Bhattacharya v. The Bd. of Regents of Se. Mo. State Univ.

• Decision Date: 22 December 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-00043-MTS
• Parties: DR. SHAMIK BHATTACHARYA, PHD, Plaintiff, v. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF SOUTHEAST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

DR. SHAMIK BHATTACHARYA, PHD, Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF SOUTHEAST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00043-MTS

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division

December 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW T. SCHELP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. [11]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion in part and dismiss Plaintiff's claims arising under federal law. Since only claims arising under state law remain, the Court considers whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them and declines to do so. Therefore, the Court will dismiss those state law claims without prejudice and deny the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as to those claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Shamik Bhattacharya is^[1]a tenured professor of mechanical engineering at Southeast Missouri State University (“SEMO” or “the University”), a public university located in

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Cape Girardeau. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 174.020. He filed the instant action against a slew of SEMO-related Defendants: the University's Board of Regents,^[2] the President of the University Carlos Vargas, and several other additional University officials.^[3]Plaintiff alleges that he voiced his displeasure with the University's realignment of its engineering program, and, when he did, Defendants, in concert, “acted ruthlessly to crush his dissent.” Doc. [1] ¶ 6. The University took away his course load and, in its place, assigned Plaintiff to perform “minor clerical functions.” Id. ¶ 155. Eventually, Plaintiff says, the University began the process of terminating him and set a formal termination hearing.

In this action, Plaintiff asserts six counts against Defendants. Counts One, Two, and Three allege violations of the First Amendment actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Four alleges a violation of Plaintiff's “right to due process of law,” presumably under § 1983 as well.^[4] In Count Five, Plaintiff amalgamated a claim he dubs “violation of Missouri administrative law - arbitrary and capricious decision making; Article II, § 1 of the Missouri Constitution; and, federal procedural due process rights.” Finally, Count Six alleges a breach of contract claim or, in the

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alternative, anticipatory breach of contract related to Plaintiff's tenure contract, both presumably under Missouri common law.

Plaintiff initially sought a temporary restraining order to block the University from “proceeding with a disciplinary hearing scheduled to occur on April 13, 2022,” and from “continuing disciplinary proceedings against [him].” Doc. [3] at 1. The Court denied Plaintiff's request. Doc. [7]. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's action altogether under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For a pleading to state a claim for relief it must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The complaint must contain facts sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility” when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the “reasonable inference” that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court assumes all of a complaint's factual allegations are true and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989); Martin v. Iowa, 752 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2014). However, the Court “need not accept as true a plaintiff's conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Facts

Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in 2017, SEMO altered its departmental organization in an effort to increase enrollment at the University. It created an “engineering technology” program to prepare students for “industrial careers such as engineering.” Doc. [1] ¶ 5. Plaintiff, a tenured professor of mechanical engineering at SEMO, did not approve of the reorganization, and he made his disapproval known to others. Plaintiff asserts that the University has retaliated against him for voicing his disapproval of the reorganization. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the University has punished him for “three incidents” where he spoke negatively about the reorganization. Doc. [16] at 11.

The first incident stemmed from the assignment of lab space following SEMO's departmental reorganization. The University placed the Department of Chemistry and Physics in a single, newly constructed building with state-of-the-art labs and new equipment, but the University relegated the Department of Engineering and Technology “to a distant building that featured predominately lecture style classrooms with computers.” Id. ¶ 105. Worse still, Plaintiff and the other Department of Engineering and Technology professor faced the calamitous condition of being forced to perform research “in the same lab space as that assigned to students,” unlike the Department of Chemistry and Physics professors who “each had their own labs.” Id. ¶ 106. Since the Department of Chemistry and Physics professors are “predominately white,” and Plaintiff and the only other Department of Engineering and Technology professor “are Indian,” the “clear outcome was that the Indian professors would be expected to walk [five] minutes to and from their lab space to do their research in student labs, without any of the equipment needed” whereas the “white faculty” was “allowed to do their work on new equipment.” Id. ¶ 109-10. While

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complaining to a fellow faculty member in a conversation that was, “incidentally overheard by a student,” Plaintiff stated that the lab assignment was “fucking racist.” Id. ¶ 114-15. The University's Office of Institutional Equity and Diversity received a complaint against Plaintiff regarding this verbal exchange.^[5]Plaintiff alleges this verbal exchange “occurred in a context of a meaningful academic debate about the institutional motivations” for the departmental reorganization. Id. ¶ 120.

The second incident also stemmed from Plaintiff's discontent over lab assignments. This time, Plaintiff was assigned to a class in a lab that, the same day, served as lab for another professor's lecture. Plaintiff “could not fetch needed supplies from the Department of Physics stockroom” because it was “reserved for only ‘pure' science faculty.” Id. ¶ 120. Via an email to the professor, Plaintiff “protested” the professor's “failure to assist [Plaintiff] in providing even minimal assistance in setting up the equipment.” Id. ¶ 122. That professor forwarded Plaintiff's email to the rest of the faculty at the Department of Physics and Chemistry, and a second complaint was filed against Plaintiff with University officials. Plaintiff alleges that, “[i]n concert with the direction of the administration and their advice about creating a paper trail to rationalize the decision to terminate [him], this incident became the basis for the second complaint against [Plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 123.^[6]

The final event for which the University's administration “punishe[d]” Plaintiff was for what the University deemed a coarse interaction with a student-or, as Plaintiff puts it, “telling a

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student the truth.” Id. at 22. Plaintiff alleges that the University was “intentionally misleading” its students regarding its engineering programs. Id. ¶ 133. One day after a class, Plaintiff spoke with a group of students about engineering and the qualifications to become an engineer. After the discussion, one of the students approached Plaintiff, and Plaintiff told the student that SEMO's engineering technology program was “a diluted form of engineering,” and that people in the engineering technology program “should not self-identify themselves as engineers.” Id. ¶ 138. The student revealed to Plaintiff that the student “was having significant difficulties” in Plaintiff's course. Id. ¶ 139. As the student “complained,” as Plaintiff puts it, about the difficulty of the material, Plaintiff told the student that Plaintiff “would not dilute [the] course work,” and that “if [the student] couldn't do the work,” then the student “needed to drop the course.” Id. ¶ 140. Plaintiff asserts that “[f]or speaking this truth, SEMO escalated [its] attack on [him].” Id. ¶ 142.

The University's provost, Defendant Godard, sent Plaintiff a correspondence highlighting the complaints made against him regarding the three events discussed above. The letter notes that the provost had requested that a “departmental review committee” be convened “to determine [Plaintiff's] fitness to continue in [his] employment.” Id. ¶ 148. Plaintiff alleges, albeit just on “information and belief,” that the letter was “manufactured opposition to [Plaintiff's] dissent.” Id. ¶ 149. Plaintiff later received a letter from Defendant Vargas that stated that “several” of Plaintiff's “actions” showed that he had “neglected [his] professional responsibilities” owed to the University under his contract. Id. ¶ 151. A short time later, in December 2021, “a group of administrators” told Plaintiff that “he could resign and take a small...