Bey v. Ga. Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 14 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5:19-cv-00236-MTT-CHW |
| Parties | YUSUFU KUUMBA BEY, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently pending before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 62, 79). Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff's motion to cease and desist retaliation (Doc. 64), Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 65), and Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery (Doc. 69). For the reasons discussed herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motions (Docs. 64, 65) be DENIED, and that Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 62, 79) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Additionally, Plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. 69) is DENIED.
Plaintiff Yusufu Kuumba Bey, an inmate at Macon State Prison, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, [1] raising claims that Defendants violated his religious rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by refusing to allow Plaintiff to wear his hair in dreadlocks and by forcibly cutting off his dreadlocks. (Doc. 1, pp. 3- 5). Plaintiff also alleges that his transfer to Macon State Prison, and continued incarceration there, violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Eighth Amendment's protection from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.). The relevant facts are as follows.
On September 4, 2018, a riot began at Autry State Prison where Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. (Doc. 79-7, ¶ 7). Upon investigation, the warden found Plaintiff to be “a major participant in” the riot and deemed him “a threat to the safe and secure operation of the facility[.]” (Doc. 79-2, pp. 19-20). Plaintiff contests his involvement in the disturbance at Autry State Prison. By Plaintiff's account, he was not housed in the building where the riot occurred. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 79-1 pp. 10-12). Nevertheless, it was recommended that Plaintiff be placed in Tier II Administrative Segregation. (Doc. 79-2 p. 21). Plaintiff received a disciplinary report for his involvement in the riot and was transferred to Macon State Prison for Tier II placement on September 12, 2018. (Id. at 19, 22). Plaintiff denies having received this disciplinary report. (Doc. 79-1, p. 86).
Once Plaintiff arrived at Macon State Prison, Defendants Eadie Jefferson, and the unknown CERT Officers forced a fellow inmate to shave off Plaintiff's dreadlocks. (Doc. 1, p. 3; Doc. 79-1, pp. 51-53). When Plaintiff attempted to pick his “locks up off the floor because they[ are] not supposed to be on the ground[, ]” Defendants stopped him. (Doc. 79-1, p. 53). Plaintiff was then placed in a cell in Tier I, pending Tier II availability. (Doc. 79-3, p. 46). Plaintiff received the assignment memo for this placement on September 12, 2018, and made no comment during the hearing. (Id.) On September 14, 2018, Plaintiff moved to Tier II. (Id. at 49). Plaintiff again received the assignment memo for this placement and made no statement at the hearing review. (Id. at 49-50). Plaintiff appealed his placement on September 18, 2018, but his appeal was denied on September 24, 2018. (Id. at 51).
Plaintiff submitted a grievance on October 16, 2018, complaining that the forcible cutting off of his dreadlocks violated his religious rights as a Rastafarian. (Doc. 62-1, p. 41). On November 5, 2018, this grievance was denied based on the GDC's three-inch hair length policy. (Id. at 43). Although Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to appeal, the grievance form indicates an appeal was received on December 6, 2018. (Id. at 41).
Plaintiff also filed a grievance on December 12, 2018, claiming that he had been unlawfully placed in twenty-four-hour lockdown without access to outdoor recreation. (Id. at 50). On January 4, 2019, Plaintiff's grievance was denied because it contained more than one issue and was not the proper mechanism for challenging administrative segregation placement. (Id. at 51). Plaintiff appealed on January 14, 2019, and that appeal was denied on February 21, 2019. (Id. at 48-49).
On December 14, 2018, Plaintiff received his first 90-day assignment review hearing. (Doc. 79-3, p. 55). It was recommended that Plaintiff move “to a higher phase, Phase 2, due to improved behavior.” (Id.) Even so, Plaintiff appealed, again contesting his assignment in Tier II as unwarranted. (Id. at 56). The warden agreed with the recommendation to move Plaintiff to Phase 2, and denied Plaintiff's appeal. (Id.) On March 21, 2019, at his next 90-day review hearing, Plaintiff was recommended for transfer to Phase 3, based on his good behavior. (Doc. 79-3, p. 64). Plaintiff made no comment at the hearing, but rather appealed the recommendation. (Id. at 62). The warden upheld the recommendation to move Plaintiff to Phase 3. (Id.)
On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining that his Tier II placement was unlawful and violated his due process rights. (Doc. 62-1, p. 55). This grievance was denied on July 15, 2019, because Plaintiff did not follow the correct procedure for challenging housing assignments. (Id. at 56). Plaintiff filed an appeal on July 29, 2019, but that appeal was denied. (Id. at 53-54). Plaintiff submitted another grievance on June 21, 2019, complaining about the unsanitary conditions in the Tier II showers. (Id. at 60). Plaintiff's grievance was denied on July 17, 2019. (Id. at 61). Plaintiff appealed, but that appeal was denied. (Id. at 58-59).
On August 16, 2019, it was recommended that Plaintiff move to Tier I, to be monitored for thirty days, and then to the general population. (Doc. 79-3, p. 61). Plaintiff made no comment regarding this recommendation at the 90-day review hearing. (Id.) On October 2, 2019, Plaintiff returned to general population. (Doc. 79-1, pp. 119-20; Doc. 79-7, ¶ 77).
The parties have now filed cross motions for summary judgment. Defendants first moved for summary judgment based on exhaustion and Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Doc. 62). Plaintiff responded[2] and moved for summary judgment[3] against all Defendants. (Doc. 65). Defendants responded to Plaintiff's motion and further moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 79). Plaintiff timely responded to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 82). Plaintiff has also filed a motion to cease and desist (Doc. 64), and a motion to compel. (Doc. 69). Defendants have responded to both of Plaintiff's motions. (Docs. 72, 76).
Plaintiff has filed a motion to cease and desist, seeking to halt the alleged ongoing violations to his rights under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, due process clause, and Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 64, p. 1). To the extent the Court construes this motion as a request for a preliminary injunction, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion be DENIED.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2003). “The preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant ‘clearly carries the burden of persuasion' as to the four prerequisites.” U.S. v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974)). Plaintiff has failed to analyze the relevant legal standard. In denying his first preliminary injunction motion, the Court specifically advised Plaintiff to support a renewed “motion with specific citations to relevant evidence.” (Doc. 57, p. 2). Plaintiff's current motion fails to do so, and thus, he has failed to meet his burden under the preliminary injunction standard.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion to compel Defendants to (1) answer his second set of interrogatories, (2) produce documents relating to Plaintiff's involvement in the disturbance on September 4, 2018, and relating to Plaintiff's religious accommodation requests, and (3) pay Plaintiff the expenses incurred in moving to compel. (Doc. 69, p. 1). For three reasons, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
First Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is untimely. In accordance with the Court's scheduling order, the discovery period expired on October 5, 2020. (Doc. 57, p. 1). Plaintiff filed his motion to compel on October 7, 2020. (Doc. 69, p. 1). Plaintiff has provided no explanation for missing the Court's deadline and no explanation as to why he did not request an extension of the discovery period. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is untimely. See El-Saba v. Univ. of S. Alabama, 738 Fed.Appx. 640, 645 (11th Cir. 2018) (), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 942 (2019).
Second this Court does not entertain motions to compel absent a certificate that the movant first attempted to confer, in good faith, with the opposing parties to seek the requested information without court action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37; Local Rule 37. Plaintiff's motion is unaccompanied by such a certificate. The failure to do so provides the Court with another reason to deny Plaintiff's motion to compel. See Samadi v. Bank of America, N.A., 476 Fed.Appx. 819, 821 (...
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