Bhatt v. University of Vermont

• Decision Date: 30 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2007-038.,2007-038.
• Citation: 2008 VT 76,958 A.2d 637
• Parties: Dr. Rajan D. BHATT v. THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

958 A.2d 637

2008 VT 76

Dr. Rajan D. BHATT v. THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT.

No. 2007-038.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 30, 2008.

John L. Franco, Jr., Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeffrey J. Nolan and Amy M. McLaughlin of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.

DOOLEY, J.

¶ 1. Plaintiff Dr. Rajan Bhatt appeals from a decision of the Chittenden Superior Court, granting summary judgment to defendant The University of Vermont (the University) on plaintiff's claim that he was subjected to discrimination because of his disability. On appeal, plaintiff argues that: (1) the Vermont Public Accommodations Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 4500-4507 (VPAA), requires accommodation of disability-based misconduct not caused by drug or alcohol abuse; (2) the University did not adequately consider measures that might have accommodated plaintiff's disability; and (3) the court's conclusion that plaintiff posed a direct threat of harm was procedurally defective and not authorized under the statute. We affirm.

¶ 2. The facts of this case are entirely contained in a stipulation to which the parties agreed for the purpose of presenting defendant's motion for summary judgment. In the spring of 1999, when plaintiff was in his fourth year at the University's College of Medicine (the College), a faculty member discovered that plaintiff had falsified an evaluation for a pediatric-surgery rotation, falsely claiming to have completed such a rotation at another medical school. The College accordingly convened a hearing of the Committee on Fitness (the Committee) to review the accusations against plaintiff. The regulations applied by the Committee stated in pertinent part that "a student whose behavior is considered to render him/her unfit for a career in medicine may be dismissed at any time from the College of Medicine. Such behavior includes, but is not limited to, demonstrated poor judgment, lack of personal integrity, [or] lack of personal accountability."

¶ 3. During the bearing, plaintiff admitted that he had submitted a false evaluation but maintained that this was an isolated incident. In particular, plaintiff insisted that he had accurately represented his other qualifications, including the magna cum laude credential received from his undergraduate institution. In a decision dated April 1, 1999, the Committee informed plaintiff that, while his offense was severe enough to warrant dismissal, the Committee had chosen to impose less serious sanctions, including postponement of graduation, monitoring, and inclusion of the incident in plaintiff's record.

¶ 4. Later, however, the College discovered that plaintiff had also falsified evaluations for two other surgical rotations at other medical schools that he had never, in fact, completed. In addition, the College discovered that plaintiff had falsely represented that he had graduated magna cum laude from his undergraduate institution and had altered his diploma to support his misrepresentation. The Committee further discovered that, in the middle of the original hearing, plaintiff had phoned the admissions office of his undergraduate university and impersonated an employee of that institution in order to create the impression that he had graduated magna cum laude.

¶ 5. The College then convened a second hearing. At the hearing, plaintiff acknowledged having made the false representations of which he was accused but asserted that all of his misconduct was caused by Tourette's Syndrome and a related obsessive-behavior disorder from which he suffered. Plaintiff claimed that "stressors he endured during two particular University rotations triggered his behavior," incidents plaintiff now argues involved racially hostile remarks made by other students and faculty at the College.¹ Plaintiff provided expert testimony to establish the existence and nature of his disability² and argued, on the basis of that disability, that sanctions less severe than dismissal were proper.

¶ 6. Nonetheless, in a later decision dated May 13, 1999, the Committee voted to dismiss plaintiff from the University. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Dean of the College, John Frymoyer, M.D., who rejected that request on June 17, 1999. Dr. Frymoyer's written appeal decision stated in pertinent part:

Underlying your appeal is your statement that you have "Tourette's Syndrome with associated tics, impulsivity and obsessive compulsive disorders." ... For the purpose of argument only. I will assume you have a disability as defined by law and the disability includes uncontrollable impulsiveness and obsessive compulsive behaviors.

