Bey v. L.A. Sheriff Dep't
| Decision Date | 11 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 20-7458 VAP (PVC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | ZAYIN-ZARI BEY, Plaintiff, v. LOS ANGELES SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
On August 17, 2020, Plaintiff Zayin-Zari Bey ("Plaintiff"), a California resident proceeding pro se, constructively filed a civil complaint purportedly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ("Complaint," Dkt. No. 1). On August 26, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's application for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status. (Dkt. No. 5).
In civil actions where the plaintiff is proceeding IFP, Congress requires district courts to dismiss the complaint if the court determines that the complaint, or any portion thereof, (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons stated below, the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
According to caption of the Complaint and the list of Defendants, Plaintiff sues the "Los Angeles Sheriff's Department" [sic] ("LASD"), LASD Sheriff Alex Villanueva, Deputy Sheriffs Ronald Reynolds and D. Perez, and Captain of the LASD's Metrolink Bureau, Edward C. Wells. (Complaint at 1-2).1 Although every Defendant, like Plaintiff, is a citizen of California, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter. (Id. at 1, 4).
Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint and its many attachments are difficult to summarize in a coherent narrative and are largely nonsensical. The "Complaint" consists of a form "Demand for the Conversion of Property," (id. at 1-5), attached to which is a seemingly random collection of documents, including (1) two Notices of Lien, (id. at 6-7); (2) an "Affidavit of Truth" referencing "Bill of Attainder #AA742660," (id. at 8-11); (3) an "Affidavit of Obligation Commercial Lien," again referencing "Bill of Attainder #AA742660," with a "Certificate of Non-Response," (id. at 12-16); (4) a "Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure," (id. at 17-19); (5) a "Notice of Default," (id. at 20-22); (6) an "Affidavit of Facts; Notice of Motion for Speedy Trial by Jury" captioned for the Superior Court of California, San Bernardino County, (id. at 23-25); (7) an LASD Watch Commander's Service Comment Report, (id. at 26); (8) a letter from the Office of the Sheriff, County of Los Angeles, Hall of Justice, (id. at 27); (9) a Notice to Appear and arecord of Verbal Notice by Peace Officer, DMV or Court Employee, (id. at 28-29); (10) a cover sheet for "Exhibit A," with the subject "Contracts Given to Alleged Deputy at the time of the unlawful arrest, search and seizure on date 05/22/2020," (id. at 30); (11) a document from the so-called "Moorish National Republic Federal Government" purporting to convey a navigation right to the bearer and an exemption from traffic stops, with a table of fines due to the bearer for improper acts by authorities, (id. at 31-32); (12) an affidavit of Plaintiff Zayin-Zari Bey declaring that he has an unrestricted right of travel exempting him from compliance with the Vehicle Code, (id. at 33-36); (13) a Notice of Sale asserting rights due a property owner, (id. at 37-39); and (14) a proof of service. (Id. at 40). The vast majority of the attachments receive no mention or explanation in the Complaint.
The form Complaint itself, i.e., the "Demand for Conversion of Property," (Complaint at 1-5), is nearly devoid of facts. However, in the attachment entitled "Affidavit of Truth," Plaintiff asserts that on April 22, 2020, he was driving on a main street going about 25 mph. (Id. at 8). He noticed a black and white car approaching him from the rear with its "emergency lights" on. (Id.). When the car started getting too close to him from behind, Plaintiff felt he was in danger, turned his car into the driveway of a private property, and stopped his car. (Id.). The black and white car then stopped behind Plaintiff's vehicle. (Id.). An "alleged lawman," later identified as Deputy Reynolds, got out of the car and approached Plaintiff's car. The officer demanded to see Plaintiff's "papers." (Id.). Plaintiff gave Deputy Reynolds a "Charge Schedule, an Affidavit of Identity and Right to Travel, as well as a Purchase Agreement" for the vehicle. (Id.). Deputy Reynolds ignored those papers and demanded to see Plaintiff's picture ID. Plaintiff hesitated, but eventually handed over his "nationality card" under "duress and coercion" following Deputy Reynolds' promise that he would not tow Plaintiff's car. (Id. at 8-9).
Plaintiff asked to see Deputy Reynolds's supervisor, which "enraged" the Deputy. (Id. at 9). Deputy Reynolds also accused Plaintiff of "breaking some laws." (Id.). Soon after, "back up officers" arrived at the scene. (Id.). Plaintiff asked for the name of one of the officers. (Id.). Moments later, about 40 tactical "military units" surrounded his car, which frightened Plaintiff's "family member" who was inside his car. The "armed military soldiers" drew their guns at him. (Id.). Plaintiff was told to get out of his car by a "masked military soldier" or else have his window broken. (Id.). Plaintiff and his cousin, who was in the vehicle, were forced out of the car and placed in handcuffs in a police car. (Id.). Plaintiff claims the handcuffs caused him extreme pain. (Id.).
An officer approached Plaintiff and demanded that he "give him information in exchange for [his] guaranteed release from [the officer's] custody." (Id.). Plaintiff said that he wanted to exercise his right to remain silent. (Id.). The officer then became "very rough" with him and caused "serious damage" to his shoulder. (Id.). The officer also threatened to break Plaintiff's leg and tried to slam the door on it as it was hanging out of the police car. (Id.).
Deputy Perez approached Plaintiff with a "bill of attainder" and told him that it was "mandatory" that he sign it. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff claims that he signed it under duress while reserving "his right to contract." (Id.). After Plaintiff signed the "bill of attainder," Deputy Perez twisted Plaintiff's thumb until it was almost disfigured to produce a thumb print on the back of the bill. (Id.). The name "Charles Monroe," to which Plaintiff has a "right to trademark," was in the upper portion of the bill of attainder. (Id.). Deputy Perez told Plaintiff that he must pay money to the court because he signed the bill of attainder, although Plaintiff claims that he is not liable for any charges because he signed under duress. (Id.). Plaintiff also claims that he was damaged by the theft (or towing) of his private vehicle -- though it is not clear why, or even if, Plaintiff's car was actually towed. (Id.). After exchanging some words, the officers departed. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants deprived him of his "rights under color of law" for towing his car without due process in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, which also constituted an unlawful conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 1962. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated his rights under Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution and the Ninth and Thirteenth Amendments. (Id. at 14-15). Plaintiff seeks cumulative monetary damages in the amount of $26,537,000.00. (Id. at 5).
When screening a complaint to determine whether it states a claim upon which relief can be granted, courts apply the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Similarly, courts will not "accept any unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) (); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (). Pro se pleadings are "held to less stringent standards" than those drafted by a lawyer....
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