Bibbins v. State

• Citation: 696 P.2d 1300
• Decision Date: 20 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-67,84-67
• Parties: Kevin Joseph BIBBINS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 1300

696 P.2d 1300

Kevin Joseph BIBBINS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 84-67.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 20, 1985.

Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne; and K. Leslie Delk, Asst. Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Laramie, for appellant.

Kevin Joseph Bibbins, pro se.

A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Division John Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger Fransen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

This appeal is from the district court's denial of appellant's petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant contends that his constitutional rights were violated before his plea of guilty and at sentencing. The issue, according to appellant, is, "Whether the district court erred in dismissing on its face appellant's petition for post-conviction relief."

We will affirm.

On July 2, 1982, on the basis of a negotiated plea, appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. In exchange for this plea, another count of aggravated assault was dismissed. After a presentence report was received and a sentencing hearing, sentence was imposed September 9, 1982. Appellant was sentenced to not less than two years and not more than six years in the penitentiary. The court considered the sentence a "high maximum and relatively low minimum." On February 9, 1984, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief according to § 7-14-101, et seq., W.S.1977. On February 14, 1984, the district court filed an order denying appellant the relief prayed for in his petition. ¹

In appellant's pro se petition for post-conviction relief, he states:

" * * * [T]he defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial when these 2 court appointed public pretenders [sic] failed to adequately and competently to represent the defendant for the following reasons set out below * * *."

Appellant then lists 25 complaints against his court-appointed lawyers. ² Appellant also contends that he was

" * * * denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial, sentencing hearing when the prosecutor either by knowingly using such perjured testimony and or by knowingly using a perjured pre-sentence investigation report * * * or actively suppressing such evidence known to be exculpatory."

Appellant further claims that his plea of guilty was procured by fraud, coercion and was involuntary. He also lists seventeen separate provisions in the United States and Wyoming Constitutions that he maintains were violated. However, he does not explain in any way how these seventeen constitutional provisions were violated; he only reminds us of the rights protected.

The essence of appellant's petition is:

A. His plea of guilty was induced by fraud, and coercion and was not voluntarily made.

B. The prosecutor used perjured testimony and/or a perjured presentence investigation report and suppressed exculpatory evidence.

C. Inadequate court-appointed counsel resulted in a denial of a fair and impartial trial.

Section 7-14-101, W.S.1977, provides in part:

"Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute proceedings under this act [§§ 7-14-101 to 7-14-108]. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition verified by affidavit. * * * The clerk shall docket the petition upon his receipt thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention of the court. * * * "

Section 7-14-106, W.S.1977, provides:

"The court may receive proof by affidavits, deposition, oral testimony, or other evidence. In its discretion the court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing. If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as may be necessary and proper."

Appellant complains that five days after the petition was filed, the court dismissed it. He concludes from the court's disposition that "the court's action can only be classified as either a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or a judgment on the pleadings." The record does not support appellant's characterization of the court's disposition of his petition. The court recited in its order that it had inquired into the matter, found no legal basis for the motion (petition) and denied the motion (petition)--not dismissed it.

We conclude from the recitation in the trial court's order of denial that the court did more than deny the petition on its face. We must assume that the court's inquiry included an examination of the court file. The file contained the arraignment, change of plea, sentencing hearing, and the innumerable materials referred to in footnote 1.

The post-conviction procedure set out in §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108, W.S.1977, does not mandate a formal hearing nor does it require that a petitioner be brought back into court for a hearing. Whether a formal hearing is held or a petitioner is brought personally before the court seems to depend on the circumstances of each case. Whether oral testimony, depositions, affidavits or other evidence is produced, likewise depends on the circumstances of each case. Here, the trial court acted on the petition before it, considering only the court file. It was apparently determined from the court file that there was no legal basis for the petition. We cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong.

In Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711, 715 (1971), we said:

" * * * Before a person is entitled to an evidentiary hearing he must present initially a substantial claim, and some specificity is required. An application is properly denied without a hearing where it states only bald legal conclusions with no supporting factual allegations. [Citation.] Here there were no factual allegations supporting the contention which was in conclusory form. The law does not grant an absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on the application. [Citations.]"

In this case the allegations in appellant's petition consist principally of bald legal conclusions sans specificity.

A.

Appellant contends that his "plea of guilty was produced fraudulently, coercively and involuntarily." This accusation is an unwarranted conclusion, and lacks specificity, but more significantly, flies in the face of the record. On July 2, 1982, at the change-of-plea hearing, the record reveals the following:

"THE COURT: * * * [D]o you make this plea under any threat or any coercion?

"THE DEFENDANT: I make it voluntarily, Your Honor."

The trial court was abundantly justified in determining that there was no merit to appellant's claim that his guilty plea was obtained improperly.

B.

Appellant contends that the prosecutor used perjured testimony and/or a perjured presentence investigation report. Alternatively, appellant says the prosecutor actively suppressed evidence known to be exculpatory. We have difficulty identifying the "testimony" that appellant alludes to.

" * * * 'Testimony' is a particular kind or species of evidence, namely, that which comes to the tribunal through living witnesses speaking under oath or affirmation in the presence of the tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial. [Citations.]" State v. Ricci, 107 R.I. 582, 268 A.2d 692, 697 (1970).

" * * * [F]requently the word 'testimony' and 'evidence' are used synonymously, although technically the word 'testimony' has a more limited meaning than the word 'evidence.' * * * " Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Company, 73 Wyo. 287, 278 P.2d 605, 615 (1955).

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel argued the case to the court, but neither produced testimony or introduced evidence. The nearest thing to testimony produced at the hearing was from the mouth of the appellant. The court invited, nay urged, appellant to tell the court anything and everything he desired. Appellant addressed the court at length. He characterized his case as one of self-defense and related some of the circumstances. However, he did not recant on his guilty plea nor did he say he was not guilty. In fact, he said twice that he was wrong in what he did.

In his address to the court, appellant did not disagree with the information in the presentence investigation report which recited that he had been convicted of (1) "kidnap, assault with intent to rape, assault with intent to murder" in November, 1976; (2) "assault with a deadly weapon" in March, 1978; and (3) also juvenile offenses.

As nearly as we can tell, the alleged perjured testimony that appellant alludes to was the presentence investigation report which was placed in the court file eighteen days before the sentencing hearing. We say this because when appellant addressed the court at the sentencing hearing, he disputed the prosecutor's characterization of some of the information in the report. Specifically, appellant was wroth because his association with a woman was not recognized as a common-law marriage. Also, he was in disagreement with the prosecutor regarding his status as a parolee from California, and claims that whether he absconded from parole in California or whether he had permission to leave California affected the severity of his sentence. In view of the serious nature of the offense to which appellant pled guilty and his prior criminal convictions, it is inconceivable that this made any difference in his sentence.

If there was something other than the two matters we have...