Bgha, LLC v. City of Universal City, Tex., 02-50220.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
| Citation | 340 F.3d 295 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-50220.,02-50220. |
| Parties | BGHA, LLC, doing business as Camelot, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF UNIVERSAL CITY, TEXAS, Floyd Bryant, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Police Chief, Wesley Becken, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Mayor, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2003 |
v.
CITY OF UNIVERSAL CITY, TEXAS, Floyd Bryant, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Police Chief, Wesley Becken, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Mayor, Defendants-Appellees.
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Jennifer Scott Riggs (argued), Hill, Gilstap, Adams & Graham, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lowell Frank Denton, George E. Hyde (argued), Denton, Navarro, Rocha & Bernal, San Antonio, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Scott Dean Bergthold (argued), Law Office of Scott D. Bergthold, Scottsdale, AZ, for Community Defense Counsel, Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and FALLON, District Judge.*
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
Out of concern over the adverse secondary effects sexually oriented businesses ("SOBs") were bringing to it and surrounding communities, the City of Universal City, Texas ("City") enacted SOB Ordinance 504 (the "Ordinance").1 The Ordinance imposes various licensing and zoning restrictions on SOBs. BGHA, L.L.C., doing business as Camelot, an operator of an adult cabaret in the City, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, the City's Police Chief Floyd Bryant, and the City's Mayor Wesley Becken (collectively, the "Defendants") seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court initially denied Camelot's request for a temporary restraining order. Upon the parties' consent, and consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 536(i), the case was assigned to a magistrate judge for all purposes, including trial and entry of judgment. The request for injunctive relief was mooted when Camelot combined its request for injunctive relief with a trial on the merits. The parties then filed cross
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motions for summary judgment. The magistrate judge granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Camelot's. Finding no constitutional violations, we affirm.
Camelot operates an adult cabaret in the City. The Ordinance defines an "adult cabaret" as a night club, bar, restaurant or similar commercial establishment which regularly features persons who appear in a state of nudity, live performances which are characterized by the exposure of specified anatomical areas and specified sexual activities, or films and other media which are characterized by the exposure of specified anatomical areas and specified sexual activities. Under the Ordinance, the owner of an adult entertainment business is required to obtain a license from the City. To obtain a license, an owner must demonstrate, among other things, that the business is in a permissible location. In that regard, the Ordinance requires that the adult entertainment establishment be located within a "specified zoning district" as set forth in the City Zoning Code, and not be situated (1) within five hundred feet of a church, school, daycare center or public park; (2) within three hundred feet of a boundary of a residential district or property line of a residential use; (3) or within one thousand feet of another license. Because Camelot is located within three hundred feet of a residential district, the City denied Camelot's application for a license. The City, however, allowed Camelot to operate as a non-conforming SOB for three years in order to permit the amortization of the investment in its business.
Nearing the expiration of its non-conforming use status, Camelot filed a request for a one-year exemption from the zoning restrictions. The City Council denied Camelot's request and its subsequent re-application for an adult cabaret license. Camelot continued to operate its business without a valid license and was issued over twenty citations by the City. Camelot filed suit arguing that it was not an adult entertainment establishment and that the Ordinance is unconstitutional. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Camelot is an adult entertainment establishment and that the Ordinance is constitutional. The magistrate judge dismissed the claims brought against Police Chief Floyd Bryant and Mayor Wesley Becken as duplicitive of the claims brought against the City. Camelot appeals the magistrate judge's finding that the Ordinance is constitutional.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. See Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record indicates "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Camelot argues that the Ordinance is an unconstitutional prior restraint (as applied) on its free speech. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991), a three-judge plurality of the Supreme Court held that an enactment banning public nudity, as applied to nude dancing, can be upheld as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation if it comports with the intermediate scrutiny test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672
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(1968).2 In O'Brien, the Supreme Court set out the four-part test as follows:
A Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 376-77, 88 S.Ct. 1673.3
On appeal, Camelot contests the magistrate judge's finding only with respect to the second element — that the...
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