Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 72-2138

• Decision Date: 26 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-2138,72-2139.,72-2138
• Citation: 483 F.2d 508
• Parties: Peter Joseph BIAGIARELLI, Appellant in No. 72-2139, v. Allyn R. SIELAFF, Commissioner of Corrections et al., Appellants in 72-2138.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

483 F.2d 508 (1973)

Peter Joseph BIAGIARELLI, Appellant in No. 72-2139, v. Allyn R. SIELAFF, Commissioner of Corrections et al., Appellants in 72-2138.

Nos. 72-2138, 72-2139.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued June 18, 1973.

Decided July 26, 1973.

Donetta W. Ambrose, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, Pa., Israel Packel, Atty. Gen., for appellant in No. 72-2138 and appellee in No. 72-2139.

Michael A. Donadee, Neighborhood Legal Services Assn., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee in No. 72-2138 and appellant in No. 72-2139.

Before VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge.

This is a civil rights action arising out of a complaint filed by a prisoner, Peter Biagiarelli, who is confined in the Western Pennsylvania Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh.¹ Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2201, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Biagiarelli alleges that he has been deprived of certain of his constitutional rights, in particular his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, by having been placed in segregated confinement without a due process hearing.² After hearing argument and testimony, the district court directed a declaratory judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff.³ After careful consideration, the record requires that the district court order be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff charged in his complaint that he was taken from his cell on October 19, 1971, without notice or warning, and placed in solitary confinement, where he remained until December 24, 1971.⁴ The prison authorities defended their action on the basis that they had received information that Biagiarelli was involved in a conspiracy to escape from prison and that an emergency situation existed which required prompt action. The district court included this finding in its opinion (349 F.Supp. at 914):

"The prison authorities presented evidence that an emergency situation existed on October 19, 1971. They were unable to give him any hearing because they had received information of a conspiracy for a prison break in which plaintiff was involved from reliable sources, to wit: the Chief of Police of the City of Pittsburgh. In their judgment this emergency situation justified placing the plaintiff in solitary immediately for reasons of security."

The defendants assert in their appeal that since Biagiarelli was placed in "administrative" segregation, as opposed to "punitive" segregation, he was not entitled to the minimal due process requirements set out by the district court. These included: (1) a written notice of charges; (2) a statement of the general nature of evidence supporting the charges; and (3) a hearing before a designated official where the prisoner has an opportunity to respond to charges. See note 3, supra.

The plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal contending that the opinion and order of the district court did not provide sufficient safeguards for a prisoner subject to isolation from the general prison population.⁵

In Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972), we were presented with the claim that "the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was abridged by the circumstances of their transfers from the general prison population to `segregation' or `punitive segregation.'" 465 F.2d at 184. In Gray we held that:

". . . the transfer of a prisoner from the general prison population to solitary confinement without either notice of the charges or a hearing6

"6. This is not to say, of course, that this notice or hearing must in all cases precede the transfer to solitary confinement; in some cases, as, for example, during a prison riot, notice and hearing must be delayed a reasonable period of time.

does not, absent unusual circumstances . . ., meet minimal due process requirements."

465 F.2d at 185.

The extent of the rights guaranteed to a state prisoner under the Fourteenth Amendment is not unlimited.⁶ As Judge Aldisert explained in Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970):

"To determine, with precision, those rights which follow an inmate into prison involves a process of weighing and balancing conflicting interests. The desire that there be a maximum opportunity for the exercise of rights and privileges may often collide with the practical necessities of managing and administering a complicated penal community. The task of striking the proper balance between these conflicting interests is generally within the competence of the prison authorities. Thus, the federal courts have been understandably reluctant to intervene in matters of state prison administration, recognizing that a wide latitude for judgment and discretion must be extended to prison officials."

This case presents an example of the "unusual circumstances" referred to in Gray. Here the prison authorities, in order to maintain control and to insure the continued security of the institution, were entitled to postpone notice of the charges, or the holding of a hearing for a reasonable period of time. See Gray, supra, 465 F.2d at 185 n.6. This was not the ordinary case of a prisoner being placed in administrative or punitive segregation^6a for disciplinary purposes,⁷ but the case of a prisoner alleged to have been involved in a conspiracy to escape from the prison.

We disagree with the district court's order establishing a per se rule that the placement of a prisoner in solitary confinement, whether punitive or administrative segregation according to the previous Pennsylvania terminology, without written notice of the charge, a statement of the general nature of the evidence, and a hearing, constitutes a constitutional deprivation. See United States ex rel. Arzonica v. Scheipe, et al., 474 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1973).

We are not prepared to hold that the due process clause requires the prison authorities to provide a prisoner with a statement of the evidence, which forms the basis for the removal of the prisoner from the general prison population.⁸ Even where the question is raised at the time of a criminal trial in the federal courts, the defendant generally is not entitled to have the prosecution furnish him with a detailed statement of the evidence the prosecution plans to use.⁹

Biagiarelli was only entitled to either written notice of the basis for his removal from the prison population and an opportunity to rebut the charge, or a hearing. When the notice reasonably should have been given, or the hearing held, depended on when the threat to the institution subsided, regardless of whether he was held in punitive or administrative segregation. It is not feasible for courts to adopt hard and fast rules that will apply to every institution, or to every situation that might arise within a particular institution. Emergency conditions may require prompt and decisive administrative actions, and what is reasonable must be measured against the urgency of the circumstance necessitating the action. See Arzonica, supra. This rule of reason involves the weighing and balancing of conflicting interests referred to in Gittlemacker v. Prasse, supra, 428 F.2d at p. 4. See United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1973).

Since the notice of appeal was filed on October 30, 1972, the Bureau of Correction in Pennsylvania has issued new guidelines for all state correctional facilities. See Administrative Directive, Bureau of Correction, BC-ADM 801 (Parts I, III and IV are set forth in the Appendix). These regulations, which took effect on November 1, 1972, reflect a careful effort to comport with this court's position in Gray and the district court should have an opportunity to consider them. It appears, however, that they do not provide for either notice of the charges or a hearing where administrative custody, which may continue for at least 30 days before an interview with the Program Review Committee, is involved, even though no threatened prison breach or similar emergency is present.

The district court's September 13, 1972, Final Decree and Declaratory Judgment will be vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of this opinion and Administrative Directive BC-ADM 801.

APPENDIX

_________ BC-ADM 801 _____ Administrative Directive _______ Subject Adjustment of Behavior ________ Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Justice Bureau of Correction ________

I. SCOPE AND PURPOSE

Institutional life shall be governed by standards of behavior designed to promote correctional objectives and to maintain the general welfare of the institutional community. The laws of this Commonwealth, the rules and regulations of the Bureau of Correction and of the institution are a part of the standards of behavior governing each institution.

Behavior which deviates from such standards shall be handled by staff in the manner prescribed by this directive. Such behavior shall be evaluated within the context of the total treatment plan of the individual, the effect of such behavior upon others and its consequences for the good order of the entire institution.

The methods used by staff shall be for the purpose of bringing about voluntary compliance with the standards prescribed. Sanctions shall be imposed only when necessary and in the degree necessary to regulate the unacceptable behavior.

* * * * * *

III. PROCEDURES

A. Behavior problems which may be resolved by immediate counseling, warning or verbal reprimand shall be dealt with accordingly by the staff person involved. More serious violations shall be the subject of a Misconduct Report.

B. The JBC-141 form (Misconduct Report) shall be changed in style to a three-sheet snap set, one copy of which must be given directly to the resident by the staff member who writes the Misconduct Report. No action on the Misconduct Report will be taken unless this is done. One copy shall be retained by the staff...