You provided no evidence that you requested an accommodation ... before [any] discoveries [of the fraud] .... Finally, although it was clear at the time of the first hearing on March 31, 1999 that you had been "caught" engaging in deceitful behaviors, and accordingly faced dismissal, you did not at that time assert that your behaviors had perhaps been caused by your disability. By failing ... to request an accommodation, you accepted any consequence, positive or negative, emanating from your actions.

. . . .

You argue the sanction against you should be something less than dismissal, because, again continuing the assumptions I have been making, your disability caused and/or contributed to your actions and should be viewed as a mitigating factor. There is no evidence the Committee failed to consider issues of disability and the testimony regarding Tourette's Syndrome, not all of which seems to support your contentions .... I would note that even assuming you have a disability, there is still sufficient evidence in the record to support dismissal rather than other sanctions. Deception, dishonesty and perpetration of fraud are absolutely unacceptable, irrespective of cause.

¶ 7. Plaintiff then began seeking treatment for his disability and contacted the Dean approximately six months later, providing the contact information of his treating physicians and requesting that the Dean speak to them about plaintiff's improved medical condition. The Dean directed plaintiff to reapply for admission to the University, and plaintiff duly did so in February 2000, requesting reinstatement to the class graduating in 2001 or transfer and advanced standing at the University. That request was denied in writing on June 26, 2000.

¶ 8. Thereafter, plaintiff continued pursuing a medical degree, this time at a Massachusetts branch of the University of St. Eustatius School of Medicine. Plaintiff completed those studies and entered into a residency program at The University of Arizona in 2003. However, because plaintiff's degree is not recognized in every state and limits where he can practice medicine, plaintiff instituted the present action in November 2004, seeking equitable relief, including the award of his degree or reinstatement to the College in order to obtain his degree.

¶ 9. In October 2006, when discovery was still ongoing, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) misconduct caused by a disability may be sanctioned under VPAA, even where the misconduct is unrelated to drug or alcohol abuse; and (2) plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" to attend the College and was not, therefore, entitled to the protections of VPAA. On December 22, 2006, the trial court granted defendant's motion. First, the court addressed whether plaintiff met the "essential eligibility requirements" reasonably imposed by the College. Relying on federal case law, the court reasoned that "medical schools are not required to alter their policies or programs in such a way as would compromise the integrity of their programs." The court bolstered this conclusion by emphasizing that the court should generally "defer to an academic institution's professional judgment of the competency required for award of an academic degree." The court thus concluded that plaintiff did not meet the essential eligibility requirements of the medical program:

The College, hospitals, and a student's patients must all be able to trust the student to ... maintain confidentiality, give candid advice, obey regulations regarding controlled substances, and be forthcoming, even if it means disclosing her own errors. We would defer to [the University's] judgment in imposing this graduation requirement even if we did not agree it was sound.

¶ 10. In the alternative, the court concluded, summary judgment against plaintiff was proper because the accommodation he requested would be "an `unreasonable' modification as a matter of law." This was so, the court stated, because granting plaintiff's requested relief "would undermine the justification for the privileges inherent in a medical degree."

¶ 11. Finally, the court concluded that summary judgment was proper because "plaintiff would put the public at a risk of harm." The court found reasonable the Dean's conclusion that plaintiff posed an unreasonable risk of harm to his patients and concluded that "VPAA will no more obligate [the University] to sanction [plaintiff's] care of patients than it would require a bus company to hire a blind driver." Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to defendant. This appeal followed.

¶ 12. Summary judgment is mandated where, after the relevant period for discovery, a party "`fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element' essential to his case on which he has the burden of proof at trial." Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 254-55, 565 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1989) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). We review an award of summary judgment de novo, construing all doubts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. In re Mayo Health Care, Inc., 2003 VT 69, ¶ 3, 175 Vt. 605, 830 A.2d 129 (mem.).

¶ 13. Plaintiff claims that the University's failure to readmit him as requested violated...