Biami v. Meisner
| Docket Number | 22-CV-544-JPS |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2023 |
| Parties | CHAZE BIAMI, Petitioner, v. WARDEN MICHAEL MEISNER, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
1
CHAZE BIAMI, Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN MICHAEL MEISNER, Respondent.
No. 22-CV-544-JPS
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
December 22, 2023
ORDER
J. P. STADTMUELLER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
1. INTRODUCTION
On May 5, 2022, Petitioner Chaze Biami (“Petitioner”) filed a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. This Court screened the petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases and ordered Petitioner to file an amended petition omitting a perceived unexhausted ground for relief. ECF No. 5 at 9-11. The Court then screened Petitioner's amended petition, ECF No. 6, understanding it as raising two grounds:
(1) [t]hat his due process rights were violated because his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made in violation of Wis.Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) or its federal equivalent; and
(2) [t]hat his counsel was ineffective regarding the nature of Petitioner's plea
ECF No. 8 at 2-3 (also setting briefing schedule).
Petitioner filed a brief in support of his amended petition. ECF No. 7. Respondent answered the amended petition in June 2023 and opposed it
in September 2023. ECF Nos. 13, 16.[1] This case is now ripe for a merits analysis. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will deny the amended § 2254 petition and dismiss this case with prejudice.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 The Facts Giving Rise to Petitioner's Criminal Case[2]
This § 2254 petition arises out of Petitioner's conviction in Milwaukee County Circuit Court Case No. 2016CF2689.[3] Petitioner pleaded no contest in that case to “three counts of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and three counts of second-degree reckless injury, each as a repeat offender” after he drunkenly drove the wrong way down a highway at a high speed and collided with an oncoming vehicle in June 2016.
2.2 Procedural Background
Petitioner's plea hearing before the Milwaukee County Circuit Court was held in December 2016. ECF No. 13-10. Attorney Michael Steinle (“Steinle”) represented Petitioner at that proceeding.
County prosecutor Francesco Mineo (“Mineo”) began by informing the court that Petitioner intended to “enter[] a plea to Count 1, 2, and 3, injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, great bodily harm as a repeater, as well as Count 7, 8, and 9, second-degree reckless injury as a repeater.” Id. at 2. He then clarified that “[t]he remaining counts w[ould] be dismissed as
read-in, as well as the other TR traffic matters.” Id. The State intended to recommend “full restitution for all victims, a global sentence of 20 years of initial confinement and ten years of extended supervision [in addition to] ¶ 24[-]month driver's license revocation, an ignition interlock device, as well as the mandatory AODA assessment.” Id. at 2-3. The State would recommend as conditions of supervised release “AODA treatment, random urine screens, absolute sobriety, no driving without a valid driver's license, and any other conditions the Court deems appropriate.” Id. at 3. The proceeding continued as follows:
The court: Mr. Biami, you got a total of 13 counts in front of me right now. The district attorney and your lawyer are telling me you are going to plead to six of them. The others will be dismiss[ed] and read-in, which means I can consider them at sentencing.
Once we go to the sentencing the district attorney is going to recommend that I sentence you to 30 years in prison, 20 years initial confinement, ten years extended supervision. You and your lawyer can argue for whatever you want. Do you understand the deal?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
The court: Do you understand that the maximum on Count 1 is a fine of up to $25,000, you could be put in prison for up to 18 and a half years, divided into 13 and a half initial confinement, and five years extended supervision. Do you understand the maximums in Count 1?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
The court: Those are the same maximums in Count 2 and Count 3. Do you understand that as well?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
The court: And with regard to Count 7, the maximum penalty is a fine of up to $25,000, and you could be put in prison for up to 18 and a half years, divided into-Strike that. It's 13 and a half initial confinement and five years extended supervision. The same is true for Counts 8 and 9. Do you understand those maximums?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
The court: Knowing all of that, including all of the maximums, what is your plea to the charge of injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle as a habitual criminal in Count 1? Guilty or not guilty?
