Bfi Waste Servs. of Tex., LP v. City of Santa Rosa, Case No. 1:15-cv-059
| Decision Date | 26 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-059 |
| Parties | BFI WASTE SERVICES OF TEXAS, LP, D/B/A ALLIED WASTE SERVICES OF RIO GRANDE VALLEY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SANTA ROSA, TEXAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
The Court is in receipt of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff, BFI Waste Services of Texas, LP, D/B/A Allied Waste Services of Rio Grande Valley (hereinafter, "Allied"). Dkt. No. 26. For the reasons provided below, Allied's Motion is denied.
This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Allied initiated this action by filing its Complaint for Accelerated Declaratory Relief on April 6, 2015. Dkt. No. 1. Allied's Complaint seeks monetary relief, attorneys' fees, and accelerated declaratory judgment relief pursuant to the federalDeclaratory Judgment Act (hereinafter, "DJA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57. Id. at 4. The primary relief sought by Allied, however, is a declaratory judgment which states that it has a valid and enforceable contract with Defendant, City of Santa Rosa (hereinafter, "Santa Rosa"), to be the exclusive provider of solid waste collection and disposal services in Santa Rosa, through June 25, 2020. Id. at 9.
On April 22, 2015, Santa Rosa filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 5. In brief, Santa Rosa's Motion to Dismiss argued that the Court should dismiss this action because Santa Rosa is immune from suit in federal court pursuant to § 271.156 of the Texas Local Government Code. Id. at 2-3. Allied filed a Response to Santa Rosa's Motion to Dismiss on May 8, 2015. Dkt. No. 6. Allied argued that it may maintain a federal DJA action in this Court despite § 271.156. Id. As the parties' briefing left certain questions unanswered, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefing on several issues bearing upon Santa Rosa's alleged immunity from suit under § 271.156, prior to June 5, 2015. Dkt. No. 8.
On May 11, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Expedited Rule 16 Pretrial Conference and Scheduling of Expedited Final Hearing (hereinafter, "Joint Motion for Conference"). Dkt. No. 7. On May 21, 2015, Allied filed its first opposed Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. Dkt. No. 9. The Court denied this first Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint without prejudice to refiling, finding that the new claims contained in the proposed amended complaint were too vague, as drafted, to state a federal cause of action. Dkt. No. 10. The Court granted the JointMotion for Conference in part, setting a Rule 16 pretrial conference for June 9, 2015. Dkt. No. 13. The parties filed their supplemental briefing on the issue of Santa Rosa's alleged immunity on May 28th, May 29th, and June 5th, respectively. Dkt. Nos. 11, 12, and 14.
The Court held a Rule 16 pretrial conference on June 9, 2015. At the conference, the parties stated their joint wish for expedited consideration of this action pursuant to the DJA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57. The parties also indicated that they wished to consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings, through trial and judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The parties then submitted a signed Consent to Proceed Before a Magistrate Judge form. Dkt. No. 16. United States District Judge Andrew S. Hanen transferred this action to the undersigned for all further proceedings on June 9, 2015. Dkt. No. 18. The Court entered a scheduling order that same day, setting expedited deadlines per the parties' request, including a dispositive motion deadline of June 18, 2015, a response date of June 24, 2015, a final pretrial date of July 2, 2015, and a trial date of July 6, 2015. Dkt. No. 19.
Allied filed an opposed Second Motion for Leave to Amend on June 9, 2015. Dkt. No. 15. On June 10, 2015, the Court denied Allied's Second Motion for Leave to Amend without prejudice to refiling, again finding that Allied's proposed amended complaint was too vague, as drafted, to state a federal cause of action. Dkt. No. 20. The Court also denied Santa Rosa's Motion to Dismiss, finding thatSanta Rosa had failed to demonstrate that § 271.156 of the Texas Local Government Code provided it with immunity from suit in federal court. Dkt. No. 21.
On June 18, 2015, both parties filed timely Motions for Summary Judgment. Dkt. Nos. 25 and 26.1 The parties also filed timely responses to their opponent's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 24, 2015. Dkt. Nos. 27 and 28.
The standard applied when ruling on a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In pertinent part, Rule 56 provides that the court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id., see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (same). Mere allegations of a factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 requires that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).
A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Therefore, summary judgment is proper if, under governinglaws, there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. If reasonable finders of fact could resolve a factual issue in favor of either party, summary judgment should not be granted. Id. at 249.
The movant on a summary judgment motion bears the initial burden of providing the court with a legal basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to present affirmative evidence to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 257. All facts and inferences drawn from those facts must be viewed in the light favorable to the party resisting the motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
A. Allied's Arguments. Allied argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed facts show that it has a valid, enforceable contract with Santa Rosa to be the exclusive provider of solid waste collection and disposal services in Santa Rosa, through June 25, 2020. Dkt. No. 26 at 1. More specifically, Allied argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on "its anticipatory breach claim" because Santa Rosa has attempted to terminate its use of Allied's services, despite the fact that Allied's contract with Santa Rosa does not expire until June 25, 2020. Id. Allied asserts that it "is also entitled to obtain adeclaratory judgment that the parties extended the contract through June 25, 2020 because contract interpretation is a matter of law and no genuine issue of material fact exists." Id.
Allied supports its Motion for Summary Judgment with certain factual allegations (Dkt. No. 26 at 1-3) and a Separate Statement of Facts (hereinafter, "Separate Statement"). Dkt. No. 26-2. In relevant part, Allied describes these facts as follows.
1. Allied entered into a contract with Santa Rosa on June 15, 2010. The contract became effective on June 26, 2010. Pursuant to the contract, Allied agreed to provide Santa Rosa with solid waste collection and disposal services in exchange for payment at certain specified rates. The contract's initial term was five years, that is, from June 26, 2010 to June 25, 2015. Section 10.00 of the contract provided that the contract term would automatically renew at the end of the initial contract term, for an additional five years, unless Allied or Santa Rosa gave proper, timely notice of its intent to terminate the contract. Dkt. No. 16 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 26-2 at 1-2. Specifically, § 10.00 provided as follows:
2. The contract provided that it could be amended, but only upon written consent of Allied and Santa Rosa. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1. Pursuant to § 13.02 of the contract, Allied's rates would increase, based on the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"), on October 1st of each year. Before each CPI-based rate increase, Allied was required to send Santa Rosa a statement showing the predicted increase. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 10-11; Dkt. No. 26-2 at 2.
3. In September of 2013, Allied began transporting waste to the La Gloria Landfill because the landfill it had been using in Donna, Texas had reached capacity and was no longer available. Shipping waste to the La Gloria Landfill increased Allied's third-party transportation costs. In September or October of 2013, Santa Rosa "expressed concerns with the October 1, 2014 rate increase provided to Allied by § 13.02 of the Contract." Dkt. No. 26 at 2. On September 23, 2013, Allied's General Manager, Jon M. Deicla, sent a letter "Re: Contract Renewal/Disposal Site" to Santa Rosa's Mayor, Ruben Ochoa, Jr., (hereinafter referred to as "Deicla's letter")....
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