Bey v. Lybrand
| Decision Date | 08 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 2:19-cv-03297-BHH-MGB |
| Parties | Ronnell Demar Bey, Plaintiff, v. Erica G. Lybrand and PrimeLending A PlainsCapital Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Ronnell Demar Bey ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against Erica G. Lybrand ("Lybrand") and PrimeLending A PlainsCapital Company ("PrimeLending") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging various transgressions and violations in relation to the foreclosure and sale of certain property. This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 20, 23), and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint (Dkt. No. 46). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint (Dkt. No. 46) and recommends that the Court grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 20, 23) in their entirety.
By way of background, Plaintiff executed a note on June 27, 2014, agreeing to pay the principal sum of $188,522.00, plus 4.25% interest per annum, to the order of the lender, PrimeLending, by July 1, 2044 (the "Note"). (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 25-27.) The Note was secured by a mortgage agreement entered into by Plaintiff, which covered real property located at 412 Eastover Circle, Summerville, South Carolina, 29483 (the "Mortgage"). (Id. at 15-24.) The Mortgage was assigned to PrimeLending on April 2, 2015. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 4.)
On April 17, 2015, PrimeLending, by and through its counsel, Lybrand, filed a summons and complaint in the Berkley County Court of Common Pleas, South Carolina, alleging that Plaintiff breached his obligations under the Note and requesting foreclosure on the Mortgage.1 (See Dkt. No. 21-1.) The court issued a Judgement of Foreclosure and Sale on October 18, 2016, in which the Master in Equity found that Plaintiff was "in default of the terms of the Note and Mortgage . . . for non-payment of the amounts set forth [therein]" and liable for a final total debt of $228,591.53. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on October 31, 2016, with the South Carolina Court of Appeals, asserting that the Master in Equity improperly granted foreclosure without sufficient evidence; violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law; violated his civil rights by acting under the color of authority; and denied him the right to face his accuser. (Dkt. Nos. 21-2, 21-3.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the Judgement of Foreclosure and Sale on October 9, 2019, and remitted the case to the lower court on November 14, 2019. (Dkt. Nos. 21-3, 21-4.)
On December 16, 2019, PrimeLending filed an Amended Motion for Writ of Assistance with the Berkley County Court of Common Pleas, stating that Plaintiff had refused to vacate the premises despite the Judgement of Foreclosure and subsequent sale of the property on December 6, 2016. (Dkt. No. 21-5.) Plaintiff filed a response on January 20, 2020. (Dkt. No. 21-6.) The state court ultimately granted PrimeLending's motion and issued a Writ of Assistance on January 31, 2020, ordering that Plaintiff remove himself from the property. (Dkt. No. 21-7.)
On November 22, 2019, approximately one week after the South Carolina Court of Appeals issued the remitter in the state foreclosure action, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint with the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina against Defendants PrimeLending and Lybrand. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Although Plaintiff used the Court's standard pro se civil complaint form in initiating this federal action, he did not raise any substantive claims in the form itself; instead, his Complaint directs the Court to a compilation of supplemental documents attached thereto. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) Specifically, the attachments include: a copy of the Note and the Mortgage with handwritten notes in the margins; a letter dated April 25, 2016, addressed to Plaintiff and authored by a member of PrimeLending's legal counsel, discussing certain discovery requests in the state court action; a letter dated August 25, 2016, addressed to Plaintiff and authored by Defendant Lybrand, identifying PrimeLending's anticipated witness in the state court action; and several documents reflecting a purported administrative "Consumer Enforcement Action," initiated by Plaintiff on or around October 21, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 1-1.) According to these latter documents, it appears Plaintiff sent a series of notarized demands to Defendant Lybrand, as a representative ofPrimeLending, seeking $2,066,000 in damages for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA") as cited verbatim below:
(Id. at 11-13.) It seems that neither Lybrand nor PrimeLending responded to Plaintiff's "administrative" demands.2
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 20, 23)
Defendants filed respective Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on February 17, 2020, based on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendants as required under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Plaintiff's Complaint fails to satisfy the pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) Plaintiff's Complaint fails to specify Defendants' involvement in each of the alleged claims; (4) Plaintiff's Complaint does not assert a "substantial" federal claim; (5) Plaintiff's Complaint fails to establish that Defendants are considered "debt collectors" for purposes of the FDCPA; (6) any purported violations of the FDCPA or TILA are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; (7) the issue of Plaintiff's liability under the Mortgage and Note, as well as the resulting foreclosure, was decided at the state court level and is therefore barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (8) Defendant Lybrand is protected from suit under the doctrine of attorney immunity. (See Dkt. Nos. 21, 24.)
On February 18, 2020, the undersigned issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedure and the possibleconsequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 26, 27.) On March 16, 2020, Chief Judge Harwell issued a Standing Order extending all deadlines in civil cases by twenty-one days. (Dkt. No. 38.) On March 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to respond to the Motions to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 32.) The Court granted Plaintiff's request, citing Judge Harwell's Standing Order and giving Plaintiff until April 10, 2020, to file his response(s). (Dkt. No. 35.) Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss by the prescribed deadline, and the Court granted yet another extension allowing Plaintiff through April 30, 2020, to file his response(s). (Dkt. No. 41.)
On May 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed an "Amended Complaint and Response to Motion to Dismiss," alleging five general causes of action against Defendants. (Dkt. No. 46.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: (1) violations under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("SCUTPA");3 (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) violations of the FDCPA; (4) fraud; and (5) breach of contract.4 In addition to these five causes of action, Plaintiff's filing also offers the following "response" to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss:
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