Petitioner: No contest, sir.
The court: That's right. It is a no contest. The reason for the no contest, Mr. Steinle?
Steinle: Strictly for civil reasons, Judge. I explained it to him, and it is actually my legal advice to say no contest, but it is a guilty no contest-
The court: Yeah, I understand.
The court: Do you understand that when you plead no contest I accept what is true in the complaint and find you guilty of the six counts? Do you understand that?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Id. at 3-6. The court then recited each count individually, confirming that Petitioner's plea to each was no contest. Id. at 6. The court referred Petitioner to the “plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form.” Id. These forms included “attached jury instructions describing the elements of the crimes.” ECF No. 13-4 at 5, 6. The court confirmed that Petitioner signed these forms; that Steinle explained them to Petitioner; that Petitioner's responses in the forms were true and correct; and that Petitioner
understood that by signing them, he was pleading no contest to the charges. ECF No. 13-10 at 6-7. The court next confirmed that Steinle had “explain[ed] to [Petitioner] what the State has to prove in order for [the court] to find [him] guilty” and that Petitioner understood that he was giving up certain rights, including the right to be tried by a jury and to “have the State prove that [Petitioner] did these crimes by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 7-8.
The court then went on to describe the factual basis for the charges, including that Petitioner was driving while intoxicated at “almost twice the limit” and on a suspended license when he hit the victims' vehicle, severely injuring all three occupants. Id. at 8-9. The court then confirmed with Petitioner multiple times that he understood what the State “ha[s] to prove” with respect to the offenses to which Petitioner was pleading no contest. Id. at 9.
The court: So do you understand what they have to prove?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
The court: And do you understand that I am going to consider all of those facts that I just outlined, including the fact that, according to the State, that you caused great bodily harm to another human being, to three other human beings, in second-degree reckless injury. Do you understand what they have to prove and do you understand I am going to consider those facts? Yes or no?
Petitioner: Yes, sir.
Id. at 9-10. The court also conveyed that, notwithstanding the “deal between [Petitioner's] lawyer and the district attorney,” the court was “free to decide what to do with [him], and that could include the maximums.” Id. at 10.
The court confirmed that no one had “forced [Petitioner] to plead . . . no contest to these six charges,” that Petitioner was “entering into th[e] plea freely, voluntarily, intelligently, [and] with full understanding,” that Petitioner had not “used any alcohol or illegal drugs in the last 24 hours,” that Petitioner had had enough time to go over th[e] case with [his] lawyer,” that Petitioner was “satisfied that [he] ha[d] sufficiently discussed with [his] lawyer . . . the nature of the charges . . . and whether . . . there were any defenses to the[] charges,” and that Petitioner was “satisfied with the way that Mr. Steinle ha[d] been representing [him].” Id. at 10-13. Petitioner also confirmed that he was not “confused about anything that [he] was doing” with respect to his plea and that there was nothing “about what [he] [was] doing [at the proceeding] that [he] d[id]n't understand.” Id. at 13.
The court also confirmed separately with Steinle that Steinle “went over the elements of each offense” with Petitioner and that Steinle was satisfied that Petitioner “underst[ood] the elements and how they relate to his conduct.” Id. at 13-14. Accordingly, the court concluded that Petitioner had entered into the plea “freely, voluntarily, intelligently, [and] with full understanding of the nature of the charges” and “accept[ed] the plea,” “adjudg[ing] [Petitioner] guilty.” Id. at 15-16.
3. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON HABEAS
State criminal convictions are generally considered final. Review may be had in federal court only on limited grounds. To obtain habeas relief from a state conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)) requires the petitioner to show that the state court's decision on the merits of his constitutional claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). The burden of proof rests with the petitioner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). The relevant decision for this Court to review is that of the last state court to rule on the merits of the petitioner's claim. Charlton v. Davis, 439 F.3d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 2006).
A state-court decision runs contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [those] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the...
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