s authenticated by the department of state." (Id. at ¶ 17). He contends that, without warning or explanation, Defendant Officers pulled Plaintiff out of his home and wrestled him to the ground. (Id. at ¶ 18).

On the other hand, Defendants Officers argue that "Plaintiff refused to allow the Police Officer Defendants to arrest Tammie Smith Bey, clearly present at the time, by closing the door on them and by repeatedly asserting they had no authority to detain her." (Doc. 17, at 7). Officer Westbrooks' Deposition and Charge Sheet, submitted as Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, confirms that Defendant Officers initiated contact with Plaintiff as he attempted to close his door. (See Doc. 13-4, at 6 ("Officers kept asking [Plaintiff] to tell Ms.

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Smith to come outside to serve her writ; however, [Plaintiff] refused and attempted to close the door. Officer Parker stopped the door from shutting and grabbed [Plaintiff] to put him into custody for Obstructing Governmental Operations.")).

Plaintiff and Tammie were then arrested by the Defendant Officers, and Plaintiff was taken to the Tuscaloosa County Jail, where Plaintiff was transferred into the custody of Defendant Sheriffs. (Id. at ¶ 18). While at the Tuscaloosa County Jail, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Sheriffs handcuffed Plaintiff and then tased, assaulted, and "tortured" him several times for refusing to give certain identifying information. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 41). Plaintiff alleges that due to this confrontation he suffered a torn tendon in his right shoulder, along with swelling in his knee, back, and wrist. (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 41). Plaintiff was incarcerated for three days and claims his bail was set at $25,000 dollars. (Id. at ¶ 24). Although Plaintiff was initially charged with resisting arrest and second degree assault, his charges were subsequently revised to allege that he resisted arrest and obstructed governmental operations. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26).

II. Standard of Review

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Still, the complaint must include enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon "labels and conclusions" or "naked assertion[s]" without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the

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complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' " the complaint must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A plausible claim for relief requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. After Iqbal, which applied the Twombly pleading standard in a civil rights/qualified immunity context, "there is no longer a 'heightened pleading' standard in 'cases governed by Rule 8(a)(2), including civil rights [cases]' under § 1983." Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010)). The Supreme Court has recently identified "two working principles" for a district court to use in applying the facial plausibility standard. First, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions when they are "couched as . . . factual allegation[s]." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679.

Application of the facial plausibility standard involves two steps. Under prong one, the court must determine the scope and nature of the factual allegations that are well-pleaded and assume their veracity; and under prong two, the court must proceed to determine the claim's plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is context specific and, to survive the motion,

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the allegations must permit the court based on its "judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. Id.

Nevertheless, "pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, "wildly implausible allegations in the complaint should not be taken to be true, but the court ought not penalize the litigant for linguistic imprecision in the more plausible allegations." Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2008).⁴

III. Discussion

Plaintiff has asserted a number of federal and state law claims against Defendant Officers...